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IMPROVEMENT AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE VILLAGE LEVEL CHANGE AGENT IN CHINA AND INDIA

by

© DAVID C. STOTT

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Improvement and Reform: A Comparative Study of the Village Level Change Agent in China and India" submitted by David C. Stott in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Community Development.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis concerns itself with the role of local level change agents in the introduction of innovations, material and non-material, in the developing nations of the world. In particular, two types of change agent are singled out for consideration: 1) the village level worker such as was developed in India, Pakistan and the Philippines; and 2) the village revolutionary cadre, such as is found in China, Vietnam, and North Korea. Basic emphasis is placed on the village level workers of India and the village cadres of China because of the preeminent position which the two hold as prototypes of two important sorts of change agent.

The two types of change agent are compared in a number of respects in terms of the history of their development, the philosophies and change orientations of the change agencies which use them, their recruitment and selection, training, and the various methods and techniques used by each, together with an analysis of their work in the field. Ultimately, their merit as change agents is judged by their contributions to achieving the stated goals, as well as the understood goals, of the change agencies and client systems for which they work. The common stated goal in both cases has been articulated as the attainment of a fuller, more satisfying life for most, if not all, of the people with whom they are concerned.

Close and prolonged inspection of these two types of change agent reveals that both are extensions of the two systems and processes

which propel the development of their two societies. In this frame of reference, the comparisons and contrasts between the two become many and varied. Nonetheless, the predominant factor which becomes evident is that village level workers represent and further the interests of a hierarchical, capitalistically-based form of development; whereas village revolutionary cadres further the interests of a more egalitarian, socialistic form of development. Hierarchically structured change systems produce hierarchical development, whereas egalitarian-oriented systems produce more egalitarian development. In this structure, the village cadre serves the interests of most, if not all, of the people, while the village level worker serves the interests of the wealthy and the well-to-do.

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CHAPTER I

REVOLUTIONARY CADRES AND VILLAGE LEVEL WORKERS: AN INTRODUCTION

Since humans first began forming into societies and nations, mankind has experienced divisions between those that are more developed and those that are less developed.[1] It is, however, only within the last twenty-five to thirty years that these divisions have come to have recognizably world-wide dimensions. Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of books and essays have been written describing or analyzing this division in terms of richer and poorer, more industrialized and less industrialized, more and less educated, and so on.

From such comparisons, two conclusions have become increasingly evident: 1) that the richer, more developed states have, at least until very recently, continued to grow wealthier, while the poorer, less developed states, for the most part, have either not grown much richer or have actually experienced a decline in the living standards of their people;[2] and 2) that while this division between living conditions in richer and poorer nations continues to grow, the nations themselves continue to grow closer together with regard to interlinkages and interdependencies. It is, therefore, understandable why the resolution of these inequalities has increasingly become a preoccupation, not only of many in the less developed regions of the world, but of almost equally large numbers of people in the more developed states.

---

[1] By "more developed," we mean those peoples who have exploited their resources, material, non-material, or both, more fully than those "less developed" who have not exploited their resources to the same extent. Thus we are dealing with relative, rather than absolute, states of being.

[2] See for example, Barbara Ward's The Rich Nations and The Poor Nations or Pierre Jalée's The Pillage of the Third World.

This concern on the part of those in wealthier states need not necessarily smack of "charity" or "noblesse oblige." For many it is more a matter of self-interest or "Realpolitik." There is a good reason for this - for that wealthy minority of the human race who lives in the wealthier states of the world can ill afford to ignore the concerns of the poorer majority, for this majority of mankind comes closer to them day by day and the rich become increasingly dependant upon them, particularly for their resources. Thus the necessity of redressing these inequalities has become the legitimate concern of people from all walks of life in all parts of the world. Furthermore, if humanity is to survive in the years ahead, this must become the concern of millions more. What follows on these pages, then, is part of this writer's expression of that concern.

In the course of examining the efforts of the poorer nations at redressing these inequalities, it has been this writer's perception that two types of efforts can be roughly distinguished. The first may be seen as the attempts of poorer nations to wrest certain concessions from richer nations by means of such things as trade agreements (witness the recent efforts of certain underdeveloped countries to raise the prices for non-renewable resources, such as gas and oil), foreign aid and credits, or wars.[1] The other type of effort might be expressed as efforts at internal development. In developing countries, where fifty per cent to ninety per cent of the population is ordinarily found in rural rather than urban areas, a major part of this effort will generally be devoted to rural development.

The Problem of Rural Development and the Rural Change Agent

Transforming and modernizing traditionally oriented rural societies is no easy task. Almost without number are the rural development programs and projects which have either achieved very few of their stated objectives or have actually caused more difficulties than benefits for the people whose cause they espouse. In a world where more than one out of every two people live in underdeveloped, rural areas, we can ill afford to neglect or overlook this problem.

Why have so many presumably well-intended programs and projects failed so miserably? This is one of the chief questions which will be considered in this work, i.e., how and why have certain types of efforts failed to effect the sort of development they desired, while others have experienced considerably more success in achieving their objectives? Our particular unit for this analysis is what we will henceforth refer to as "the rural change agent."

What, in fact, does this term mean? Garth Jones has described the change agent role as follows:

---

[1] It is worth noting, for instance, that almost all of the major conflicts since 1945 have either been between wealthy nations and poor nations, or between two different poor nations, but not between two wealthy nations. Many, if not most, of these conflicts seem to have been aimed at the redressing of inequalities.

> A change agent functions as an agent (helper, doer, mover) employed by the client system [or, more often, the external change agency] to assist in achieving improved organizational performance. This agent may take the form of a person, a group, or an organization.
>
> The emphasis of a change agent is upon planned and deliberate intervention into the processes of change in and around the client system.
>
> The literature on change suggests that change agents. . . may be involved in three fundamental aspects of planned organizational change. First, they attempt to identify and clarify the goals of change for the client system. Second, they develop useful strategies and tactics to help client systems solve their own problems. Third, they establish and maintain appropriate working relationships between the parties engaged in the change. (Jones, 1968, pp. 15-19)

The Village Level Worker and the Village Cadre

Regrettably, it is not possible to examine all the various types of rural change agents currently operating in the rural areas of all developing countries. To do so would doubtless require an entire team of researchers working for several years at a stretch. Accordingly, this writer has restricted himself to examining two basic types of change agents which have been operating on a wide scale in two of the largest, most important developing countries. The two basic types examined here will be the Village Level Worker (or V.L.W.) of India and the village cadre of the People's Republic of China.

In addition to the fact that these two types of change agents are creations of the world's two largest developing countries, I have chosen to research them for two other reasons: 1) both have performed key functions in the introduction of village level development in the countries in which they have operated; and 2) both have applied themselves in similar contexts but in startlingly different manners and with considerably different effects.

This does not, however, mean that our analysis will be restricted entirely to these two countries. While it was India that developed and refined the concept of 'village level worker' as change agent and China that refined the concept of 'village cadre' as change agent, both types of change agent have been used fairly extensively in other developing countries. From time to time, the use of village level worker-type change agents in Pakistan and the Philippines and village cadre-type change agents in North and South Vietnam will be referred to for comparative purposes.

Objectives

In essence, then, the chief objective of this thesis may be expressed as follows: to critically examine two of the more widely utilized types of rural change agents in order to better understand two major alternative strategies open to change agencies and their agents and to assess their relative merits.

In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to examine a number of different aspects of change agent functions in both cases. Accordingly, the subtopics dealt with in each case will include: 1) a short history of the development of both Chinese village cadres and Indian V.L.W's; 2) the philosophy and basic change orientation of the change agencies utilizing the two types of change agents; 3) the recruitment and selection procedures used in both cases; 4) the types of training each receives prior to entering the field, as well as follow-up training; 5) the methods and techniques used by each in introducing changes of various types; 6) various "internal" assessments and evaluations of the effects of change agent efforts in each case[1]; and 7) various external assessments by authorities and experts from outside the system itself.

The Analytical Approach Used

The approach taken in analysing our subjects is basically very simple and is composed of three steps: 1) change agent philosophy and objectives as they have been expressed by the change agency. Further on, this writer will attempt to indicate how these roles and objectives are actually understood by the change agent, change agency, and the client system. As we shall see, stated positions and understood positions are frequently different in this context; 2) the means and methods used by the two types of change agents in achieving their objectives. Again, the stated means and methods and those actually employed may differ, and, wherever possible, these differences will be brought to the reader's attention; 3) an assessment of the extent to which the stated and understood means and methods have proven effective and the stated and understood objectives have been accomplished. These assessments have been contributed by both the change agencies and client systems on the one hand, and by external observers on the other. Finally, this writer's own assessments and interpretations of the data will be offered.

---

[1] By internal assessments it is meant the assessments of members of the client systems involved, the change agencies, and the change agents themselves.

Sources

Since the early 1950's, a great wealth of literature has been written about development in the two countries which concern us here. Most comparative studies in the social sciences find it necessary to consult as wide a body of knowledge as possible in the area being researched, and this study shares that necessity. There are, however, two particular difficulties encountered in a study of the literature dealing with Chinese and Indian village level change agents.

The first difficulty emerges from the fact that, while a considerable amount of the literature available makes reference to the two types of change agents, there are very few authoritative studies which profess to deal with village cadres or village level workers as change agents per se. This is especially true in the case of the Chinese cadre. At the time of this writing, the writer has only been able to locate two books and two articles in English which purport to concentrate on cadres as a subject for study, and all four treat cadres as a general entity, with little reference specifically to the village level, or "basic" cadre, which is our interest in this study.[1]

The second difficulty which the researcher encounters in this sort of study is that of locating fairly "objective" accounts and analyses in both cases. Many studies of village level workers in India tend to be over-idealistic and, in varying degrees, divorced from the reality of the situation. On the other hand, many studies of Chinese development reflect what can only be understood as an anti-Communist bias. This writer's position in both cases is to glean what factual material may be presented and forget about the rest.

---

[1] Two books are: John Wilson Lewis' Leadership in Communist China and A. Dook Barnett's Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China; the two pamphlets are Walter Gourlay's The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, and Peter Tang's The Training of Party Cadres in Communist China.

As with any other research work, certain books and articles have been found to be of greater usefulness than others. Two works which the writer has found to be especially helpful in the Indian instance are S.C. Dube's India's Changing Villages and Taylor, Ensminger, Johnson and Joyce's India's Roots of Democracy. E.H. Valsan's Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government has also proven useful because of the case studies it provides. These works will be frequently cited in the section on Indian Village Level Workers and, in some respects, form a touchstone for the analysis of V.L.W's. All three provide reasonably objective analyses and demonstrate a good understanding of the realities of V.L.W. operations.

Unfortunately, no such works exist in the case of Chinese village cadres. There are, however, certain works which have proven to be especially useful in providing understanding and reasonably objective analyses of village cadres as change agents. Franz Schurmann's Ideology and Organization in Communist China serves as a basis for many of this writer's understandings in this respect, and will be frequently cited. Numerous other works have also proven useful in elucidating certain aspects of the village cadre function. William Hinton's classic Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village provides a vivid and realistic picture of cadres in operation in one Chinese village during the 1940's.[1] Boyd Compton's Mao's China: Party Reform Documents 1942-44, together with various works by Mao Tsetung, have proven useful in highlighting some of the major principles and problems of the cadre approach. Finally, the writer owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the works of Paulo Freire, particularly Pedagogy of the Oppressed, for clarifying many of the conditions and principles inherent in the use of the village cadre approach.

These are only a few of the many books and articles which have served as the basis for this writer's research and conclusions in this study. Works such as Garth Jones' Planned Organizational Change have provided some of the terminology used herein. In addition, a number of works on the cadre and V.L.W. approaches used outside of China and India have proven very useful and thought provoking. These include works such as Frances Fitzgerald's Fire in the Lake, and Jack Mezirow's Dynamics of Community Development, and others, all of which will be referred to in due course.

Terms in Need of Definition

Several terms will be used throughout this thesis which might best be defined at this time. The term "change agent" has already been defined and should need no further definition. The term "client system" can be simply understood as referring to any particular village or region which is the subject of a particular change agent's attempts at introducing changes. Two other important terms which will be used frequently are "strategies" and "tactics." Garth Jones distinguishes between the two as follows:

---

[1] Two other village case studies from the same period will be referred to as well - Isabel and David Crooks' Revolution in a Chinese Village - Ten Mile Inn and C.K. Tang's A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition. The first work, however, lacks a certain objectivity in its support for the Communists, while Tang's work suffers from leaning too much in the other direction.

> [Strategies] determine the general direction along which the change movement should be directed with a view to achieving the best results with the developing correlation of forces.
>
> [Tactics] are part of strategy (or strategies) subordinate to it and serving it. These are methods used to achieve the directive of strategy. . . . The implementer of change must devise tactics best able to promote the overall objectives of the fundamental strategy. (Jones, 1968, p. 202)

Finally, a common goal of the development process can, perhaps, be stated here as one which both types of change agents and agencies may be said to have in common as an objective. In both cases, the stated general goal of most efforts at planned development may be said to be the attainment of a fuller, more satisfying life for most, if not all, of the people with whom they are concerned. One major preoccupation of this study will be the degree to which the two types of change agents being reviewed have assisted in the achievement of this goal.

The Writer

This writer's interest in rural development first began when he served as a service volunteer attached to a community development block in northern India from 1966 to 1968. At that time, he was able to witness many village level workers in action and to engage in similar change agent activities himself. Since that time, he has had the opportunity to visit other developing countries, particularly in East

Africa, and to observe rural development efforts in these areas.

Since returning to North America in 1970, he has done a considerable amount of research in the field of rural development in Asia and Africa. In particular, he has developed a considerable interest in the study of rural development in revolutionary China and has written several short research papers on the subject. It therefore occurred to him that a thesis comparing some aspect of rural development in China and India would be quite appropriate. This, coupled with his abiding concern about village level strategies for the introduction of innovations, led him to determine that a study of village level change agent operations in the two countries could prove both interesting and worthwhile for himself and others. Thus began this study.

A Final Note

One last observation before the reader is left to plunge into the welter of material that follows. To the best of this writer's knowledge, this is the first work of any sort which attempts in any way to compare Chinese village cadres with Indian village level workers. Hence, this thesis must be understood as a tentative and exploratory work rather than, shall we say, a definitive study of the subject at hand. This writer was also limited in work with primary resource material by his linguistic inability to read either Hindi or Mandarin and his financial inability to afford paying translators. Those with more time, money, and ability who may wish to go further in this study are certainly encouraged to do so by this writer.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY CADRE

> Philosophers only explain the world by various ways; yet the thing is to change it. (Karl Marx)

In this chapter, the author proposes to introduce the Chinese village cadre as a change agent. Topics to be examined will include: 1) the nature of the cadre function; 2) the history of cadre development in revolutionary China; 3) the Mass Line philosophy as the basis of the cadre role as change agent; 4) the recruitment and training which cadres received; and finally 5) the techniques which they were taught to apply at the village level. Later, in Chapter III, the writer will examine the cadres in practice and will comment on their effectiveness in achieving the objectives which the Communist Party set before them.

The Cadre Function

> Strictly speaking, a cadre (or kanpu in Chinese) is someone who holds a formal leadership position in an organization. A Party Secretary is a Party cadre; a military officer is a military cadre; an official is a government cadre; and so on. . . . Colloquially, however, the word cadre generally refers to Party members who exercise leadership roles. It is also used to designate a leadership style. A cadre is a leader who is supposed to lead in a certain way. The ideal cadre is supposed to act as a combat leader, in intimate relationship with his followers, yet always responsive to higher policy. (Schurmann, 1966, p. 162)

When examining the Chinese village cadre as a creature of history, one is quickly forced to recognize an evolving or shifting process of development. Cadre recruitment and training, as well as the use of cadres in the village, has varied considerably from period to period. In spite of this, however, the revolutionary cadre of 1942 still had much in common with the cadre of 1955 or 1974. Certainly the importance of their role as cadres has not changed or appreciably diminished during this time. The cadre was created to act as the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in the villages during the 1940's and he is still expected to perform that function. Mao Tse-tung himself has observed:

> 'The revolution depends on cadres. . . . Cadres are the decisive factor after the political line has been determined.' These 'treasures of the nation and pride of the whole Party are virtually an all-decisive element in the cause of the Chinese people.' (Tang, 1961, p. 2)

In order to successfully perform their function as the vanguard of the Revolution, cadres have repeatedly been called upon to act in one of two capacities:

1. Penetrating the Chinese village, winning the friendship, loyalty, and leadership of the village, developing enthusiasm and participation among the people, and leading them along a general developmental line which has been laid out by the Party and the government;
2. Operating as a controlling agent who serves to limit the excesses of an agitated peasantry. This latter function was particularly evident during the land reform movements of 1945-1949, the Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968, and to some extent, the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960. In fact, the use of cadres as "controlling agents" is really

a logical extension of their first function or, to use an analogy, having created a fire, one must then control and direct it.

Life in revolutionary China has been punctuated by periodic mass movements of varying duration, followed by more extended periods devoted to consolidating and stabilizing the advances of the previous movement. In both cases, mass movement and stabilization, it is usually local cadres who assume local leadership roles.

A Short History of Cadre Development

The Pre-Yenan Period

The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921 and by 1927 could claim the allegiance of thousands of people throughout China. This period was characterized by strong influence and direction of the Soviet Russian dominated Comintern. Comintern orthodoxy dictated that: 1) an urban, proletariat-based revolution must be the basis for carrying through a socialist revolution in China, as elsewhere; and 2) China must first pass through a bourgeois, "democratic" stage of development before it could proceed to a socialist revolutionary stage. In the Chinese context, the bourgeois democratic movement was seen as being the Kou Min Tang under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, the Party's immediate tactic was to work within the K.M.T. in order to gain influence within it, rather than opposing it openly.

In 1927, however, the K.M.T. turned on the Communists and began violently suppressing them. The Communist response was to begin forming guerrilla armies and occupying parts of the country.

By the early 1930's, the Communists occupied several parts of the countryside, with the most extensive and important base being in the province of Kiangsi in southeastern China. It was here that the Communists first introduced land reforms and co-operatives in the villages. However, these were introduced "from the top down" without the use of village-level cadres as we now understand them. As a result, the land reform was not effectively carried out in many areas, and the Party did not win the support of as much of the peasantry as it had intended (Wolf, 1969, pp. 146-148). Consequently, when the Kou Min Tang armies of Chiang Kai-shek invaded their Kiangsi base in 1934, the Communists did not receive the peasant support they had hoped for and their armies were forced to leave Kiangsi, as well as other parts of the country.

When their various forces finally regrouped in the Yenan region of Shensi province in northern China, the Party had come under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Having learned a valuable, though costly, lesson in Kiangsi, the Party set about rebuilding the movement "from the bottom up" by first winning the support of the villages and developing them as the foundation of the revolution. The key figures, that is, the "vanguard element," in developing that support were the village-level cadres.

The Yenan Period

Prior to what is now commonly referred to as the "Yenan period" of the Chinese Revolution (1935-1945), the assumption was made by both

Chinese Communists and Soviet Communists that the vanguard element of the revolution would emerge on its own during the course of the revolution and would lead the people in the local areas. This assumption changed radically during the Yenan period in northern China.

> A new approach began during the Yenan period. It was now thought that the vanguard must not simply 'emerge' but must be created, trained and 'cultivated.' As a result, the Chinese Communists developed a continuing concern, in theory and practice, with the problem of leadership. The central concept of this new approach was that of the cadre. (Schurmann, 1966, p. 163)

Schurmann goes on to explain how, during this period, the Communists ceased moving "outward" in order to concentrate on penetrating "inward" and "downward" by means of a broadly based program of tax reforms, some land reform, and peasant associations designed to win the support of all but the wealthiest classes in the villages.

> But, though the peasants might spontaneously support the Communists, organization was needed to give that support continuity. The Communists realized that such organization would have to be built up within the natural village, yet with assurance that it would be primarily loyal to the larger cause rather than to the narrower village interests. By creating a new Communist Party and by training a new type of leader, the cadre, the Chinese Communists were finally able to achieve what no state power in Chinese history had been able to do: to create an organization loyal to the state which was also solidly embedded in the natural village. (Schurmann, 1966, p. 416)

Beginning in 1935-36 and continuing until total liberation was achieved in 1949, the Party expanded its membership very rapidly (from 40,000 in 1937 to 1,210,000 in 1945 to 4,500,000 by 1950) and utilized both Party members and non-Party members as cadres in the villages (Gourlay, 1952, p. 3).

For the most part, cadre recruitment during the 1935-1940 period and even later consisted primarily of younger elements, particularly poor peasants. These people were frequently drawn to the cause by its calls for agrarian reform and resistance to the invading Japanese armies. Many, if not most, were illiterate or, at best, semiliterate, with little, if any, understanding of Marxist philosophy. Nonetheless, they could generally be counted on to support the revolution actively (in fact, sometimes _too_ actively) because they saw the revolution as being carried out in the interest of themselves and their fellow villagers.

Basically, the Party took the position that "the movement in action would provide the major educational and ideological training of peasant activists" (Selden, 1971, p. 113). This sort of "training through praxis" could not be left to chance, for to have done so would have doubtlessly led to such chaotic activity in the villages that a state of anarchy would have prevailed. In fact, many areas which the Communists entered and organized were otherwise totally cut off geographically from the main seat of the movement in Shensi province. Thus, a minimal amount of political uniformity became necessary in the absence of centralized government administration. To quote Boyd Compton:

> No matter what steps the Party might have taken. . . to tie units and areas together, decentralization and segmentation remained a fact. Considerable areas of local Party initiative existed throughout the war. In this setting, uniformity of action could not be forced on the scattered Party units. It would have been impossible to set up a system of close central inspection. The Party answered its challenge through an intensive program of indoctrination and training which culminated in the Cheng Feng Movement. (Compton, 1952, p. xxvi)

The Cheng Feng Movement ("Correcting Unorthodox Tendencies") of 1942-1944 was of seminal significance in the cultivation of the cadres as the vanguard of the revolution in the villages. It proved to be the first of many movements directed at the Party in general and the cadres in particular. It had as its objectives: 1) to raise the political understanding of the cadres; 2) to educate them in order that they might more effectively raise the political consciousness of the people in their villages; 3) to better win the villagers' support of the movement; and 4) to aid the cadres in better understanding the needs and interests of the villagers.

Significantly, it was during the Cheng Feng Movement that the Mass Line of Mao Tse-tung was first precisely enunciated and propagated among the cadres. As we shall see, the Mass Line was to become the basis of the cadre approach to the present day. More will be written about this later in this chapter.

The Civil War Period

Following the defeat of Japan in August, 1945, the pretense of the "United Front" of Communist and Kou Min Tang (K.M.T.) forces against Japan rapidly broke down, and by July of the following year, a declared state of civil war existed between the Communists and the K.M.T.

The Yenan-United Front period of 1940-1945 had been characterized by minor gradualistic reforms and an emphasis on class co-operation within the villages. However, the Civil War period which followed and lasted until October, 1949 was marked by an intensification of class conflict within the villages. As a state of total war came to exist between the American backed and financed Kou Min Tang and the Communists, a greatly increased level of radicalization and mobilization of the peasantry became evident in those parts of the countryside controlled by the Communists.

The radicalization of the peasantry was centered around the one issue most immediate to the interests of the majority of the people, total land reform. It was the young, poor peasant cadres who were the key personnel in the process of radicalization. This radicalization was carried out by uniting the poorer class elements against the richer (particularly the large landholders) and by precipitating an open power and leadership struggle in the villages, that is, young, poor peasant activists versus old, wealthy, established landholders and gentry.[1]

The importance of this struggle to the development of modern China cannot be over-emphasized. It wrenched the traditional Chinese village out of centuries of self-isolation and began the long process of integrating it with the government, the Party and the nation. Perhaps of even greater importance, the cadre/activist-led land reform had the effect of decisively breaking the back of the decayed traditional social order of the villages and preparing the way for the introduction of new types of organization.[2]

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[1] As a general rule, the Communists initially divided peasants into five class categories in each village: landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant, landless laborer. The category any particular person or family fell into was largely determined by the amount of land he owned and whether he hired labor to work it for him. In general, most early cadres were of poor peasant origin. This remains the case to the present.

[2] A "cadre," in the sense in which we are using the term, refers to a person given particular leadership responsibilities and Party sanction to perform leadership functions at the village level. An "activist," on the other hand, was ordinarily a person without Party training or official recognition who emerged as a leadership element in the course of a Party-induced movement. Such activists would frequently be accepted as cadres later on, once they had proven themselves as worthy and committed social activists.

During the Civil War period, cadre roles and recruitment were changing as well. In January, 1945, for instance, as World War II drew to a close, Mao Tse-tung called upon Party cadres to learn economic work (as contrasted to political work) and develop technological skills within two or three years, "in order to hasten the industrialization of China" (Tang, 1961, p. 10). Later, after 1949, the Party periodically repeated similar exhortations to the cadres, calling on them to be both "Red" and "expert."

It was during this period of the Civil War that the Party first began utilizing large numbers of students and "intellectuals"[1] recruited from the cities. These people formed what came to be known as the Rural Service Corps. Members of this corps would attach themselves to the People's Liberation Army, then when a new region was liberated, teams of Service Corps members would enter the villages and initiate the process of land reform (Gourlay, 1952, pp. 22-23). At the same time, the People's Liberation Army recruited young peasants from these villages. While in the army, these peasants received training and indoctrination oriented towards introducing reforms into their own villages. Then, as local activists and cadres, they continued the process of making revolution in these villages.

Cadres After the Civil War

Finally, let us take a brief look at village cadres since 1950.

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[1] In Chinese Communist terminology of the period, an "intellectual" was considered to be anyone having a secondary school education or better.

Perhaps the outstanding feature of development in China during the early 1950's was the efforts of the Party and the government at recreating order and stability in order to introduce appropriate control agencies in government administrative, economic and productive activities. One of the first things that needed to be done if stability was again to come to the countryside was the gearing down of the land reform set into motion in 1946. The Communists had been able to generate a flood of peasant activism in the villages with their calls for land reform and redistribution. However, in most cases they did not have sufficient control within the villages to contain the excesses of many villagers in the first throes of their new-found power. "It was essential that the land reform be halted, for the longer the revolutionary terror continued, the greater the threat to organization" (Schurmann, 1966, p. 434). Thus, in March, 1949, even before final liberation was achieved, the Communist Party Central Committee was calling for a slowing down of the land reform drive. It was not, however, until 1951 that "revolutionary terror" was completely restrained in China and the peasantry was generally deactivated.

Among the cadres themselves, another important development was taking place in the early years following liberation. With the de-emphasizing of land reform came a de-emphasizing of the role of the village cadres as the vanguard of the revolution. This, too, came as a result of a major governmental shift in policy aimed at emulating Soviet governmental forms and adopting a centralized, bureaucratic state administration and form of control. The government and Party needed educated administrators to fill positions as functionaries; hence, it looked to the bourgeois, intellectual, and student elements in the Party and the population in general to fill these positions. Rather than many of the older members of the Party and the movement, these were the people who received promotions. Passed over were the poor, illiterate peasants in whose name the revolution had been fought and who had often dedicated years of their lives to the cause. This policy, necessary though it might have been at the time, nonetheless left many peasant cadres embittered for some time (Gourlay, 1952, p. 68).

A further development during the early 1950's was the incorporation of many former non-Party activists into the Communist Party. As a result, by 1958 most positions of organizational leadership, both in the villages and elsewhere, were held by Party members.

The Revitalization of the Cadre Role

The year 1955, like 1950 and 1945, represents a fairly important watershed in the evolution of government initiatives in the villages. This year saw the first decisive moves away from a mixture of Soviet and traditional Chinese state bureaucracy aimed at the exploitation and control of the countryside. The rural areas were now securely under government control and disorganization was no longer a major threat in the villages.

But the relative neglect of political and social development in the villages had brought about a new threat to the introduction of a new social and economic order. Many traditional village leaders had managed to reassert themselves in their villages and had assumed positions of power and influence within the new system. If the new order was not to be undermined and if agricultural production was to be rationalized and increased, further socialist initiatives were needed. Accordingly, 1955 saw the large scale introduction of agricultural production cooperatives in the villages, and with it, the renaissance of the village level or "basic" cadre.

> The only way the Chinese Communists saw to penetrate the fabric of village organization was, once again, to do what they had done during the Yenan period, namely make use of the Party cadre. But neglect of rural Party organization during the early 1950's had meant that there had not been enough village Party cadres to perform this task. Thus, Party recruitment policy changed. Early in 1955, before a decision to cooperativize had been made, China's leaders launched a program of building up Party organization in all rural areas of China (Schurmann, 1966, pp. 442-443).

Fortunately, about this same time, many of the core cadres who had enlisted as Chinese volunteers in the Korean War effort were being released from service and were returning to their villages. In many cases, these cadres were to constitute the leadership elements in both the co-operative movement of 1955-56 and the commune movement during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960. In fact, the Great Leap Forward saw an even greater expansion of rural Party cadres in the countryside (Lewis, 1961, p. 101). Since the Great Leap Forward, the Party has placed continuing emphasis upon village cadres and has used them extensively as brigade and work team leaders on the communes. As brigade and work team leaders, it is their responsibility to lead the brigade or the team in its work, help it determine its priorities, set its standards, etc. Cadres have also played critical roles in the introduction of movements (such as the Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1964) to the villages.

Cadres Since the Cultural Revolution

Of particular significance to the role of the cadres in the villages, was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that shook China between 1966 and 1968. The Cultural Revolution was hardly limited to the urban areas, and its effects were felt in even the most remote parts of the country.

The Cultural Revolution had major implications for the cadres as well. Since the Cheng Feng Movement, the cadres had been the objects of several internal reform movements within the Party. However, the Cultural Revolution carried this process one step further by calling upon the common people to criticize their local leaders, the cadres. A good deal of public criticism and self-criticism occurred. The result was that some village and other middle level cadres were removed from their posts and many more admitted their errors and returned to positions of leadership subject to their continued good behavior.[1] Whether the Cultural Revolution has established a precedent for continued public criticism of Party and government personnel remains to be seen. But such a trend would serve as a healthy influence not only in China, but in most countries, in the opinion of this writer.

Summary

In essence, then, we can see that the role played by the basic village cadre has, with the single exception of the 1950-1955 period, expanded and deepened its dual operation of village leadership and revolutionary vanguard. How well it has fulfilled these functions will be further analyzed in Chapter III.

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[1] Jan Myrdal, in his book China, The Revolution Continued, describes how the process of public criticism of cadres developed in one village in northern China which he visited in 1969. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the Cultural Revolution and the cadres.

Let us now turn to a brief examination of two leading principles espoused by the Party for its cadres. Again, with the exception of the 1950-1955 period, these principles have been presented by the Party as the basis of the cadre approach in the villages. They are commonly referred to as the Theory of Contradictions and the Mass Line.

The Theory of Contradictions and the Mass Line

> The strategy of Communism. . . is contained in its theory. Theoretical knowledge is the abstraction of principles synthesized with actual conditions so as to offer general laws applicable to all similar situations. One level below the enunciation of immutable principles, and one step above practice, theory is the link binding the two. In the Marxist concept of knowledge, principles and practices are inseparably united. Theory is the instrument for transforming principles into practice, and for using practice to formulate principles. Communist theoreticians study practical experiences which raise questions answerable by formulating a general theory. This theory, in turn, is of practical service because it provides rules to eliminate erroneous ways and determine new conditions. Thus, in Marxism-Leninism, theory is primarily a means to summarize experience in order to point out future practices (Tang, 1961, p. 27).

The writings and political influence of Mao Tse-tung have been a major force in the development of modern Marxist theory and practice almost since the death of Lenin in 1924. There is little question, certainly, that Mao Tse-tung has served as the primary theoretician and strategist of the Chinese Communist Movement from 1935 to the present day. This, however, should not mislead us into assuming that Mao exists as a theoretician independent of the mainstream of "orthodox" Communist theory. In most essentials, his thinking bases itself on the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It is, however, in the interpretation and application of this theory that Mao differs so markedly from Soviet bloc leaders and theoreticians.

In particular, it is Mao's application of the Marxist Theory of Contradicitions to the Chinese situation and the Chinese Communist movement which has served to distinguish the development of Communist China from other Communist states. This interpretation in practice also has direct relevance to cadre practice in the villages. In addition, cadre use of Mao's Mass Line strategy of social and political intervention has come to be recognized as a unique contribution to Marxist and leftist revolutionary and post-revolutionary strategies and has served as the basis for setting cadre standards of practice in the villages of China. Let us first briefly examine the Theory of Contradictions as it applies to the cadres.

The Theory of Contradictions

The Theory of Contradictions is an important part of basic Marxist doctrine, particularly with application to the idea of class struggle prior to the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the advent of Communism. Mao's application of the Theory extends much further than this, however. He utilizes it in analyzing a broad range of social and economic relations at all levels of society from the individual to the state and nation both prior to, and following, the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.[1]

> The theory of contradictions has been put to three practical uses. First, it has been used for analysis, as described in our discussion of the dialectical conception of Chinese society. . . . Second, it serves as a basis for behavioral norms, particularly in group settings such as thought reform - the juxtaposition of individual and group through struggle which sharpens contradictions to a point of polarization leading to a dialectical resolution. Third, the theory of contradictions has been used as an approach to create and use organization (Schurmann, 1966, pp. 53-54).

The Mass Line

All three of the applications listed above have direct relevance to cadre practice in the villages, which should become evident further on in this study. It is, however, the third application which is of interest here, for it is this application which was instrumental in the development of the Mass Line as a cadre organizational approach. Liu Shao-chi, former President of the Republic and the Party's chief authority in charge of organization during the early 1940's, spoke of the contradictions inherent in the concepts of "democracy" and "centralism". The two are core elements in the Leninist concept of "democratic centralism," a concept which was to serve as the basis of the Mass Line approach (Schurmann, 1966, p. 54).[2] "Democracy" was seen as being "impulses coming from below" while "centralism" meant "impulses coming from above." That a contradiction existed in practice between the two "impulses" is apparent judging from this portion of a newspaper editorial published in the liberated areas in January of 1943:

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[1] The three most important documents dealing with this facet of Mao's philosophy are: "On Practice" (July, 1937), "On Contradiction" (August, 1937) and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (February, 1957). All three works can be found in The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.

[2] See also Kung-jen-jih-pao (Worker's Daily, editorial), January 30, 1965, quoted in Chalmers Johnson, "Central Committee Leadership and Mass Response," edited by Ping-ti Ho Tang Tsou.

> One must use the methods of appeals and mobilization through administrative power from the top down. But one must create a degree of volition and freedom on the part of the masses. If one only uses administrative power, power which is organized from the top down, then one cannot consolidate the system. But only to emphasize volition and freedom, and not to make use of appeals and mobilization through strong administration, to organize positively means that work will degenerate into laissez-faire (Schurmann, 1966, p. 424).

In the opinion of this author, the Mass Line as a revolutionary strategy was, and continues to be, an effort to incorporate these two concepts and resolve the contradictions between them. But how has the Party described the Mass Line? The first precise statement of Mass Line policy, and still the best statement we have on the subject, is found in the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership," passed and promulgated by the Central Committee in June, 1943:

> Two methods must be adopted in accomplishing any task: the first is to combine the general and the particular, and the second is to unite leadership with the masses. . . . In all our Party's actual work, correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses. This means taking views of the masses (unintegrated, unrelated views) and subjecting them to concentration (they are transformed through research into concentrated, systematized views), then going to the masses with propaganda and explanation in order to transform the views of the masses and seeing that these (views) are maintained by the masses and carried over into their activities. It also means an examination of mass activities to ascertain the correctness of these views. Then again, there is concentration from the masses and maintenance among the masses. Thus the process is repeated indefinitely, each time more correctly, vitally and fruitfully. This is the epistemology and methodology of Marxism-Leninism (Compton, 1952, pp. 176-177).

Effectively, what is outlined here is a four step process beginning with "perception" (working with the peasants, studying their views, identifying their problems), followed by "summarization" (summing up scattered views and information for the particular Party committee responsible for the area), then "authorization" (whereby the Party committee considers the reports and issues appropriate directives or instructions), and finally, "implementation" (going to the masses with propaganda and explanation in order to transform their views and activities)(Lewis, 1961, p. 72). In essence, the first two steps of this process -- perception and summarization -- are "from the bottom up," "particular," or "democratic" impulses, while the last two steps -- authorization and implementation -- are "from the top down," "general," or "centralist" impulses aimed at organizational continuity and development.

This then, outlines the basic features of the Communist Chinese interpretation of the Theory of Contradictions and what this writer sees as their approach to resolving this contradiction by means of the Mass Line approach.[1] The basic features of this Theory and its application in the Mass Line should be kept in mind as we study the ramifications of the Mass Line on cadre recruitment, education, and methods of work. In addition, in Chapter III we will examine some of the strengths of the Mass Line, and some of the difficulties it presented in its application in the villages. But let us turn now to a consideration of the sort of recruitment and educational procedures which the Party has used in the creation of its basic cadre leadership.

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[1] Mao refers to such internal contradictions as "non-antagonistic contradictions" in his "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People."

Cadre Selection and Recruitment

Introduction

Up to this point in our comments on village-based cadres and activists, the impression may have been given that these change agents, almost single-handedly, were responsible for effecting the Revolution in the villages. Such was hardly the case, for organizations such as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as the force of various popular movements in the countryside, performed vital functions both before and after total Communist takeover in 1949. One must, however, recognize the decisive role which cadres and activists performed in coordination with the PLA and the various village movements. The role played by these people in any given situation often proved vital to the success or failure of any given initiative.

Without proper selection of cadres together with appropriate and adequate training and utilization of proper techniques and methods of work, these change agents could hardly be expected to serve the Party, the people, or the Revolution very well. In fact, many of the difficulties they had or created can be traced to recruitment problems and inadequacies in cadre education and training. More will be written about this further on. Let us now turn to an explanation of cadre recruitment policies.

Recruitment

Many different types of people from different backgrounds were singled out as activists and recruited as basic level cadres during the course of the Revolution and afterward. By far the greatest number of such cadres were young males of poor peasant origin. The next highest source of recruitment (probably not constituting more than ten per cent of the total of those who have served as cadres from the Yenan period to the present) were students and urban youth, both male and female.

In addition, certain other uniformities can be seen in cadre recruitment policy. Since the Yenan period, with the exception of the 1950-1955 period, the Party has been committed to penetrating the villages and "striking roots" in their social structures with the use of cadres in village leadership positions, as well as through village movements, peasant and youth organizations, etc. In order to do this, the Party and its Mass Line philosophy has continually called upon cadres to be working members of their communities.[1] These were the preconditions for recruitment -- people dedicated to change, people with roots in the village or capable of striking roots there, and people who shared the work of the common people. It is, therefore, understandable why the Party looked to the young poor peasants for their recruits and why these people responded in such large numbers.

During the 1935-1949 period, the Party was initially able to draw out activist members by several means. During the early Yenan and United Front period, many peasants were drawn to the Party by its slogans, such as "Land to the Tillers!", and by its reputation in those areas occupied by the Red Army.[1] Later on, with the introduction of the land reform and the subsequent airing of grievances against landlords, the Party was able to develop many of the activist elements that emerged from this struggle, many of whom went on to become Party cadres. Richard Solomon refers to this process as "emotional mobilization" and describes it as follows:

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[1] "Organization had to be created within the village itself, indissoluably linked to the village. The Communists realised that organization, to be effective, had to be linked with work" (Schurmann, 1966, p. 426).

> If emotional mobilization was seen as the way to generate popular energy for destroying the old order, it also was conceived of as creating the context within which the Party could recruit activists to expand its own ranks and link itself with the most basic levels of social organization, in particular the organization of production. The Party had early learned that 'active' elements naturally emerge in the course of political movements, apparently motivated by their own enthusiasm for the objectives of the movement and their desire to cooperate with the Party. The task of the Party leadership cadre thus was seen as a matter of both using and recruiting these active elements in the service implementing Party goals (Solomon, 1969, p. 96).

It was not always an easy process to be accepted as a member of the Party, however, as Party members are supposed to set an example of high socialist standards for others to follow. Becoming a Party member was no easy task, and carried considerable prestige with it. Therefore, an activist would ordinarily have to prove himself as an activist before he would be considered for admittance into the Party itself.[1] Preference was also given to poor peasants and workers who were considered more trustworthy elements than wealthier farmers, intellectuals, or members of the petty bourgeoisie and with good reason!

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[1] Jan Myrdal describes two such peasants in Report from a Chinese Village, pp. 48-49.

Thus, prior to 1945, the Party drew its largest number of wartime recruits from landless laborers and poor peasants, who had no probation period and one month probation period, respectively. Middle peasants and petty bourgeois groups served three months probation (Compton, 1952, p. xxix). After 1945, this probationary period was raised to six months for "workers, coolies, hired farm hands, poor peasants, urban paupers, and revolutionary soldiers," while one year's probation was necessary for "middle peasants, salaried employees, intellectual elements and professionals," with rigorous examination of the ideology, character, and background of the applicant (Gourlay, 1952, p. 4).[2]

Clearly, the Party considered the poor peasants, landless laborers, etc. to be ideologically more trustworthy than middle peasants and members of the bourgeoisie. Also, if the Party was to justify its position as a peasant and workers' party, the majority of its membership should come from these classes. Under the lengthy probation periods required, it is understandable why a great many village activists were not Party members, although many of them fulfilled very necessary leadership functions in promoting revolutionary change in the villages.

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[1] "First, a cadre should be examined minutely, and intrinsically by the leadership as to his capabilities and limitations, his merits and defects, his whole personal history and his work. Secondly, a cadre should be examined at the place where he does his work and through the rank and file under his leadership" (Liu Shao-chi quoted in Tang, 1961, p. 3).

[2] "The Party faced a staggering problem in attempting to create a minimum uniformity of thought and action among these different segments of its membership (Compton, 1952, p. xxix).

As noted previously, one major secondary source of basic cadres since 1935 has been the People's Liberation Army. Young peasants recruited to the Army receive indoctrination and politicization during the course of their service and frequently serve as cadres in their own or other villages after completing their service. In many cases prior to 1948, cadre work teams attached to the PLA served as advance cadres in introducing land reform, etc. in the villages.

From 1948 until the early 1950's, however, the PLA expanded so rapidly and occupied so much territory that its proportion of trained cadres was lowered considerably. It was during this period especially that the Party began recruiting large numbers of students who were more ideologically aware and more easily trained to go into the countryside and "spark the land reform" than were most elements of Chinese society (Gourlay, 1952, pp. 17 and 23)(Cf. Yang, 1959, p. 134).[1] Calling on students to further the Revolution by joining the land reform movement and working with the peasants also had the important effect of "proletarianizing" the new generation of "intellectuals" and creating loyalty to the system among a much needed, but potentially dissident, segment of the population.

After 1949 and Communist takeover in China, the Party found it necessary to recruit large numbers of cadres for all levels of Party work, from the village up. In 1949, excluding military cadres, there were 720,000 cadres at all levels in the country. By September of 1952, that number had risen to 2,750,000. By that time every village had at least one Party cadre.

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[1] And Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Volume IV, p. 274

Three types of people comprised the greater part of those recruited: 1) worker and peasant activists who had emerged from the various movements and struggles; 2) students graduating from higher schools; and 3) a number of "old intelligentsia" recruited from the higher classes and trained as cadres.

The Party faced a dilemma resulting from the fact that, while the Revolution had been carried on in the name of the peasants and workers and while many of the people had become dedicated activists and revolutionaries, for the most part these people possessed more "virtue" ("Red-ness") than ability ("expertness"). Therefore, being illiterate or semiliterate, they could not really be given positions of responsibility in administration. This situation was gradually corrected after 1955. Nonetheless, the widespread use of peasants as cadres continues to present problems for the Party because of the cadres' "low cultural level"[1] and low level of ideological understanding in spite of the many training courses which had been set up specifically for them.

On the other hand, from the Party's point of view, the intellectuals, both young and old (though more so the old):

> . . .still suffered from 'employee viewpoints, pure-technique viewpoints, and tendencies not to be concerned with politics.' They have no confidence in the positive

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[1] "Low cultural level" is a term used by the Party to signify people or groups which have little formal education and little understanding of the world beyond their village.

> elements (i.e., the activists) that have 'gushed forth' from the movements; they dislike the young 'superior' cadres, they insist on 'qualification and seniority' as criteria for promotion, develop vested interests, obstruct the promotion of new cadres, insist on vertical rule, stress ' culture and technique', disregard the merits of the man, and, lastly, have no interest in cadre training programs (An Tzu-wen quoted in Schurmann, 1966, pp. 169-170).

This continuing contradiction between the essentially "red" cadres of worker and peasant origin and the essentially "expert" cadres, the educated elites of predominantly bourgeois or middle class origin, continues to present difficulties to cadre recruitment and promotion policies. It was also one major consideration in the Cultural Revolution's effort to make the "experts" more "red."

Also, since the late 1950's, most new Party recruits have been drawn from the membership of the Young Communist League rather than from the activists who have emerged during the various mass movements (Barnett, 1967, p. 179).

Cadre Education and Training

> The training of the Communist to perform with an effective mass line style primarily hinges on a progressive understanding by the trainees which comes from the theoretical study and effective daily practice. To be divorced from objective reality is the error of 'subjectivism,' and to fail to create unity and solidarity within the Party and masses is the error of 'sectarianism.' The training of the cadres must combine Marxist-Leninist precepts with specific and concrete daily work to overcome these errors and thus instill the habit of the mass line style of work (Lewis, 1963, pp. 84-85).

In reviewing this very essential aspect of cadre development, we will concentrate on the training which cadres receive in ideology and methods of work. To examine other aspects of cadre education such as literacy training and technical training would take us beyond our major focus and would not add substantially to this discussion.

Purpose of Training

The real spirit and purpose of cadre education as perceived and developed by Mao Tse-tung and other architects of the Chinese Communist Movement is not merely an academic education in Communist ideology and cadre work methods. It is seen, in fact, as being a continual effort aimed at raising the level of consciousness of the basic cadre, as well as all other leadership elements in the society. The assumption is made that, if the level of socialist consciousness and commitment is not continually raised among the peoples' leadership, then it cannot be expected that the consciousness of the masses will be raised either.[1] The argument then follows that the only way a cadre can truly raise his level of consciousness is by continuous learning, continuous effort, and a continuous mixing of theory with practice in an effort to genuinely "live" and exemplify an ever increasing level of socialist consciousness. Mao has described what a true socialist consciousness should and should not consist of

> . . .such things as selfishness and self-interest, inactiveness and negligence in work, corruption, degeneration and vainglory are most contemptible; while the spirit of impartiality, of active and hard work, self-denial in the interest of the public and of complete absorption in arduous work, commands respect (Mao Tse-tung quoted in Lewis, 1961, p. 83).

In addition, Party cadres are theoretically the "most capable of focusing the will of the masses, understanding their aspirations, and representing their interest" (Jen-min-jih-pao, November 11, 1959, quoted in Lewis, 1961, p. 87). All this places high demands on the individual cadre. But the Party has also demonstrated a strong determination to see their cadre role expectations become realities. This determination was first clearly spelled out on the same occasion as the first propagation of the Mass Line -- the Cheng Feng Movement of 1942-1944.

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[1] "A work assignment cannot be described as properly accomplished if its completion is not accompanied by a heightening of the consciousness of the masses"(Jen-min-jih-pao, January 14, 1961, quoted in Lewis, 1961, p. 95).

The Cheng Feng Movement

The Cheng Feng Movement was many things, but more than anything else, it was the Party's first big educational movement. It was said that the whole Party went to school at that time. "Incorrect" and "unorthodox" tendencies such as "dogmatism" (accepting a particular political "line" and applying it uncritically and without close regard to the situation at hand), "subjectivism in thought," and "sectarianism" (separation from the masses) were attacked. Mark Selden, in an illuminating history of the Yenan period, has described how this was carried out within the Party and among the cadres:

> With the Central Committee directive of April 3, 1942, cadres throughout the border region began an elaborate program of study and a thorough examination and revaluation of the work of every organ and individual. Special committees at all echelons of the party, government, and army directed the study campaign. Throughout the border region cadres were to devote two hours per day to study which included group discussion and criticism, preparation of study notes, and examination on designated texts. Extended study of the rectification documents over a three month period preceded a critical investigation of each organization's work; this

> investigation applied newly assimilated principles to each cadre's concrete duties and to an evaluation of his performance (Selden, 1971, p. 199).[1]

The Cheng Feng Movement, like the Mass Line approach, came to be broadened and expanded as the revolutionary movement and the Party expanded. By 1945, the reform process had become a "continuing organizational mechanism" (Compton, 1952, p. xlvi). Periodic Cheng Feng-type movements were to recur on the average of every one to three years with the intention of educating new cadres and reeducating some of the older cadres whose style of work might be in need of correction. Almost all of the movements have been directed against such problems as corruption, arbitrary exercise of power, separation from the masses, individualism, departmentalism, "vested-interestism", or similar trends which tend to exacerbate Party functioning or cut off the leaders from the masses.

Methods of Education and Training

The fact that the Party resorted to (and continues to resort to) periodic educational movements among its cadres should not be understood as indicating that such movements have been the only means of training village cadres, or even that they have been "the most important" educational activities among the cadres. Numerous other means were used to remold cadre activity away from traditional or archaic patterns of thought and behavior (what Paulo Freire refers to as an oppressor -

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[1] The "rectification documents" which formed the basis of the movement have been translated and are published in: Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952).

oppressed frame of reference) and to educate cadres in the dynamics of leading the socialist movements in the villages.

In addition to the periodic rectification or "socialist education" movements, other mechanisms used to educate cadres and create a dedicated core of local leaders have included: 1) early use of cadre training schools; 2) teaching and training carried on within the PLA; 3) "winter study movement"; 4) spare-time schools; 5) small group study sessions; and 6) old cadres helping new cadres.

Prior to 1949, a certain number of cadre training schools were established in the various liberated zones.[1] Also a considerable amount of training and indoctrination was carried out by and within the People's Liberation Army.

Following Communist takeover, the Party initiated a full-scale program of popular education aimed at spreading an understanding of the basics of Marxist socialist ideology and behavior throughout the population. An important part of this program was, of course, directed at the leading or vanguard elements of the population -- the basic cadres and activists.

During the "Anti-Japanese War," "winter study movements" for cadres were held during the slack period following the harvest. This was revived in 1949-1950 in the form of short-term "winter schools" which sought to provide village cadres with basic elementary education as well as a training program in village leadership. In addition, special cadre training schools were organized throughout the country to provide a basic elementary education to experienced cadres. In 1950, there was a total of twenty-four such schools throughout China, with a total enrollment of 4,034, but this number was to increase rapidly thereafter. In North China at this time there were some 350 spare time schools for worker and peasant cadres (Gourlay, 1952, pp. 31-34).

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[1] See "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Yenan Cadre School," December, 1944 (Compton, 1952, pp. 74-79).

In general, all forms of cadre education, while calling for the "professional, political, cultural and theoretical education of cadres," have stated that practical education for on-the-job proficiency was "the primary task in education and study." This sort of professional education was to include five fields of study: 1) investigation and research on conditions connected with the assigned duties; 2) research on relevant Party policies, regulations, directives and resolutions; 3) research on particular experiences related to the work of each department; 4) research on the historical background of a particular type of work; and 5) scientific knowledge relating to the type of work to be carried out (Compton, 1952, pp. 81-83). Towards this end, the Party prepared hundreds of training manuals and handbooks. Such works, in addition to outlining basic approaches, were frequently filled with brief accounts of particular cadre experiences in the field of operations being considered.[1]

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[1] For a description of one such manual see (Lewis, 1963, pp. 147-148).

By 1960, each Party committee at the county and commune level was said to be maintaining a school for the regular training of cadres. One Party official in Anhwei Province described them as follows:

> Party schools of county committees and people's communes are using a method which coordinates group training with on the spot training, in accordance with the seasonal needs of production, the requirements of the work on hand, and the persons to be trained (Tang, 1961, p. 12).

In addition, there are several other types of "non-regular" schools and training institutions which vary considerably with respect to the context in which things are taught, the intensity with which they are taught, and the level of sophistication of the teaching, but which otherwise teach similar material. By the early 1960's, short term training schools (the "winter study movements" of the 1940's and the "winter schools" of the 1950's) were in operation throughout the country. "On the spot" instruction has also been used extensively in the training of cadres. "Spare time schools," like on the spot instruction, are usually located in close proximity to those they teach and specialize in instructing during hours not given over to labour. Literally millions of cadres and tens of millions of "the masses" have attended these institutions. Rotation training has also been widely used. This system, like the spare time schools, does not require the prolonged withdrawal of cadres from productive labour (Tang, 1961, pp. 12-17).

The Party also utilized a number of educative techniques among its cadres and the population at large. One of the most widely used techniques has been the small study group. Small study groups have been organized not only in villages and on communes, but also in factories, government bureaus, mass organizations, army units, etc.[1] Lewis has described these groups as follows:

> The small group (hsiao - tsu) has the intimacy of the traditional family, which it resembles in size and in the rules of direct and frank relationship. This group form is the one which the Communists in Yenan found effective for retraining Koumintang prisoners and for indoctrination of party and cadre personnel. In this small study group, which ranges from three to fifteen members, all the interpersonal pressures can be brought to bear including criticism, self criticism, 'frank speaking' (t'an pai), ostracism, and mutual help (Lewis, 1961, p. 158).

Another frequently used technique for educating new cadres is the use of "one old cadre leading one new cadre."[2] Modified consultations are held between new and old cadres with the novices questioning and learning from the more experienced. Division of labour was also created in such a way that older cadres could work together with or close to the new cadres in a one-to-one relationship, thereby helping the new cadres deal with the various problems they encountered.

Cadre Techniques

Let us next turn to a brief examination of a few of the more important techniques which village cadres were taught to use.

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[1] Small study groups, together with some other Chinese Communist pedagogical techniques, such as the use of case studies and continuously relating Marxist theory with reality, are not original creations of the Chinese Communist Party. Douglas Hyde refers to the use of small group study among English Communists: "Through small study groups they aim 1) to teach Marxism, 2) to equip those who attend them to go into effective action for the cause, 3) in the process of teaching them, to contribute to their training as leaders" (Hyde, 1966, p. 73).

[2] See (Compton, 1953, p. 27).

Types of influence - Ray Hofheinz has distinguished five types of influence which were developed in the village during the course of the Liberation struggle. The first type of influence he refers to as "influence as presence"; in this case, the first presence of committed activists or revolutionaries from the outside entering a village and making their presence known and felt there.

The second form of influence, which also often marked a second stage of revolutionary advance, has been termed "influence as impact." This impact normally took the form of demonstrations, mass meetings, denunciations of landlords or other "capitalist roaders" and in some cases public execution of the worst offenders if the villagers determined collectively that this was desirable.

The third form is referred to as "influence as control." This included the establishment of reasonably stable organizational structures within the village, security from outside attack and internal reprisals by the ousted elites, and the establishment of peasant monopolies in trade, business and transport.

The fourth form of influence, "influence as mobilization," took the form of exposing the peasantry to propaganda and "agitation" together with calling on them to form mass organizations such as peasant associations, women's associations, cooperatives, etc.

The fifth form, "influence as participation," stressed such things as "active rather than passive membership in organizations, normative rather than coercive appeals, ethical pressures to make sacrifices and to criticize oneself and others." This was seen as the final stage of influence, "the ultimate aim of which is the creation of a totally committed and unquestioningly loyal population" (Hofheinz, 1969, pp. 36-37).

We have noted these five types of influence because, as will become apparent, many of the techniques which cadres were taught to use in the villages can be understood as advancing these various forms of influence, both in the course of the liberation struggle and following it.

Investigation and research - Before and while the first type of influence (presence) was being felt in the villages, a preliminary stage of "investigations" and research was necessary. In fact, to a large extent, these investigations can be understood as being the first stage of the Mass Line process - "perception" - with the report writing that followed constituting the "summarization" stage of the process. One primary method of carrying out these investigations was by Marxist class analysis. To quote Mao Tse-tung, writing in 1941:

> The only way to understand conditions is to investigate society and the conditions of each class' livelihood. . . . The basic method in understanding conditions is to pick out, consciously and according to a plan, several cities or villages and make a thorough investigation, applying the basic viewpoints of Marxism, i.e., the method of class analysis. Only in this way can we gain the most fundamental knowledge of Chinese problems (Mao Tse-tung, quoted in Compton, 1952, p. 55).

Methods used to carry out these investigations included: 1) collecting and studying relevant newspapers, magazines and books dealing with the area in question; 2) gathering local people with knowledge of the village or area and holding investigation meetings with three to five such people at each session in order to learn about a particular locality, problem, or whatever; 3) conducting a detailed investigation of the living conditions and interrelations of the various classes in the area; 4) writing detailed biographical sketches of well-known persons in the area such as landlords, enemy officers (during the KMT period), KMT officials in the area, and other possible opposition elements; and 5) individual oral interrogation, i.e., questioning workers, peasants, merchants, etc. (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Resolution quoted in Compton, 1952, pp. 70-72).

The application of all these methods of investigation was, essentially, a standard which the Party would have liked to effect. This was not always possible, however, and abbreviated versions of this procedure were resorted to during periods of rapid change or expansion of the revolutionary movement, such as the 1948-1950 period. During this time, teams of outside cadres entering an area often quickly sought to determine "reliable" and "unreliable" elements in a village. Thereafter they worked to unite the reliable elements in a preparatory committee for a peasants' association which would be the nucleus of local reform actions. Without such outside assistance, many local reform movements would not have begun, due to the fact that most poor peasants were thoroughly intimidated and lacked confidence in their own ability to organize themselves and change their lives.

Revolutionary committees - It was the responsibility of the activists and cadres to initiate the formation of revolutionary committees and peasant associations. Cadres were expected to unite the largest possible number of poor and middle peasants in organizations such as peasant associations. In so doing, these emerging activists would normally form a core of leadership whose task it was to lead the people in the struggles that followed. Ordinarily, such activists would constitute the basis of a "poor peasant committee." These committees developed and supplied the leadership of the village peasant associations which in turn were designed to include most of the peasants in the village.

In effect, this amounted to the creation of a whole new rural leadership nucleus within the village, one maintaining at least nominal loyalty to and linkage with the Communist Party and movement, and at the same time committed to change and reform within the village itself. But in order to begin the long process of raising the consciousness of the people and winning their support, it was necessary to determine and then promulgate issues to which the majority would actively respond.[1]

Consciousness raising - In bringing forth this response, the Party used such means as propagating slogans (part of the third phase of the Mass Line approach). Writing in 1943, Mao said:

> . . .in the general reform of 1942, all those who met with success had adopted the method of combining a general slogan with particular guidance. All those who were unsuccessful had failed to adopt this method (Compton, 1952, p. 176).

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[1] Again, this approach is shared by Communist leaders in other parts of the world:

> "This, then, is their (Communist leaders) approach to the technique of campaigning. Collectively, the leaders at all levels must find issues upon which to campaign which will relate activity to the real need of the people. Ideally, these issues should be linked to the people's deepest desires. Quite frequently Communist campaigns have, on the face of it, little to do with the long-term aims of Communism. But they have a great deal wo do with keeping Party members in action, attracting others to the movement and creating the image of a party which alone concerns itself with the lives and problems of ordinary folk" (Hyde, 1966, p. 106).

Raising the people's consciousness and winning their support required the active participation of the masses. It was in this effort that cadres, as leaders of reform committees and organizations, established the necessary preconditions. They called upon the people to categorize themselves and their fellow villagers, rich and poor, into classes, and to activate "struggle" between these classes (as described previously in the section on the history of the cadres).[1] The uniting of a fragmented, intimidated peasantry against their oppressors was no easy task, however. Mao himself noted this in "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership":

> However active the leading group may be, its activity will amount to fruitless effort by a handful of people unless combined with the activity of the masses. . . the masses in any given place are generally composed of three parts, the relatively active, the intermediate, and relatively backward. The leaders must therefore be skilled in uniting elements around the leadership and must rely on them to raise the level of the intermediate elements and to win over the backward elements (Mao Tse-tung, 1954,Vol. III, p. 118).

Class struggle - In revolutionary China, the Chinese Communist Party's understanding of the phrase "raising the consciousness of the masses" initially took the form of raising the class consciousness of the poor peasantry and workers. One major technique which local revolutionary leadership used to achieve this was through generating campaigns to arouse popular hostility towards a class or social enemy. This approach proved to be a powerful tool of social change -- "a force for undermining established social institutions and relationships, for overcoming the anxiety before power of those long politically passive" (Solomon, 1969, p. 95).

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[1] Those wishing to know more about the criteria used to classify people should consult the Appendix for Mao Tse-tung's "How to Analyse the Classes in the Rural Areas."
Note: The words "struggle," "line" and "policy" frequent much of Chinese Communist political literature. John Lewis has explained these terms in this way:

> "Struggle brings the perception of problems, lines raise this perception to rational appraisals of the general situation, and policies detail the carrying out of these revolutionary actions" (Lewis, 1963, p. 97).

Such hostility normally took the form of "speaking bitterness" against landlords and other exploiters of the people, "settling accounts at exploitation," and "seeking the root of poverty" by calling upon the people to discuss and analyse the causes of their own poverty. All three consciousness raising techniques were frequently carried out by means of discussion groups, large and small. In addition public meetings were held which not infrequently ended with those attending condemning their oppressors and demanding the redress of their grievances.[1]

In more recent times, instead of "struggle meetings" another form of meeting -- the "study meeting" -- has been widely utilized by cadres as another, more regular, means of consciousness raising. One such study meeting has been described in China: The Revolution Continued (Myrdal, 1970, pp. 13-17).

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[1] Compare Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed:

> "The oppressed must see examples of the vulnerability of the oppressor so that a contrary conviction can begin to grow within them. Until this occurs, they will continue disheartened, fearful and beaten. . . . This discovery (of the oppressor's vulnerability) cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to mere activism but must include serious reflection: only then will it be a 'praxis'"(Freire, 1972, pp. 51-52)

For a good early example of this see Mark Selden's description of the rent reduction movement of 1942-1944 (Selden, 1971, pp. 234-235).

Public Criticism - Another important technique, which was first used systematically in the resolution of conflicts during the Cheng Feng Movement and later expanded in usage, is the utilization of public criticism. Today this technique is one of the major means of behavioral reform, both within and outside the Chinese Communist Party. The technique itself is based on Lao's theory of contradictions in its emphasis on "unity-criticism-unit." Thus it was intended not simply as a method of exposing errors, but, more importantly, as a means of correcting those errors by argument, persuasion, and peer group pressure (Selden, 1971, p. 197).

In the Chinese context, there were some good reasons for applying this particular technique. According to Solomon:

> In the context of the general notion of the 'mass line' approach to leadership, the Party institutionalized the technique of group 'criticism-self-criticism', by which traditional attitudes towards the use of authority were to be overcome: the mandarin posture of stern aloofness and arrogance towards the lao pai hsing which had helped to maintain the political passivity of China's peasants was to be abandoned in favour of direct and active communication and social contact with those whose support was seen as necessary to the success of a mass political-military movement (Solomon, 1969, p. 88).

Public criticism served the function of forcing cadres to remain responsive to the needs and interests of the masses. In effect, it forced cadres to either defend their actions or admit their errors and commit themselves to changing their behavior.

An interesting parallel can be made between the use of public meetings and group criticism to correct behavior or thinking in China and the use of public meetings to censure deviant or immoral behavior in individuals in communal societies such as Hutterite colonies and Israeli kibbutzim. Theodore Caplow makes some observations on these forms of social control in his chapter "Utopian Communities" in Principles of Organization.

The cadres themselves also frequently serve as initiators of criticism sessions directed at other members of the public who were guilty of "unsocialist" practices. Self-criticism follows the same pattern as public criticism and is sometimes used in conjunction with public criticism and sometimes by itself as a means of having individuals declare their errors before others in their group or meeting.

One final technique used by cadres might be variously termed propagandizing, sloganeering, or information dissemination, and consists basically of making certain that Party or government material reaches all the people in their area. This may be done by means of wall posters, films, through talks with village organizations or general village meetings -- in essence differing little from the means of communication used in many other parts of the world.

Party Channels of Operation

No assessment of village cadres in practice would be complete without some mention of the importance of Party channels of operation in the role of the cadres. Rather than expatiating on Party organizational structure, etc. this study attempts only to describe the essence of

Party operation as it relates to the village cadres. In this writer's opinion, there are perhaps two salient features of Party operation at the local level: 1) its ability to maintain a "unity of command" among its members; and 2) its previously referred to ability to "analyze its own failings and strengths so as to prepare in the most comprehensive and realistic way for its vanguard mission" (Lewis, 1963, p. 201).

Unity - The Party has been able to maintain a high degree of unity by a number of means. Perhaps the most important of these was, and is, the stress which the Party places on disciplinary training and submission to central leadership. A 1941 Central Committee Resolution used during the Cheng Feng Movement summarizes this approach:

> Strict observation of the following is demanded: the individual must obey the organization, the minority must obey the majority, lower echelons must obey higher echelons, and the entire Party must obey the basic principles of the Central Committee (Compton, 1952, p. 159).

Self-correction - As regards the second feature, the Party's ability to analyze and attempt to correct its own failings and improve its own strengths, we have seen how such techniques as criticism and self-criticism, Party schools, study groups, study movements, etc. have assisted the Party in analyzing itself and attempting rectifications where necessary. Perhaps more than any other single factor, this genius at self-analysis and correction has given the Party a flexibility and viability almost unique among political organizations, rural or urban, anywhere in the world.

Summary

In this chapter we have attempted to outline some of the salient aspects of the Chinese village cadre as a change agent. In order that the reader might have a basic understanding of the history of cadre development in China, we first supplied a brief history of the cadre role in the Revolution. Following this, the author outlined two of the primary theoretical bases of cadre action in examining the Theory of Contradictions and its strategic corrollary, the Mass Line. From there we proceeded to examine more specific aspects of the cadre phenomenon, beginning with cadre selection and recruitment, followed by cadre education and training. In this latter section, we attempted to delineate some of the more important tactics used by cadres in introducing reforms into village settings. Throughout this chapter the writer has tried to avoid passing judgment on any aspect of the cadre phenomenon -- the business of assessment has been reserved for the following chapter. Let us now turn to that assessment.

CHAPTER III

ASSESSMENTS AND COMMENTARIES ON CADRE LEADERSHIP

Problems of Implementation

It is difficult for any student of Chinese affairs to fully comprehend the enormous problems faced by the Chinese Communist movement during the revolutionary period of the 1930's and 1940's and the initial post-revolutionary period of the early 1950's. Externally, the very existence of the movement was threatened at various times by both Japanese and Kou Min Tang forces vastly superior to the Communists in number as well as firepower. In addition, many Communist-held areas were geographically isolated from each other, and periodic enemy embargoes of goods in these areas made life very difficult for the local populations. Internally as well, many problems were experienced by the people as local elites resisted reforms in the villages.

For our purposes, however, the most crucial struggle during this period was within the movement itself. It was, perhaps, during this struggle that the Party demonstrated some of its greatest ingenuity and formulated some of its most enduring contributions to the revolutionary movement in China and other parts of the Third World as well. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one important aspect of the Party's genius was its continuous struggle within itself to improve its own performance. The following passage, written in 1950 by the Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Bureau, aptly summarizes the essence of this internal struggle:

> As everybody knows, the present strength and success of we Communists are but the result of our ceaseless efforts to conquer our own weaknesses and faults. Inasmuch as regular ideological struggles within the Party ranks constitute the main force responsible for impelling the Party towards progress, it is but natural for every large-scale ideological struggle or study movement to further consolidate our position (Hsi Chung-hsun quoted in Gourlay, 1952, p. 113).

As much of the evaluative literature on cadres in the villages addresses itself to cadre roles and performance rather than village problems or conditions, the greater part of this chapter will attempt to present and analyse that material.

Because the cadres have performed such vital functions, the Party has found it necessary to do two things: 1) allow local cadres considerable leeway, thus enabling them to apply themselves to the particular conditions of their village or region without heavy-handed intervention from higher government or Party functionaries; and 2) seek to develop and maintain a high level of unity of commitment to socialist ideology and action in order that at least reasonable uniformity of development may be maintained at the local level.[1]

Thus, by means of educational and rectification movements, the Party actively sought to expose cadre errors and improve cadre behavior. Campaigns aimed at doing this have occurred at various times since the first Cheng Feng Movement of 1942-1944, notably in 1947-1948, 1950, 1951-1954, 1957, 1962-1965 (the Socialist Education Movement) and

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[1] "The hallmark of the mass line concept is its balance of situational flexibility within the limits of firm operational principles" (Lewis, 1963, p. 98). So long as the Party has used a Mass Line philosophy, it has attempted to do this with its cadres in the field.

1966-1968 (the Cultural Revolution). While the particular emphasis of each movement has varied accordingly, there have been a number of common cadre problems which the Party has found necessary to attack as new cadres enter the fold and as older cadres are found to be operating inappropriately. These common problems, to some extent at least, appear to be interrelated and center around such things as the practices of "commandism," "tailism" and "bureaucratism" among cadres, cadre self-interest and "opportunism" and a continuing cadre "low cultural level."

The Basic Problem of Reeducating the People

It us surely no easy task to take the traditionally most backward classes in the country --the illiterate or semiliterate members of the poor peasant and landless labour classes -- and attempt to forge them into revolutionary village leadership elements. One need only imagine the difficulties this would present in another equally old traditional setting, such as village India, to appreciate the magnitude of the problem. In any event, if those recruited as cadres were to become truly effective change agents, then they, like the peasantry of which they were members, had to effectively break from the psychological and behavioral constraints of the old system of traditional village loyalties and subserviance to an archaic hierarchical value system.

If a decisive break could develop at this point, then the second development, i.e., the introduction of a new set of Communist-based and reform-oriented values and behavioral standards could follow accordingly. Cultures being what they are, however, this first step of breaking down loyalties to the old system has not been accomplished easily among either the cadres or the villagers as a whole. Even many of the most enthusiastic and dedicated cadrés, who scorned the landlords and other "oppressors of the people," had a tendency to assume the postures of those who had oppressed them in the first place.[1]

"Commandism"

One of the most persistently denounced forms of practice found among cadres has been given the label "commandism" by the Party. The following passage from a Party report of May, 1950, offers one description of how commandism operated at the village level, in this case with regard to the collection of taxes:

> The masses have much to criticize in connection with our working personnel. Their chief fault lies in their dependence on 'compulsive orders.' The cadres, in their failure to reach deep into the masses through propaganda and public elucidation campaigns, are inclined to depend on the simple issuance of orders. Thus various sums of money or quantities of stuff to be collected are arbitrarily determined by a minority of people, without allowing others to express themselves and without listening to the opinion of others. Mass meetings when held, are treated as matters of form where others are only allowed to agree to the ideas of the cadres but not to speak up against them at all. With the practice of true democracy thus discarded, all sorts of irregularities naturally crop up in the form of personal influence, special favours to friends and relatives, and undue pressure against the well-to-do (Hsi Chung-hsun, quoted in Gourlay, 1952, p. 109).

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[1] "Almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors or 'sub-oppressors'. The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. . .the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole" (Paulo Freire, 1972, pp. 29-30).

Other writers have described similar instances of "commandism." William Hinton's eyewitness account, Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village, describes several cases of commandism at work (Hinton, 1966, p. 238, for example) and Thomas Bernstein has noted the same thing in Hopei province in an article on "Problems of Village Leadership after Land Reform" (Bernstein, 1968, p. 16). Commandism continues to present itself as a problem having the affect of cutting local Party leadership off from the masses, although its cause is now rather different from its cause during the 1940's and early 1950's. As recently as 1967, James Townsend wrote:

> Judging from Party literature, 'commandism' is the greatest single manifestation of unsuitable cadres. Commandism may be due to incompetence or bad character but it is more likely to be the result of impatience with the mass line on the part of cadres who are overly enthusiastic or who are harassed beyond endurance by the demands from above (Townsend, 1967, pp. 206-207).

"Tailism"

The reverse of commandism also came to be recognized as a major problem, although it was not of quite the same magnitude as commandism. This problem was given the label "tailism" by the Party and occurred when cadres were not effectively leading their fellow villagers. Instead, they follow the determination of the local people on any matter, whether it corresponded to the general Party line on that matter or not. Mao himself characterized commandism as "rashness" and tailism as "hesitation," but does not admit the difficulties which many conscientious cadres encountered in attempting to operate effectively by striking a compromise between the two extremes (Mao, 1967, p. 198).

"Bureaucratism"

Finally, one additional problem which has been continually attacked by the Chinese Communist Party and which has, no doubt, helped to encourage practices such as commandism has been "bureaucratism."

> Bureaucratism consisted of these failings: higher level officials had made no effort to understand conditions in the villages. They did not understand the backwardness and lack of skill of the basic level cadres, nor did they grasp the limitations of what could immediately be done to change the ways of the peasantry. Hence higher level departments attempted to do too much too quickly without regard to objective limitations. . . . Each department assigned priority to its particular project and demanded immediate fulfillment from the basic level cadres. They put blind pressure on the village cadres in failing to define the scope and limits of what it was they wanted done, hence the excesses (Bernstein, 1968, pp. 17-18).

In fact, in the official analysis of the causes of commandism at the local level, bureaucratism at the district and provincial level has often been singled out as the most important contributing factor.

Low Cadre Cultural Levels

Another major cause of poor cadre performance lay in what the Party frequently refers to as "low cadre cultural level." While many peasant cadres demonstrated great courage and leadership ability during the struggle towards Liberation, from the point of view of developing the political and administrative machinery necessary to create and stabilize a new social order, they had several crucial deficiencies. These included: 1) a high rate of illiteracy; 2) generally no training or experience in administration; and 3) an inadequate understanding of revolutionary theory. This problem was remarked upon as early as 1943 during the Party's first rectification movement:

> Ninety percent of the subdistrict and township cadres are products of the revolutionary struggle and are positive elements closely linked to the masses. But generally they are deficient in cultural and intellectual development, thus limiting their ability for independent work. Moreover, their progress is greatly limited by concepts of village and family life (Mao Tse-tung quoted in Selden, 1963, p. 146).

This particular deficiency continued to plague the Party after Liberation. Bernstein notes that, in 1951, an attitude survey was taken of 109 long standing Party members in four village Party branches in the province of Shansi. The survey revealed that, while all members knew that the Party's ultimate goal was "communism," none of them had any clear conception of how this goal might be achieved. Also, some were willing to go along with the Party, while others felt that the status quo was adequate (Bernstein, 1968, p. 11).[1]

This low level of ideological acumen and administrative expertise also contributed to another problem. It sometimes enable a resurgence of landlord and rich peasant influence during the early years following land redistribution. It was the landlords and former gentry who were often the only people in the village with administrative expertise at that time. These people, by first offering their services to village cooperative societies and peasant associations, were soon able to secure themselves important positions in the new village leadership. If this process was not checked, the effect would frequently be the blunting, if not outright sabotaging, of local village revolutionary movements.

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[1] While the problem of low cadre cultural levels was to be alleviated to some extent in later years, it was clearly still in evidence in the early 1960's:

> "A report on Hopei in 1960, after great efforts to improve cadre education and to import outside political leadership for the communes, stated that over half of all commune cadres had only a 'lower middle' cultural level, or less and that many of them had had no systematic study of Marxism-Leninism or the writing of Mao Tse-tung" (Townsend, 1967, p. 206)

Lewis also comments on the stories of "pompous, ill-trained cadres" that are "repeated endlessly" by refugees in Hong Kong (Lewis, 1963, p. 202).

While low cadre cultural levels continue to present problems, the Party has engaged in a number of actions aimed at raising their overall cultural level. Besides teaching literacy, the Party has used some of the methods cited previously in the section on cadre training, particularly the use of oral communication and group study. The Cultural Revolution has also had a major, and continuing, impact on raising the ideological level, not only of the cadres, but also of the populace in general. This has been achieved through the popularization of many of Chairman Mao's works, especially the Little Red Book and his Selected Works (Jan Myrdal, China: The Revolution Continued, chapter 4).

Cadre Opportunism

Another major cadre deficiency seems to have developed predominately since Liberation. In general terms, the author has chosen to call it "cadre self-interest and opportunism." Because a high level of socialist behavior and activism is demanded of basic cadres as the leaders and "standard setters" for socialist practice in the villages, it is understandable that cadre behavior, contrary to this norm, would tend to discourage socialist initiatives and would be condemned by the Party. Among other things, the cadre is asked to reject self-interest and narrow family or group interests.[1] However, as many people who have tried rejecting self-interest have admitted, this is not an easy task, even for the dedicated. And basic cadres have not always proved to be as dedicated to the cause as the Party would like.

Some of the early difficulties which the Party experienced in this regard can be linked with low cadre cultural levels, for if local cadres had been more ideologically aware and committed, the Party might have seen a higher retention of activism among them in the early years following Liberation. As it was, 1951 and 1952, in particular, saw a rapid increase in passivity among cadres. The reason for this lay in the fact that, following land reform and the improvement of their physical and social positions, many village cadres wished to retire from political activism in order to devote their time to increasing their newly acquired wealth and status.[2]

> . . .there were two inter-related threats to the regime's goal of maintaining the village political base built up before and during the years of land reform. One was simply the trend toward withdrawal from political involvement, as basic level leaders sought to enrich themselves and their families. This trend toward political passivity threatened to erode the regime's organizational linkages with the village. The other trend was expressed by cadre Wang's remark: 'After I make a little money, I'll become active again.' The threatened consequence of this trend from the

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[1] This is the lesson of Mao's much publicized essay, "On the Memory of Norman Bethune."

[2] This account is another instance of Freire's contention that the oppressed, upon achieving liberation, usually seek to imitate their erstwhile oppressors, since the oppressed-oppressor dychotomy is the only life they know.

> "As upwardly mobile property owners, many cadres took the rich peasants as their reference group" (Bernstein, 1968, p. 9).

> Chinese Communist Party's point of view was that the rural leadership would become not only useless for socialist transformation, but even worse, a resisting obstacle (Bernstein, 1968, pp. 3-4).

The problem of cadre devotion to their expanded landholdings diminished with greater education, further rectification movements and particularly with the movement of the middle and late 1950's towards cooperativization and communization of holdings. This did not, however, mean an end to cadre self-interest and opportunism as an obstruction to the introduction of planned change at the local level. The period following the "three lean years," of 1959-1961, for instance, seems to have experienced the widespread incidence of cadre deviance from Party norms with cadres engaging in illegal or "immoral" activities. For example, documents captured from Lien-Chiang commune in Fukien province in 1964 revealed that basic level cadres shared in several of the unorthodox practices which were occurring at that time among the peasantry. These included such things as "extravagant squandering of money, excessive eating and drinking, reckless cutting down of collective forests, speculation and black market activities, superstitious practices, money marriages, etc." (Ridley and Chen, 1969, pp. 48-49). In addition, basic level cadres would, in some cases, use their position for special privileges, to misappropriate funds, etc.

There were also other cadres who, while not necessarily corrupt or engaged in unorthodox practices, were unwilling to continue to serve as cadres because of the burdens and tensions of the position. About eight per cent of the Lien-Chiang cadres were said to have this attitude (Baum, 1968, pp. 324-325). Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to assess how widespread these practices were among village cadres generally. We do, however, know that they were considered a serious problem at Lien-Chiang during the course of the Socialist Education Movement. In fact, this movement itself was directed primarily at decreasing such unorthodox or corrupt practices among the cadres and the peasantry.[1]

The Party has at various times utilized a fairly wide range of techniques in its efforts to make cadres more responsive to its own general line and priorities, as well as to the needs and interests of the masses. The various educational approaches cited earlier apply here, as does the use of group study, criticism and self-criticism. It is worth noting here that it was during the Socialist Education Movement and later during the Cultural Revolution, that cadres were first publicly criticized by the people themselves, rather than by their superiors in the Party as in previous campaigns and movements. In addition, it was sometimes necessary to replace indifferent or inefficient basic cadres. In any event, Party members were expected to be constantly looking for new recruits to replace those who had fallen by the wayside. The desirability of doing this had been expressed as early as 1943 in the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

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[1] One major focus on cadre reform at this time took the form of the "Four Cleans" campaign: ". . .the "Four Cleans" referred to the task of checking up on and clearing account books, granaries, state properties and work points. Cadre corruption in these matters was held to be the greatest single cause of peasant dissatisfaction with basic level leadership in the countryside. Such corruption, however, was adjudged to be an internal (i.e., non-antagonistic) contradiction, and was to be handled primarily through methods of persuasive education" (Baum, 1968, p. 326).

Resolution on Methods of Leadership:

> In the process of any great struggle, the leading nucleus in the initial, intermediate, and final stages should not be, and cannot be, entirely the same; activists (heroes) in the struggle must be constantly recruited to replace those elements which were originally part of the nucleus, but which have been found wanting on closer inspection, or have degenerated. A fundamental reason that the work in many areas and many organs has not progressed has been the lack of just such a constantly healthy leading nucleus, which is unified and connected with the masses (Compton, 1952, p. 178).

Certain other difficulties in cadre roles presented themselves as well. Sectarianism -- the tendency to give first loyalty to village or family rather than to Party and the Revolution --was denounced quite frequently in Party documents during the 1940's and 1950's. During this same period, Mao also decried "dogmatism" (preaching Marxist doctrine divorced from concrete realities) as a problem of many intellectual cadres, and its opposite, "empiricism" (practice divorced from theory), among non-intellectuals. He also spoke out regarding the need for cadres to do research into local conditions before beginning the action phase of their activities.

Interpretations of Cadre Problems

In addition to the various cadre difficulties which the Party has outlined and various "China-watchers" and others have commented on, there is also a certain amount of literature written outside of mainland China which attempts to interpret the cadre role in the villages. One especially important aspect of this literature which keeps reappearing in various fashions is what might be called "the weight of tradition" and its clash with an ideology which seeks the total transformation of a traditional value framework into a modern, egalitarian one. Franz Schurmann comments:

> If it is not difficult to conceive of ideology inculcating special categories and language, it is more difficult to conceive of a fundamental moral and psychological transformation of the individual. The values of Chinese Communist ideology diverge sharply from traditional Chinese values. Thus, struggle differs from harmony (stressed in Confucian ethics), the stress on public life differs from the earlier Chinese love of privacy, collectivism differs from earlier belief in individuality, and proletarianization, as we said, has no historical basis in Chinese traditional values (Schurmann, 1966, p. 49).

Cadre-Village Ties

One of the chief bastions of traditionalism in rural China, as in many other parts of the world, has been the family system and the presence of family and clan loyalties at the village level. Some writers, such as James Townsend, have commented on one aspect of this situation by pointing out that many of the veteran cadres of the 1960's emerged during the land reform and early cooperativization movements, and the Party used them effectively because of the importance of their personal ties in their villages. However, simply because they had such strong ties in their villages, many of them gave primary loyalty to their villages and hence were often subject to "particularism" (i.e., placing loyalties to one's family, clan, village, class or unit before loyalty to the state, nation and Party). Townsend suggests, and data such as the Lien-Chiang documents seem to confirm that, as late as the mid-1960's, a high degree of particularism still remained, both in the villages and among the cadres.

> The message of national loyalty has, of course, remained, but it is doubtful if political education, as it has actually been presented to the peasants by village leaders, has been as strongly oriented toward the destruction of particularism as central policy and propaganda suggest (Townsend, 1968, p. 208).

"Man-in-the-Middle"

Whether or not cadres were guilty of particularism, they were expected to remain in close touch with their fellow villagers and were to be genuinely accepted as village leaders. At the same time, however, a cadre was supposed to give first loyalty to the application of Party policy in the villages. Thus, the cadre's role placed him in a particularly difficult and vulnerable position. He had to confront the traditionalistic attitudes of his fellow villagers with the change oriented values of the Party. He had also to lead his people in the acceptance and application of the new values without alienating them or offending the Party.[1] He could not use force to bring about compliance to Party policy for to do so would not only alienate him from the rest of the village, but would also bring about peasant resistance in the form of passive resistance or counter-pressures. In any event, the use of force or excessive pressure to secure peasant cooperation has never been deemed acceptable by the Party. On the other hand, if certain Party priorities or goals are not achieved at the village level, it is the cadre, not the masses, who is seen as being at fault by the Party.

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[1] Thomas Bernstein (Barnett, 1969, p. 398), Ezra Vogel (Treadgold, 1967, pp. 183-184) and Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwe (Asian Survey, April, 1968, pp. 323-345) all comment on this problem.

Another major difficulty which some writers see as a continuing problem in maximally cultivating the cadre as an agent of social change has been what was initially referred to as the contradiction between "virtue" and "ability" (later the "Red" and "Expert" contradiction). This particular problem was related not only to basic level cadres, but to all Party cadres, high or low. In effect, what the Party sought in order to maintain unity and a continuing revolutionary ardor within its ranks was a membership that was technically qualified to fulfil the various specialized tasks of development and administration and yet was dedicated to a collectivist society. This combination was not easily achieved, however. Franz Schurmann elaborates:

> The value of expertise is essentially a technical goal, in the sense that the educated individual aspires to acquire skills and knowledge. The value of 'red' is essentially a human goal, in that it requires the total transformation of an individual, a 'resocialization' as the sociologists say. However, the human consequence of expertise appears to be 'individualism'. And individualism is in its essence anti-organizational. The consequences of expertise are what the Chinese Communists have in mind when they attack the professional intellectuals. However, on theoretical and empirical grounds it can be argued that the indoctrinated red cadre develops capacities for organizational commitment and solidarity, but at the cost of not becoming a technical expert himself (Schurmann, 1966, p. 52).

Since the beginning of the Cheng Feng Movement in 1942, the Party has attempted to make its "experts" more "red." In like manner, since the first schools were established for the training of basic level cadres, it has attempted to provide these cadres with some technical expertise as well as "redness." Since the early 1960's in particular, with the advent of the Socialist Education Movement followed by the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Party has called on rural cadres and peasants to read Chairman Mao's works and to "place politics in command" of all economic and productive tasks.[1] It is difficult to estimate how successful this policy has been. However, perhaps the best indication of at least qualified success in this regard can be implied from the steadily increasing national agricultural production figures since the early 1960's.

A Preliminary Assessment of the Chinese Cadre as Change Agent

Thus far, the author has attempted to make as objective a presentation and analysis of Chinese basic level cadres as possible. There is, however, one very important element which almost any external observer or researcher must sacrifice for the sake of "objectivity." This element is a firsthand sense of the feelings of those who were immediately a part of the action described or who were responding to it. I.F. Stone has described this problem in relation to the military literature on guerrilla warfare, a case which finds many appropriate parallels in the academic literature on the Chinese liberation struggle and the role of cadres during and after this period.

> In reading the military literature on guerrilla warfare now so fashionable at the Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from outside through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they can't hear the music. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper with pedantic fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured racial feelings, the

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[1] For an interesting account of cadre policy during this period, see (Baum, China Quarterly, April-June, 1969, pp. 96-98).

> misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the desperation. So they don't really understand what leads men to abandon wife, children, home, career, friends; take to the bush and live gun in hand like a hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce any longer to humiliation, injustice or poverty. . . . (Stone, 1968, pp. 173-174).

This hiatus between feeling and "objectivity" can be a genuine problem, especially when making an evaluation of a subject such as the one chosen. Ultimately, this writer has concluded that in this case an "objective" assessment which does not take into consideration the "feeling" components involved may be "objective" but it can hardly be said to offer an accurate picture of the situation. The author believes that accuracy is more important than "objectivity" and will attempt to give an accurate assessment of the subject thus far.

Penetrating the Villages

Perhaps the cadres' outstanding contribution to the Communist cause in China has been their penetration of their own villages and their forging of a village loyalty to the state and its commitment to reform and modernization. As Schurmann has phrased it:

> By creating a new Communist party and by training a new type of leader, the cadre, the Chinese Communists were finally able to achieve what no state power in Chinese history had been able to do: to create an organization loyal to the state which was also solidly imbedded in the natural village (Schurmann, 1966, p. 416).

In "On Methods of Leadership," Mao and the Central Committee outlined three points for leadership operation which were considered crucial for successful cadre operation in the field: 1) action must be based on the unity of internal party relations and on trained, proved cadres; 2) success in action depends on overall, daily performance of cadres at the working level; and 3) each stage of the Mass Line method must be well defined, concrete, pretested, and must "utilize all available devices (techniques) to arouse and involve the people" (Mao Tse-tung, 1956, pp. 111-117).

Throughout this analysis of village cadres, the author has observed how the above points were not always fulfilled. By the Party's own admission, there has been a shortage of "trained, proved" (and committed) cadres since the Party first started relying on them in the villages. Nor has cadre daily performance at work been as good as the Party had hoped for (for instance, frequent charges of cadre "opportunism" and self-interest have been noticed); nor have all the stages of the Mass Line method been scrupulously followed at all times (note the charges of "commandism," hasty research into village conditions, etc.).

It would be unrealistic to conclude that the Party has experienced no major difficulties in policy implementation at the village level. On the other hand, however, it is equally clear that since the 1940's the Party has persisted in its recruitment and utilization of local activists as leadership elements and basic cadres at the village level. Must we attribute this to a blind ideological commitment to one particular approach? If yes, this would be a major departure from the otherwise essentially pragmatic approach to development which has been an outstanding characteristic of most Communist Chinese development initiatives. Or has the village cadre proved himself to be of real value over and above his apparent deficiencies? In seeking an answer to this question, one must refer to some of the previously presented material.

Pre-liberation and post-liberation cadres - It is worth noting that the nature and effect of the cadre role as village change agent is somewhat different in the pre-liberation and post-liberation periods. Pre-liberation cadres fulfilled the vital function of winning support for the Party in their villages and introducing the first real village reforms, thereby promoting the first real development of the new consciousness among their fellow villagers. In doing so, the cadres themselves were often only slightly more knowledgeable of the nature of the reform process than were the villagers. Therefore, while serving as leaders, they were often simultaneously subject to the same consciousness raising process that their fellow villagers were experiencing. As such, village cadres behaved admirably, forging a link between the Party and the people, and carrying out reforms basic to the Communist program, often in spite of the fact that most lacked any substantial formal education or systematic knowledge of Marxist ideology. Here also, we must emphasize the fundamental importance of the sense of dedication which so many cadres demonstrated in their commitment to the cause of revolutionary change.

After 1949, this situation was to change substantially as the Party and government sought to consolidate control over the countryside. While the cadre still remained the vital link between the people and the Party, his position was supplemented with the introduction of various mass organizations -- associations, cooperative societies, women's associations, etc. Also, the cadre's role came to be understood as continuing the task of raising public consciousness, rationalizing and improving production, and advancing the movement away from an individualist/family frame of reference and towards a collectivist approach.

In order to achieve these ends, cadres would have to be equipped with certain ideological and technical tools. We have observed that, for at least some cadres, only a minimal ideological and "cultural" level was attained and expertise in the use of certain techniques remained questionable. Also, for whatever reasons -- self-interest, overwork, lack of understanding of what was to be accomplished --cadres were not always spurred on with the same high level of devotion to the cause which characterized the pre-liberation period.

Leaders and followers - That such problems should have presented themselves is quite understandable. A leader can only be as good or as effective as his followers allow him to be, and the weight of tradition hung heavy in many Chinese villages well after land reforms and other measures had broken the back of the old feudalism. Most cadres had been raised in either the villages in which they worked or in other villages quite like them. Therefore, in spite of the training they may have received from the Party, they found it difficult to go against everything they had known during their lives in their villages. Indeed, any cadres who went totally against village norms would soon have found themselves isolated from the villagers. Had the Party made widespread use of "outside" cadres who were strongly committed to the Party line but lacked the confidence of the villagers, the result would have been the same. And it was, in fact, isolation from popular peasant support which the Party sought to avoid above almost any other consideration. Thus, it is understandable why the Party has continually sought to upgrade its older cadres, develop new ones, and enable all to better win local support while carrying out national or provincial policies.

There are other reasons why cadres have had problems at the village level. We have already noted the difficulties cadres have experienced as "men in the middle" caught between village and Party loyalties. In the Chinese case, it was often the Party bureaucracy which intentionally or unintentionally encouraged poor practices such as commandism among basic cadres. We previously noted how overwork sometimes forced cadres to abandon the use of more time consuming methods such as persuasion and village discussions. Since the Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960's, the Party has attempted to rectify such bureaucratic malpractices. Because they are given responsibility for activating the peasants at the local level, village cadres have been greatly criticized if the peasants are not activated. While this may be the case in certain instances, one can also observe many other instances where the masses themselves may not wish to become activated over a certain issue, for whatever reason. It is not, however, customary for the masses themselves to be criticized by the Party. The Party criticizing the people (especially the working class) could have two effects: 1) it could have the effect of alienating the people from the Party; and 2) by inference, it contradicts the Party's frequently repeated assertion of an identity of interests between the workers and the peasants and the Party itself. Therefore, it is usually the cadre who, officially at least, is made responsible for those instances where a conflict of interests exists between the Party and the peasantry.

Another aspect of the cadre role as change agent is the important role which cadres played in bringing the people into active participation in their own development. Such participation is a cornerstone of the Mass Line philosophy. Both Mao and Liu Shao-chi, as well as other Party leaders, time and again emphasized the necessity of involving the masses in the planning and execution of change in almost all phases.[1]

Another important aspect of the cadre change agent approach which has lent credibility to their role as far as their fellow villagers are concerned is the fact that, in addition to being from the communities in which they work, most basic level cadres also share the same tasks as other peasants. Formerly most cadres were unofficial peasant leaders and currently many work as commune work team leaders, brigade leaders and other positions of semi-official leadership. This practice is in conformity with the Communist Chinese conception of the necessity of egalitarianism in relations between the Party leadership and the masses.[2] If we apply this to the case of work groups, then it follows that those wishing to exert influence for change within that group are best advised to be a part of that working group themselves.

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[1] Reputable Western social scientists and social psychologists have affirmed the advisability of this approach in their own research. Coch and French, for example, determined that industrial productivity could be greatly increased by giving workers more responsibility for methods of work organization and supervision and by allowing them full participation in the important decisions (Zaltman, 1972, p. 77).

Conclusion

In conclusion, let us return to one of this study's initial questions: have cadres justified their existence as change agents or are they more a creation of ideological necessity than truly effective agents of change? In quantitative terms, it is still difficult to answer this question. We know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what major difficulties the Party has experienced through its use of cadres, as well as how these cadres have been used successfully in many instances. But with one or two exceptions (such as the Lien Chiang documents), we do not know how many cases of cadre inefficiency or misbehavior have been committed in any given area, or how many cadre-led projects have been successfully completed to the satisfaction of the Party and the people.

Ultimately, perhaps, we must expand our vision somewhat in order

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[1] It also finds justification in the findings of Western social psychologists, as do various other aspects of the cadre approach. For example, Darwin Cartwright tells us, with regard to "the group as a medium of change," that:

> "If the group is to be used effectively as a medium of change, those people who are to be changed and those who are to exert influence for change must belong to the same group" (Cartwright, 1972, p. 79).

to get at least a partial answer to that question. We must ask ourselves several questions. How well has rural development generally proceeded in the Chinese countryside? Have cadre-led, collectivized production units resulted in greater agricultural production? Have cadre-led reforms had a decided impact on the behavior and ways of thinking of the people themselves? Are the people enjoying, happier, fuller, more satisfying lives as a result of these changes?

To all these questions a large and diverse body of statistical data, social and economic research, travel descriptions and reports, etc. indicate an almost unqualified affirmative response. Rural development has proceeded amazingly well in China over the last twenty-five years. With the exception of a few bad years (such as the 1959-1961 "three lean years" period), agricultural production has steadily risen, cadre-led reforms have had a major impact on village behavior and ways of thinking, and the people certainly appear to be leading happier, fuller, more secure lives than ever before. It seems equally certain that the Chinese village cadre must receive a good deal of the credit for having brought about this result. However, the cadre approach must also be compared to other village change agent approaches, such as the Village Level Worker, if we are to reach some final assessment of the strength of the cadre approach.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHINESE CADRE CHANGE AGENT APPROACH AS IT HAS BEEN APPLIED ELSEWHERE

In previous chapters we have discussed the cadre approach without any extensive reference to other similar approaches. This may have left the reader with the impression that this study examines a singular phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese case, with no antecedents and no application outside of China itself. This is clearly not the case.

Origins of the Cadre Concept

The cadre concept per se is not a unique creation of the Chinese Revolution; rather it was developed during the course of the Russian Revolution. Stalin, in his writings on Soviet Party organization, wrote about cadres and he utilized local Party cadres extensively, although in a much more bureaucratic and dictatorial fashion than was the case in China. Georgi Dimitroff, General Secretary of the Communist International during the 1930's, also wrote at some length about Party cadres. One of his more important statements on the subject was made during the Comintern's Seventh World Congress held in August, 1935. This particular statement is said to have had a fairly strong influence on the development of the cadre concept during the Chinese Communist Party's Yenan period. For example, the "main criteria in the selection of cadres" as outlined by Dimitroff in his speech, were to become important aspects of cadre selection policy among Chinese Communists: 1) "absolute devotion of the cause of the working class" and "loyalty to the Party" under any conditions; 2) "the closest possible contact with the masses"; 3) "ability independently to find one's bearings and not to be afraid of assuming responsibility in making decisions"; and 4) "discipline and Bolshevik hardening of the struggle against the class enemy" (Dimitroff, 1938, pp. 119-120).

In addition, other widely applied Communist and Comintern policies of the time were applied at the local level by the cadres. For example, the United Front concept which the Comintern espoused during the 1930's found its national application in China with the Chinese Communist Party's establishment of a "United Front" with the Kou Min Tang against the invading Japanese. At the local level, the cadres applied the United Front approach by attempting to unite the various factions within a given village -- the poor peasants, rich peasants, even landlords -- into a united effort against the Japanese (see Chapter IV of Crook's Revolution in a Chinese Village for a particular example of this). Thus we see that, while the concept of the political cadre was not indigenous to the Chinese movement itself, the Party, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and others, refined and developed the concept and extended it to situations which had previously not been anticipated

Cadre Use Elsewhere

It seems fairly clear that certain cadre precepts and policies used during China's revolutionary struggle and afterwards have been further adopted for application outside China. This has occurred in spite of frequent warnings by the Chinese Communist Party that each country must base its revolutionary movement on its own particular conditions.[1] While some writers have affirmed the basic differences of the approach used,[2] it is nonetheless difficult to deny the impact of the Chinese example. After all, the Chinese Revolution was, in Mark Selden's words, "the first and classic people's war" (Millar and Aya, 1971, p. 180) and it is difficult to deny the importance of the Chinese model for other developing countries seeking to create an egalitarian socialist society.

It is, however, not only the force of the model, but also (and perhaps more importantly) a similarity in conditions that have led other countries to adopt certain aspects of the Chinese approach. In particular, countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam, as well as liberation movements such as the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, have successfully adopted several important aspects of the Chinese cadre approach. Like China, these countries previously were subject to a semi-feudal socio-economic system with landholdings concentrated in the hands of landlord elites. Also, both countries, like China, have a general scarcity of available land in relation to the size of the labour force.

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[1] Ho Chi-minh, whose country has been one of the chief adopters of the Chinese approach, has reiterated this as well:

> "We do not carry on studies to learn by heart every sentence and every word and apply the experience of brother countries in a mechanical way. We must learn Marxism-Leninism to analyse and solve the actual issues of the revolution in our country according to its particular conditions" (Ho, 1968, p. 181).

[2] Despite many similarities, the Chinese, Vietnamese, Algerians and Cubans fought very different wars and owed little to Mao's 'doctrine'. . ." (Eqbal Ahmad, 1971, p. 180).

Democratic Centralism and the Mass Line in Vietnam and Korea

The principle of democratic centralism has been adopted as a basic aspect of cadre policy in North Korea, North Vietnam, and within the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Pike, with reference to the NLF tells us:

> Democratic centralism was defined in various (NFL) documents as 'decisions made at committee meetings by majority vote, which individuals must then obey'. . . . The minority obeys the decision of the majority. . . , the lower echelons obey the decisions of the upper echelons, all elements of the Revolution obey the Central Committee. . ." (Pike, 1966, p. 149).

What is significant about this definition is that, almost word for word, it matches the definition the Chinese have given as one of their interpretations of democratic centralism.

In addition to their utilization of democratic centralism as an organizational principle, Ho Chi-minh and Kim Il Sung refer to the importance of the Mass Line in advancing their own revolutions. Both seem to have adopted the Chinese extension of democratic centralism, both generally and with specific reference to village cadres.

Other Techniques Utilized in Vietnam and Korea

In addition to the adoption of such basic strategies as democratic centralism and the Mass Line, it seems apparent that the countries mentioned have also utilized a number of Chinese techniques and tactics with at least a reasonable amount of success. Some of these techniques and tactics are as follows:

1) Selden and Chaliand have informed us that in both North and South Vietnam, the Viet Minh, followed by the NLF, have utilized cadres in a manner similar to the Chinese by first winning the support of a broad spectrum of the peasantry through campaigns to reduce rents on agricultural lands, followed by land reforms through land redistribution (Selden, 1971 b, p. 225; Chaliand, 1967, p. 35). They also mention, together with Douglas Pike, that both countries have used village cadres working alongside the people to introduce their reforms. Chaliand, for example, tells us that North Vietnamese cadres were called upon to practice the "three togethers" -- living together, eating together, working together. In the case of South Vietnam, the cadres were often local people who had gone north during the 1950's to escape the Diem regime and then returned, beginning in 1963, to start the job of organizing their home villages (Pike, 1966, p. 117).

2) By and large, the cadres in North and South Vietnam used various means in attempting to raise the political consciousness of the peasantry. These included such tactics as: a) division of villagers along class lines similar to the divisions used by the Chinese -- in this case, poor peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, and landlords (Conley, 1968, p. 211); b) the widespread utilization of certain slogans and "partial demands" (Conley, 1968, p. 211); c) developing organizations such as poor peasant leagues which acted as support associations under the centralized control of the Party (Conley, 1968, p. 213); d) the use of denunciation and "struggle" meetings in the course of introducing

reforms (Pike, 1966, p. 94; Conley, 1968, p. 216); and e) the use of criticism and self-criticism as a means of correcting and improving cadre practices. This last practice is also mentioned by Kim Il Sung as an important aspect of the North Korean cadre policy (Kim, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 239).

Difficulties of Cadres in Action

Certain common difficulties have been encountered in the pursuit of these policies, and at least some of these difficulties are reminiscent of those which the Chinese Communist Party faced with its local cadres. Ho Chi-minh, as well as Kim Il Sung, bemoans the "low level of ideological understanding" within the Party which comes as a result of its widespread use of uneducated cadres and Party members (Ho, 1968, p. 177 and Kim, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 44). He also calls for a personal campaign against what is surely a common obstacle to any dedicated, socialist movement --individualism, "the most dangerous enemy of socialism."[1]

Another problem which seems to be fairly common to such movements is "commandism." Chaliand alludes to this problem which the PAIGC liberation movement in Portugese Guiné has experienced in its utilization of local leaders as movement representatives in their villages (Chaliand, 1969 b, p. 123), as does Kim Il Sung in the North Korean instance. Kim has also noted the "defect: of practicing favoritism or partiality towards friends and relatives which has been found among some cadres (Kim, 1971, p. 18).

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[1] One is reminded here of slogans used during the Chinese Cultural Revolution such as "Fight Self" and "Serve the People."

Similarities

Having briefly surveyed some of the cadre practices, it seems apparent to this writer that, while each country mentioned has found it necessary to develop its movement in its own way, similar conditions have often been met with similar strategies and tactics, at least so far as the use of village cadres is concerned. It also appears that these similar approaches are prone to similar strengths. For example, the recruitment of village activists as cadres or change agents in the contexts mentioned has generally had the effect of providing the Party with direct links with the villages and the people and of winning their support for the cause of their own liberation. One is left with the feeling, however, that this strategy has also been subject to similar defects -- poor intellectual understanding and administrative capacity, etc. among cadres because of their low educational level, as well as such tendencies as "commandism," etc. Nonetheless, as we have seen these movements seem prepared to accept these defects in exchange for the strength which these cadres give to their movements. In fact, one can safely say that the shape and character of these movements in the villages would be totally different in the absence of the sort of village level cadre we have described.

Let us now turn to a completely different type of change agent, the village level worker, particularly as found in India.

CHAPTER V

VILLAGE LEVEL WORKERS AS CHANGE AGENTS

Introduction

In this chapter we will focus on a different type of change agent fostered by a very different system, but like the Chinese village cadre, committed to introducing change at the village level. This type of change agent is the Village Level Worker (or VLW as he will be referred to henceforth. There are a number of reasons for choosing the "multi-purpose village level worker" rather than another type of change agent. Several of these reasons were listed in the first chapter: 1) the similarity of work context of village cadres and VLW's; 2) the major responsibility which both assume for the introduction of change in the countryside; 3) the distinctly different approaches which village cadres, as Party political workers, and village level workers, as government functionaries, utilize as change agents; and 4) the different forms of development which these two types of workers have engendered.

A range of topics similar to those treated in the previous chapters on cadres will be covered: 1) the basic philosophy of VLW's as change agents; 2) a short history of VLW's; 3) VLW selection, recruitment and training; and 4) techniques used by VLW's. From time to time, contrasting reference will be made to Chinese cadres where appropriate, though major comparisons will only be made in the final chapter. The final sections of this chapter will deal with an overall assessment and commentary on village level workers as change agents.

This chapter will focus primarily on village level workers as they have been developed and utilized in India. However, frequent reference to VLW's in Pakistan and the Philippines will be made as well.[1] The reason for this is that, while all three countries have utilized VLW's in similar fashions, it was in India that the VLW concept was first developed and applied systematically throughout the country on a much larger scale than in either Pakistan or the Philippines. In addition, there is a more comprehensive body of literature on VLW's in India. Also, the Indian case lends itself most easily to comparison with the Chinese case. When they first undertook to develop themselves in the early 1950's both countries faced similar difficulties, the most fundamental of which was the fact that both countries possessed large land masses with immense and very diversified rural populations living in semi-feudal, poverty-striken conditions.[2] However, they have attempted to overcome these difficulties in two quite different ways, one by revolutionary means and the other, as we shall see, by more evolutionary means.

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[1] Village level workers in the Philippines were referred to as barrio development workers (BDW's) while in Pakistan they were called village AID workers. However, for the sake of simplicity and continuity, all three will be referred to as VLW's in this work.

[2] Because of these apparent similarities, China and India have frequently been the subject of comparative analyses by students of development. In this writer's knowledge, however, there has never been a detailed comparison made of Indian VLW's and Chinese village cadres.

Finally, it should be understood that this chapter will seek to highlight salient aspects of the VLW approach rather than investigate it in detail as in the case of Chinese village cadres. The reason for this is fairly straight forward. Because there is an ample body of descriptive and analytical material on village level workers -- particularly Indian VLW's -- it will not be necessary to establish many facts and conclusions about the VLW approach because in many cases a consensus already exists among many writers in this area. Nevertheless, while the VLW approach will be highlighted on the basis of previously established material, this writer's interpretation of that material should later allow an assessment of the VLW approach in a new and different light.

Village Level Workers: A Rationale

History

The conceptualization and development of village level workers as agents of change has been integrally related to the conceptualization and development of community development programs in the countries under consideration. The Indian Community Development Program in many ways established the conceptual foundation of the community development programs in Pakistan and the Philippines. The Indian program traces its origin to the ideas of village uplift and self-help first propagated by Gandhi and Tagore in the 1930's and 1940's, and F.L. Brayne in the Punjab during the same period. The concept of the village worker or "gram sevak" (literally "village servant") also traces its origin to this idea, for it was the gram sevak who was to serve the village and help it develop as part of a system of basically self-sufficient "village republics." Later, beginning in 1947-1948, this concept of village worker was systematized during the course of the now famous Etawah Pilot Project in Uttar Pradesh in northern India.[1] The concept of the multi-purpose worker at the village level as the primary agent of change in India's villages was developed from these projects.

The VLW Role

In contrast to most Chinese cadres, the multi-purpose village level worker in India was an "external" rather than an "internal" change agent. That is, very few VLW's came from the villages in which they worked, although they were supposed to have grown up in a village.

In effect, the VLW was seen as the basic agent of diffusion in "an integrated approach to village development in which technical workers functioned as part of the overall village team working through the multi-purpose village level worker." The VLW was to become "the funnel through which the help of all the development departments will be available to the villager" (Brokensha and Hodge, 1969, p. 59). The evolution of this concept, as defined by Albert Mayer, the American director of the Etawah Project, has been described by V.P. Pande:

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[1] The Etawah Project was one of four early projects which served as precursors of India's national community development program. The other three were the Nilokheri resettlement project in the Punjab, the Faridibad rehabilitation scheme near Delhi, and the Firka Development Scheme in Madras (Dube, 1958, pp. 8-11).

> The idea of the village level worker was not new. Brayne had his 'village guides' and Tagore and Gandhi had their village workers, who served the villages in their own way. But Mayer greatly increased the utility of a village worker by making him 'multi-purpose' and training him in the methods of the 'village approach', i.e., how to make friends with the people and enthuse them for village work by means of group meetings, individual discussions, etc. He also raised his salary and status and, to make him more effective, reduced his area of work to four villages (Pande, 1967, p. 159).

Because its objective was both the improvement of the material well-being of the individual villager and the establishment of progressive, self-reliant village communities, the Community Development Program as it emerged in India was seen as a multi-purpose, multi-focused endeavor. In a like manner, the role of the village level worker was multi-purpose, but it was designed essentially to advance the dual aims of the program. These dual aims were: 1) introducing material improvements and developing an awareness and interest in material change among villagers; and 2) encouraging the development of stable, self-reliant communities imbued with a sense of cooperative endeavor.

Again, we see that both the aims of the program and the objectives of the multi-purpose VLW's stand in contrast to the aims of Chinese rural development and the objectives of the Chinese village cadres. It can be said that the aim of the Chinese rural development program is the improvement of the social and material well-being of the rural collectivity by reform and improvement of social relations and the relations of production. In fact, in the Chinese case, the self-reliant community was not originally viewed as the ideal. Instead, it was the village unit which had become well integrated with the social and economic life of the country at large, although rural areas are expected to pull their own weight economically.

On the other hand, both VLW and cadre programs have stressed the need for popular participation in development by involving the people through discussions, participation in cooperative efforts, etc. Indian community development literature has also continually stressed the need for VLW's to win the trust and confidence of the villagers and, wherever possible, to attempt to develop local programs along the lines of the "felt needs" expressed by the villagers themselves.[1] This forms an interesting comparison with the Chinese Mass Line philosophy of "from the masses, to the masses." We will explore this further in the next chapter.

As the most fundamental aspect of its community development program, the VLW approach in India and elsewhere has followed an evolutionary "improvement-through-inputs" approach rather than a transformation approach aimed at fundamentally redirecting social relations and relations of production.

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[1] A similar emphasis on "felt needs" is found in the literature on the Pakistan Community Development Program:

> "The only criterion is that they (problems for which VLW's seek assistance) must be needs felt and acknowledged by the villagers and on which they are willing to work. These needs are as broad as the village itself" (Government of Pakistan Village AID Five Year Plan quoted in Mezerow, 1963, p. 191).

History of VLW's

India

India has the distinction of being the first developing country to launch a large scale community development program using village level workers as basic change agents. Fifteen pilot projects were initiated by the program in 1951 and these were expanded to fifty-five community development blocks in 1952. According to the First Five Year Plan (1952-1956), "extension would be the agency, and community development the method, by which improvements in all areas of rural life would be accomplished" (quoted in Pande, 1967, p. 173).

Increasing agricultural production was considered the first priority, and VLW's were given more training in this area than in all others combined. At the same time that the fifty-five community development blocks began functioning, the government organized thirty-four centres to train village level workers and other extension officers (Taylor, et al., 1966, pp. 197 and 225). The general image of the program which developed at this time has been summarized by P.R. Dubhashi:

> To sum up the Indian approach to programme determination in community development, it is multi-purpose, but with a stress on agricultural production; local but within the framework of the national policy; mobilizing groups and communities, but at the same time providing incentives to individual farmers; sustained but allowing for campaigns whenever needed (Dubhashi, 1970, p. 72).

We will now briefly examine the community development programs of India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, for without a reasonable understanding of these programs, we cannot expect to understand the role of the VLW.

The India and Pakistani Community Development Programs

In 1952, Pakistan began a community development program (called Village AID Program) along lines similar to those developed in India. Pakistan proposed to spend 2.7 per cent of its total planned public expenditure on the community development program during its first Five Year Plan (India, in comparison, allotted a somewhat larger proportion of its planned public expenditure -- 4.2 per cent). By 1960, the Pakistani government had invested $14.8 million in financing the program. It had also received a more than equivalent amount from the United States -- $6 million in American funds, $9.5 million in local currency from the sale of PL480 wheat, and $2.7 million from the Ford Foundation (Mezirow, 1963, p. 68). India, during the same period, was also given heavy United States financial assistance for its program, as well as considerable advice and assistance from American advisors, who had a major impact on shaping the program during its formative years.

The program rationale in India, as well as in Pakistan, called for a number of specialists whose job it was to back up the VLW's in particular fields and to assist in coordinating development efforts in the countryside in general. Accordingly, these people, as well as the VLW's, became incorporated in a larger administrative structure. In the Indian case, as the program expanded throughout each state in the country, it was divided into districts, which in turn were divided into "blocks," with about ten blocks per district. There was a total of 5,265 blocks throughout the country by 1965. Each block was composed of about one hundred villages having a total population of 60,000 to 100,000. In charge of community development at the block level was a team of eight specialist extension officers trained in agriculture, animal husbandry, cooperatives, rural industries, rural engineering, panchayats, and social education.

This team was headed by a general administrator known as a Block Development Officer (BDO). At the village level, the village level workers were assigned a "circle" of five to ten villages (usually about ten, in practice) with each VLW making his residence and headquarters in one of these villages. Carl Taylor has described the VLW's prescribed role in this context:

> He would render first aid technical assistance, catalyse and help organize village groups for self-help undertakings, and be the agent through which village needs could be made known to the Block Development Officer and his specialists. Through him, Block technical specialists could channel their proffered technical aid to the villagers (Taylor, et al., 1966, p. 177).

By 1959, the Indian Community Development Program encompassed 61 per cent of India's rural population and was continuing to expand. At the same time, the Pakistani program, while not as extensive, had established development areas which included about 12,700,000 people, or about eighteen per cent of Pakistan's total population. A total of 2,558 male VLW's were posted in these areas, giving an average of seven villages or 5,000 people per VLW, somewhat lower than the Indian average of about ten villages or 7,000 people per VLW.

The Philippines

In contrast to India and Pakistan, the Philippines had a smaller, less concentrated population and a much greater literacy rate (72 per cent as contrasted with 26 per cent for India and about the same for

Pakistan) as well as a "wealthier" population. In the Philippines a barrio development worker covers only up to five or six barrios (neighbourhoods or communities or a total population of between 1,000 and 1,500). By 1970, the Philippine community development program had trained 3,000 such VLW's, although the program only covers about fifteen per cent of the rural areas. A non-official, voluntary program covers some of the areas not assisted by the government program. Between its inception in 1956 and about 1965, an important focus of the barrio workers' efforts lay in developing amenities such as foot bridges, community centres, and latrines rather than in increasing agricultural production. Since the introduction of the "Green Revolution" in the mid-1960's, however, an increasing amount of the workers' time has been spent in the agricultural area. Like the Indian and Pakistani programs, the Philippine program has been subject to considerable American financial support and influence in program policy.

Changes in India's Community Development Program

Calls for a more responsive, decentralized bureaucracy within the Community Development Program in India led to the instituting, beginning in 1959 in the state of Rajasthan, of a structure of popular representation aimed at promoting "democratic decentralization." This structure was known as the Panchayati Raj system. The traditional Indian village or "gram panchayat" was revived and given the task of representing its village before the next highest public participative body, the Panchayat Samati, or Block Council. The Council was composed of about twenty village-nominated representatives from the one hundred villages in the Block. In turn, the Panchayat Samati was represented in the next largest representative body, the Zila Parishad, or District Council. According to this system, the VLW was responsible to the ten panchayats in his village circle; the BDO was responsible to the Panchayat Samati; and the District Commissioner was responsible to the Zila Parishad. However, in terms of power, none of these bodies could either hire or fire VLW's or other government personnel. Also they had limited powers of financial jurisdiction. In practice, they were frequently under the influence of the VLW or BDO and a few of the wealthier farmers or landlords who had managed to get elected to the Council.

Today India's Community Development Program continues to operate throughout the country and takes responsibility for a major portion of India's rural development efforts. It has, in recent years, come under increasing criticism, both within the government and among the public, for not having improved the quality of village life very substantially. Some of these criticisms will be dealt with later in our assessment and evaluation of the VLW, who has also been subject to a great deal of criticism in the Indian context. It should be noted, moreover, that while the program and its VLW's continue to operate throughout the country, there appears to be a general consensus that the program has not proved to be the success that many had hoped it would be. Several states have at various times cut off funds for their programs, only to return to them later because of an inability to develop a better alternative.

Pakistan

Pakistan's program was discontinued in 1962 following disagreements between the Government of Pakistan and the United States International Cooperation Administration which was responsible for supplying the American funds for the program. The Pakistani program's VLW's were then absorbed as secretaries and advisors in a village representative system similar to the Panchayati Raj system and known as Basic Democracies. At the present time, these former VLW's continue to serve as advisors to village development councils under this system.

Selection and Recruitment

We have seen in the Chinese case that cadre selection was generally carried out locally by Party members from the area who, usually during the course of a movement or campaign, would pick out certain activists who had emerged in the course of the campaign. Next they would enquire as to their possible suitability as cadres and then would approach them and encourage them to become cadres. As mentioned previously, these prospective cadres were usually of poor peasant origin. Such a "procedure" differs markedly from the more formal and institutionalized selection procedure for village level workers.

India

In India, during the early years of the program, many VLW's, as well as other community development personnel, were transferred from other government departments. Selected by their superior officers, this "selection procedure" was frequently used as a means of dispensing with personnel the superiors didn't want in their departments (Dube, 1958, p. 183).

As time went on, however, an increasing number of VLW's were taken directly from the public. Certain standards were set for those wishing to apply for training as VLW's. These included: 1) all candidates should be secondary school graduates; 2) they should be of "village heritage"; and 3) they should be between seventeen and twenty-five years of age (Taylor *et al*., 1966, pp. 199-200).

Pakistan

In the case of Pakistani VLW's, similar standards were applied (i.e., candidates were expected to be secondary school graduates between twenty and thirty-five years old). They were required to take a written examination testing their general knowledge and were interviewed orally to determine their knowledge of and attitudes towards rural life. Jack Mezirow comments on these selection procedures:

> The selection procedure was frequently rushed and capricious, the examinations of dubious value. Candidates with Western social graces and ability to articulate under stress were disproportionately rewarded (Mezirow, 1963, pp. 205-206).

The Philippines

Candidates for barrio worker positions were generally expected to be college graduates. Valsan defends this policy because it enabled Philippine VLW's to be promoted in the community development administrative hierarchy, something which is very difficult for most Indian VLW's (Valsan, 1970, p. 11). Dube, on the other hand, states that university graduates in India have not made very satisfactory VLW's:

> Their superior ways, manner of speech and dress, and constant desire for promotion to a higher post befitting their academic qualifications, stand in the way of their applying themselves whole-heartedly to the job (Dube, 1958, p. 172).

Motivations for Applying

In examining the reasons why people applied for VLW positions, Dube found responses ranging from the need for employment and the possibility of an increase in salary, to desire to work for village uplift and national improvement. Somewhat similar motivations appear to have caused Chinese activists to commit themselves in becoming cadres -- i.e., a desire to advance one's own position by becoming a Party activist, or a desire to advance the interests of the socialist cause in the countryside.

There seems to be some evidence that, because of their greater education, most Indian VLW candidates appeared to possess a clearer understanding of the aims and objectives of the Community Development Program than did the Chinese cadre recruit of the nature of Marxist ideology and the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party. This seems to be true, at any rate prior to the Chinese Socialist Education Movement of the early 1960's.

Education and Training

Purposes of Training

It has been noted how cadres were trained in various ways so as to create a committed core of young village leadership elements which could serve as the Party's vanguard in the villages. There has also been some indication of the wide variety of training mechanisms which the Party used or continues to use in "raising the cultural level" of its cadres. The central focus of this training has been on the ideological and political level and on training for such things as leading of discussion groups and criticism sessions. In addition, as previously noted, there seems to have been considerable effort aimed at providing cadres with one area of expertise which they would be able to utilize in their jobs, thus fulfilling the call for the cadre who is "red" and "expert."

VLW training programs also had as their purpose the preparation of village workers for the dual function of being: 1) a catalyst seeking to unite villagers in cooperative efforts for their own welfare; and 2) a "technical generalist" capable of aiding villagers on a wide range of simpler technical problems (in contrast to the single field expertise of the Chinese cadre). In practice, however, if the cadre usually sacrificed expertise for socio-political work, the VLW usually sacrificed the social-developmental side of his work for the general technical side and would frequently have to sacrifice both for the local administrative demands of his work.

Nature of Training

Like their recruitment and selection procedures, the VLW training programs in India and Pakistan have been more formalized and institutionalized than have cadre training programs in China. Because of their very formality, these training programs have been strongly criticized by various writers.

Initially in the Indian Program, VLW's were provided with six months training in such fields as public health, literacy education, animal husbandry, cooperatives, agriculture and extension methods (Taylor, _et al_., 1966, p. 200). Later this training period was increased to two years and included some field work. About seventy-five per cent of the curriculum was devoted to agricultural subjects.

In Pakistan, one year was given over to the training of VLW's, with a month to six weeks spent in field work in a village away from the training institute. As with the Indian program, a strong emphasis was placed on agricultural extension work (Mezirow, 1963, pp. 206-207).

The Philippine program provided a six month training course with four months spent in classroom and laboratory training and the last two months in barrios under the supervision of the training staff (Einsiedel, 1968, p. 17).

Critiques of VLW Training

In a short survey of seventeen Indian VLW's conducted in 1957, S.C. Dube asked, among other things, whether the VLW's felt that they had benefited from their training (Dube, 1958, p. 164).[1] Fifteen said they had, while two felt they had not. In spite of this, however, "most feel that some aspects of their training program were unrealistic." The general training they receive has also been criticized in many quarters as being overly rigid and much more textbook-oriented than pragmatically-oriented, a condition which is also found in most other Indian educational institutions. One major difficulty in VLW training programs is a lack of competent teachers.

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[1] In view of the extensive literature written on India's Community Development Program, including a good deal of writing critical of VLW's, it is remarkable how few systematic efforts have been made to assess the opinions and attitudes of VLW's toward their work, training, etc.

> . . .the instructors in the training centres have never been selected because of their special training or experience as teachers, or because they have necessarily excelled in their field of work. They have taught their courses strictly as technical subject-matter, paying little attention to how the village workers were to apply what they were taught when they took up their assignments as multipurpose extension workers. Few indeed have been the instructors of the basic course in extension methods who have themselves had formal training in adult education and extension methods. In the beginning, this state of affairs had to be accepted, but today, the same situation exists, and relatively little effort is being made to train and keep competent staff in the centre (Taylor, et al., 1966, p. 201).

These shortcomings were shared by Pakistan's VLW training programs as well. Mezirow notes that VLW training institutes "remained steeped in an authoritarian atmosphere, with almost exclusive reliance upon the lecture method of teaching. Even manual skills were 'taught' with very little demonstration or student participation" (Mezirow, 1963, p. 207). He goes on to state that learning community development skills such as group problem solving and democratic leadership were hardly ever demonstrated by the faculty, although community development rhetoric was frequently used in classes.

In contrast, it is worth noting that, particularly during the Cutlural Revolution, while much of China's educational system fell under heavy leftist criticism because of its rigid, individualistic, class-oriented manner of teaching, cadre schools and training programs remained relatively free from this sort of criticism. One may speculate that at least part of the reason for this lay in the fact that the schools and training programs, being Party run, were quite egalitarian in structure and outlook. In addition, true to form with many Communist-worker training programs, cadre training programs were strongly pragmatic and action-oriented (Hyde, 1966, Chapter IV).

Finally, one problem which both Dube and Taylor cite with reference to Indian VLW's is a lack of any sort of frequent or regular in-service training or "up-dating" courses. Furthermore, what in-service training was offered was run along lines similar to the regular training programs and did not serve to either inform or inspire the VLW's to any considerable extent (Dube, 1958, p. 188 and Taylor, 1966, p. 205.

Village Level Worker Techniques

Village level worker change agent techniques stand in distinct contrast to the techniques used by Chinese cadres. Certain commonalities can be observed, however, such as: 1) both agencies exhort their village workers to conduct investigations on village needs, interests and priorities before the introduction of change, reform or innovation; and 2) both sets of workers may use similar vehicles for information dissemination (for example, slogans and posters, discussions and propaganda meetings, etc.). While this is so, the differences far outweight the similarities between the two, making them useful subjects for contrast.

Because the long-term goals and short-term objectives of the two systems differ so markedly, so do the means used to achieve them. Chinese village cadres have sought to raise public and class consciousness by means of reforms; they commonly have attempted to create a nucleus of activist leadership and then initiated "struggle" or mobilization movements within their villages. Village level workers, in contrast, have relied strongly on extension methods (and individual demand for improvements) to raise the people's material standard of living, and have not actively sought to alter other aspects of village life.

The "VLW Role"

The ideal of the VLW in the final form it assumed during the early years of the Etawah Pilot Project was that of friend and aid to the villagers, i.e., someone they could trust:

> This feeling of friendliness, genuine interests, and mutual respect that we foster is exactly what the villager recognizes and responds to. This and the 'dirty hands' method which we teach in our training camps -- learning and teaching by actual doing and not by ordering or speechifying -- this combination is what the villager wants to see. This is what is needed to unlock his receptivity and his eagerness (Mayer, 1959, p. 163).

And what was one to do in order to establish and maintain this climate of trust between villager and government change agent? Mayer believes that it is chiefly through simpler technological improvements in such fields as agriculture, animal husbandry, and public health that this relationship can be built (Mayer, 1959, p. 161). There is also the social and community organizational approach (i.e., the other half of the supposedly "dual focus" of the multipurpose VLW) to developing village change. This will not be dealt with in this section, however, because the development of cooperative village projects, in practice, has been such a small part of the activities of the "average" VLW. Even in instances where VLW's were involved in cooperative community undertakings, community development methods were rarely used in developing such projects.

Techniques Used

In order to bring about change at the village level, an entire battery of approaches using individuals, homes groups and communities was to be utilized. In the case of India, Dube has listed most of these for us: 1) contacts and discussions with individuals; 2) visits to demonstration and model farms; 3) group discussions and meetings; 4) "method" and "result" demonstrations of new agricultural inputs or methods; and 5) use of various means of mass communication such as books, posters, plays, radio programs, exhibitions, competitions, motion pictures, etc. (Dube, 1958, p. 21 and 105-112).

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[1] The writer is personally acquainted with the record of such projects in one development block in northern India where he served as a block agriculture inspector for two years (1966-1968). The block itself had 144 villages and fifteen VLW's and was in the heart of one of the most progressive, least traditional states in the country. During the course of his stay there, only one community project came to his attention -- a project aimed at draining a bog near a village. While a good turnout of villagers was observed, it soon became clear that: 1) most of the people working on the project would not benefit from it, as most of the land to be drained belonged to an absentee landlord who lived in the city; and 2) the project itself had been organized from above, not cooperatively within the village itself.

In practice, however, the VLW, as the assigned change agent, came to rely on one method above all others for introducing innovations. This method involved the introduction of the innovation to one or several interested individuals who agreed to try it. Then, presuming they were satisfied with the innovation, they were expected to pass it on to other villagers.

The greatest usage of this method has been in the agricultural demonstration of new inputs or practices. Albert Mayer outlined this diffusion-by-demonstration as a three stage process: 1) try out the proposed innovation with a few interested individuals; 2) following a successful completion of this trial stage, result demonstrations should be used so that other people from the village and surrounding area can see the demonstrations and hear the results explained. "The farmer who has successfully demonstrated something good has a great deal of influence with his neighbours, because they feel that they too can do it"; and 3) attain a community adoption or "saturation" stage. "This stage is reached when all are convinced and are using the advanced practice, as well as cooperating in certain types of extension activities in which community action is necessary in the interest of all concerned" (Mayer, 1959, pp. 64-66).

There is a large body of research which tends to confirm that the use of the first two stages of this process frequently results in a wider diffusion of the innovation in question (See Rogers, 1971). However, the extent of acceptance varies considerably from item to item. Even more important is the question of the social-economic effects of the differential acceptance of innovations -- a question of considerable debate among researchers in this field. We will consider the question in greater detail in Chapter Six.

Time Allotments

In applying themselves to their work, VLW's found that their tasks varied according to seasonal village activities. Thus, during planting season, emphasis would be placed on introducing new seeds or cropping practices. Later on, plant protection devices such as crop spraying would be introduced. During the slack period following harvest, compost pits or non-agircultural activities such as village sanitation measures or family planning would be encouraged.

It has also been determined that most Indian VLW's tended to be most successful among members of their own caste in their village circle. Also upper caste VLW's were accepted by a wider spectrum of villagers than were lower caste VLW's (Dube, 1958, p. 166).

It should also be noted that, because VLW's tend to spend most of their time in agricultural pursuits, non-agricultural groups (such as the sweeper and leather-working castes -- the former untouchables in India) have not usually received much attention from VLW's in India and Pakistan (Dube, 1958, p. 93).

As regards the administrative aspects of the VLW approach, several salient facts should be noted. Between twenty-five and fifty per cent of most Indian VLW's working hours are spent on administrative duties -- collecting, writing and submitting the numerous reports required by their various higher-ups; assisting farmers in filling out forms in order to obtain certain government controlled or subsidized commodities such as new seeds, fertilizers, improved plows, loans, etc.; and similar types of administrative duties.[1] Valsan notes, for instance, that in Kerala, VLW's are "expected to be in the office until noon" (Valsan, 1970, p. 93). In addition, fortnightly meetings of all block staff are held and a whole day at the block headquarters is usually given over to such meetings.

Village Financial Assistance

With regard to the financial aspects of an Indian VLW's work, it has generally been the case that some VLW's have had greater access to government development capital than have others at any given period of time. The reason for this is fairly simple. As a block is ordinarily left with only a limited amount of money after covering its administrative expenses, it is rarely possible to finance a project in every VLW's circle, let alone in every village in the block. As a result, it is generally the BDO and the Panchayat Samati which together determine which parts of the block will be given a government project or some form of government assistance. As of 1970, there appeared to be no clearly established criteria by which to determine which villages or areas would receive such assistance (Panchanadikar, 1970, p. 136). In addition, no funds are set aside for VLW's to utilize at their discretion.

> The officers consider it impractical to give any drawing and spending powers to the VLW's even for approved projects in the villages under their charge. For many more years to come supervision of their work and strict financial scrutiny and control cannot be avoided (Dube, 1958, p. 176).

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[1] See (Taylor, *et al.*, 1966, p. 188).

CHAPTER VI

ASSESSMENT AND COMMENTARY ON VILLAGE LEVEL WORKERS

In Chapters VI and VII an attempt will be made to analyze the two types of change agents from what might be termed a "systemic point of view." In effect this means that VLW's and then both VLW's and cadres will be analyzed as creatures of a system. An attempt will be made to delineate the ways in which each system dictates the sorts of roles which these change agents play and the sorts of responses they are likely to receive from their client systems. This will amount to "distilling" the "prime motifs" or predominant organizational principles which, in this writer's opinion, determine the basic configuration of change agent activities in the two cases being studied.

What follows will be an oversimplification which could be termed, to reverse an old metaphor, "not seeing the trees for the forest." However, in reviewing a fairly extensive body of literature on Chinese cadres, village level workers and change agents in general, this writer has reached the conclusion that the great bulk of research in these areas errs in the other direction -- not examining the effect of the "forest" on the "trees." It is this writer's contention that it is not really possible to develop an in-depth understanding or predictive capacity of the subject at hand without some understanding of the inter-relations between the change agents and the system within which they operate. This we shall attempt to do in this chapter.

Hierarchical Organization

In reading through the literature on village level workers and community development programs in the countries considered, through discussions with others acquainted with the programs, and on reflecting on his own experiences and observations in India's Community Development Program, the writer has become increasingly aware of a common organizational thread running throughout the data at hand. Ultimately, in examining this thread in greater detail, the outlines of a framework begin to assert themselves. What becomes apparent is a fairly rigid hierarchical pattern of organization which is manifested in three principal forms: 1) the traditional socio-cultural patterns of the society; 2) the bureaucratic apparatus which these nations have adopted; and 3) the market capitalism which has been extending into the countryside in the last few decades.

Intentions and Effects

The ramifications of such a hierarchical framework exhibit themselves in many ways in the work of the village level worker. One major recurring effect, however, is the creation of contradictions between statements of purpose or intent on the part of the government program and actual results. Thus, for example, when India's Community Development Program was conceived and articulated to the public, it was intended as an egalitarian sort of movement aimed at encouraging the widest possible popular participation in development at the village level. In similar fashion, the role of the village level worker was seen as that of a "grassroots agent of change among villagers. . . and that all personnel and echelons of administration above him would serve the activities which he was attempting to promote" (Taylor, _et al_., 1966, p. 177).

In fact, and in spite of all the rhetoric, India's program, as well as those of Pakistan and the Philippines, has not been an "egalitarian movement" and has not resulted in widespread popular participation in development. And the village level worker, rather than being accepted as the most important functionary in the scheme, has been relegated the position of a minor village bureaucrat and an errand boy for the higher-ups in the program. Almost everyone writing about community development programs and village level workers in India, together with Pakistan and the Philippines, has made mention of this situation. Very few, however, have contended that such a state of affairs is a natural outgrowth of a society possessing this sort of hierarchical framework in its social organizational patterns, government administration, and economic structures. At the operational level of a national community development program, this usually means that each government administrator in the chain of command rules those beneath him and submits to those above him. At the lowest level of the official ladder, one observes the VLW submitting to those above him (the BDO and the Block specialists in the Indian case) and where possible, calling on those villagers over whom he has any power to submit to his wishes.

Internal Administration

The hierarchical structuring to which the VLW approach is subject can be found in almost all aspects related to the internal administration of development programs using VLW's as change agents. Following are a few examples from the Indian case. They are chiefly negative since few of the writers who have written about VLW's have viewed such hierarchical structuring in a positive light. Taylor, et al. describe the general effects of this structuring on India's development program:

> Each programme person with a higher status tends to dominate each person with a lower status, and each person with a higher rank tends to dominate all persons with a lower rank. This phenomenon of unhealthy inter-personal relationships sabotages the zests of persons with lower status and rank, because it automatically downgrades the vital roles of lower-ranking persons, and thus sabotages the dynamics of day-by-day programme operation. . . . To permit such feelings (of personal superiority due to status or rank) to exhibit themselves in necessary interactions among action programme personnel not only inhibits the upward and downward flow of communication which is essential to programme co-ordination, but thwarts the mutual or reciprocal support which each cadre of programme personnel can supply to each other cadre. . . (Taylor, 1966, p. 582).

This meant that, in essence, the programs themselves were "largely created and run by Central and State bureaucracies" (Taylor, et al., 1966, p. 225). Thus villagers were asked to participate in village and block programs which were dominated by officials. In practice this usually meant that higher program officials (rather than village interest groups in consultation with their VLW's) have determined what sort of assistance villages would receive. It also meant that, block specialists and others could not be said to be "serving the activities which the VLW was attempting to promote." Instead, these specialists generally instructed the VLW's, either at a block staff meeting or while "on tour," without welcoming any suggestions from VLW's themselves. Also when information dispersion from block specialist or BDO to VLW or villagers did occur, it generally took the form of a lecture or "sermon" rather than a demonstration. This sort of hierarchical status-conscious frame of reference also had the effect of making officials distrust village people's ability to create and execute their own development programs or projects, or to seriously participate in the decision-making of such projects.

"Measurable Goals" and Hierarchical Administration

Bureaucracies have a tendency to reinforce the sort of hierarchical social structuring referred to, and such is the case in change agency bureaucracies as well. One major aspect of most bureaucracies is the placing of measurable goals as the basis of bureaucratic functioning. Thus reports, figures, etc., become a continuous demand of the administrative machinery of the community development program and various interrelated government departments wishing information on some particular aspect of rural development. One result of this is that many Indian Community Development Program officials have protested, with some justification, that bureaucratic demands of this sort "did not leave them the option of trying time-consuming methods of discussion and eliciting the leadership of the local people" (Dube, 1958, p. 98). In effect, such a profusion of demands for figures and reports does not facilitate clear lower-to-upper level communication, but rather usually inhibits it. Take, for example, this illustration from a community development block in Kerala:

> One of the things stated by the Agricultural Extension Officer was that he had received a communication from the government asking for an urgent report on the number of

> pepper and cashew growers in the block who were cultivating five acres or more. He asked the gram sevaks to supply the information regarding their respective areas immediately. He had no time to wait as the government would then demand an explanation from him. He was aware that the gram sevaks (VLW's) could not give accurate figures on such short notice. The gram sevaks first resented it; then they seemed to understand the difficulty of the extension officer. Perhaps they also must have thought that it was better to give some figure then and there than to go back and do a thorough examination or forget it. So most of them sat down and came out with some figures, irrespective of their accuracy. Much of the statistics published by the government in these fields. . . seem to have been manufactured in this manner. (Valsan, 1970, p. 96).

The VLW and "the System"

As a product of a bureaucratic-hierarchical system, it is quite understandable that the VLW would operate as a creature of that system, in spite of, or perhaps even because of, his best intentions. As a result, VLW's tend to look up the administrative ladder for their justification and reward, rather than "down" to their villages. Thus, the measure of an effective VLW, in the eyes of the hierarchy (and usually in his own eyes as well), is not the degree of acceptance his person and his work receives within his village circle. Rather it is the extent to which the people will accede to the program's bidding, as represented through himself.[1] This is but one of the reasons that a

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[1] The Government of India Programme Evaluation Organization in its study of India's Community Development Programme made some interesting revelations on the VLW as an overburdened-office-bound petty official and as a change agent in charge of too many villages. They found that the average VLW "stays more than four days a month at block headquarters and nearly two-thirds of his nights in his centre village headquarters. Forty-five percent of non-headquarters villages were visited at the rate of less than once per month" (Taylor, et al., 1966, pp. 241-242).

"trust gap" of varying dimensions exists between the VLW and his client system, particularly insofar as the VLW is called upon to implement policies which may be unpopular with the people in his region.

That the VLW saw himself as being first responsible to the program administration and not the villagers is illustrated by an early sampling of seventeen VLW's in a community development block in western Uttar Pradesh in India. When asked what the job of a VLW actually was, fourteen said that it was to achieve targets fixed at the top, two saw their job as bringing village needs and demands to the attention of the program, while one saw his job as a mixture of the two. Also, like the villagers below them in the hierarchy, VLW's did not feel that they could contribute effectively to policy or decision-making in the program (Dube, 1958, p. 161).

Furthermore, the gap between villager and VLW expresses itself in the VLW's tendency, as an educated minor official, to associate with the wealthier, better educated strata of the villages he works in. This frequently has the effect of estranging him from the rest of the village, making him less able to understand, appreciate and work for their interests. Thus, the role that predominates in VLW-villager relations is not that of the VLW as friend and aid to the villager. Instead, it is that of the VLW as a minor government official with some status, who may be appealed to to dispense favors under certain conditions. One fairly common means of winning his favor in one instance is to do his bidding in another. Herein lies one major dynamic of villager-VLW relations in operation.

Physical Development and Community Development

One important aspect of hierarchic-bureaucratic development initiatives (both those utilizing village level workers as change agents and those using other forms of change agents) is a marked propensity to emphasize physical development over such things as social development and attitude change. The assumption which such initiatives make is "develop (or improve) the external and the internal will follow." One form which this has taken is described as follows:

> . . .far greater progress has been made on the building of physical targets than has been made in penetrating the inner minds of the village people. Village people have been mobilized to build roads but few have been educated to place enough value on the roads to have an organized plan to maintain them (Taylor, et al., 1966, p. 614).

Again, partially at least because it is measurable and accountable bureaucratically, most efforts in the area of agricultural development (to which most VLW's in India and Pakistan have devoted 75 to 90 per cent of their working hours) have been in terms of obvious physical accomplishment.

Self-Help and Felt Needs

> The presumption inherent in this development logic was that the successful use of community development methods. . . would develop such widespread participation of village people and such effectively-organized village groups, with enough competent local village leaders, that local development projects would be locally self-generated and locally supported by experienced village personnel, largely supported by village generated funds (Taylor, et al., 1966, p. 612).

Earlier in this chapter it was observed that village self-help projects had not been particularly widespread or successful in recent years in the countries under observation in spite of the important place which the concept of self-help generally holds in VLW and community development ideology.[1] In the Indian case, it was pointed out that VLW's were given little, if any, practical training in generating community participation in self-help schemes. This alone does not explain the failure of the self-help concept in India or elsewhere. In India, the initiation of the "self-help movement" was greeted enthusiastically at the village level, and during the first years of the program, thousands of self-help projects were started in villages throughout the country. Similar early reactions to calls for self-help have been found in other countries as well.

In India, Pakistan and the Philippines and, one may speculate, many other countries as well, one leading cause for the decline of such movements lies in the fact that if such movements are truly representative of a large number of village people, they are inimical to the smooth functioning of development program administrations. They also jeopardize the control of the elites, both within government and outside it.[2] How is this the case?

In the normal community development process, self-help must be preceded by a determination of "felt needs" on the part of those people who would be activated to work in their own interest. Felt needs, like self-help, is one of the battery of concepts which new VLW's are at least expected to understand, if not practice. In many cases, particularly during the earlier, more idealistic phases of the three mentioned community development programs, village communities were approached and did make self-assessments of their felt needs (see Mayer, 1959, pp. 178-181 for one such classic example). Unfortunately, however, such self-assessments frequently expressed needs for developments which the program and their agents, the VLW's, did not see as priority items for funding or assistance. Thus, as Jack Mezirow recounts, in the Pakistani case, villagers will sometimes give priority to such things as building secondary roads, schools, or dispensaries over innovations in agricultural production, or other fields which the government sees as a greater priority (Mezirow, 1963, p. 204) E.H. Valsan describes a typical Philippine example of the same phenomenon:

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[1] The concept of self-help is in many ways central to the whole community development philosophy as it includes, in Taylor's words: "developing self-reliance and initiative on the part of villagers, lessening dependence on government assistance and direction, and develop (ing) local institutions and local leadership" (Taylor, 1966, p. 185).

[2] On this self-help philosophy in action, one professor has observed that the programs such as we have described are: "Heavy on ideology, of course, and on wishful thinking. In fact, the last thing the government wants is 'self-help' because it would soon get round to [the poor] helping themselves to the land and property of the rich. What the government really wants is docility." (Dr. A.K. Davis in correspondence).

> The idea of credit unions, marketing societies, etc. seemed to have occurred only to the minds of the external change agents like the MDD and the BDW (VLW). These ideas did not represent the 'felt needs' of the people to whom the barrio school, the health centre, the barrio hall, the chapel and the fiesta seemed to be more important and for which they pass resolutions at the meetings of the council requesting the mayor, the governor, and congressmen of the area to donate money for financing (Valsan, 1970, p. 213).

In most instances, the VLW and the program, having aroused a sense of "need" on the part of the villagers, will not feel in a position to satisfy it. There are several reasons for this: 1) it may not be high on their list of priorities for rural development; 2) funding of a particular project such as a dispensary could easily lead to calls for funding for like projects from neighbouring villages --

requests which the agency might not be in a position to finance; 3) responding to many expressions of "felt needs" by local communities could soon threaten both the continuity of, and control of, rural development by the change agency in charge.

However, one thing can be noted with regard to the expression of "felt needs." People tend to perceive their "felt needs" in relation to what they view as possible and with an eye towards the possible source of those things which they desire. Thus, in both the Pakistani and Philippine instances a very familiar pattern is replicated. As the lowest link in the hierarchical chain, they view the source of wealth and power as being above themselves ("the good things come from high up") rather than within themselves, and little that they see of the hierarchy in action serves to alter that conclusion. Thus, such villagers will rarely view their felt needs in terms of any fundamental reforms or changes (if such has occurred to them at all) nor in terms of what they themselves can develop on their own (they who, in relation to the government, consider themselves to be poor and powerless). This is especially so when the person interested in knowing their "felt needs" is an agent of that government.

It is an unpleasant fact that as government community development programs expand and as village level workers take up posts in their villages, there is a strong trend away from villages becoming more self-reliant and better equipped to handle their own problems. Instead of becoming more self-reliant, villages are becoming more dependent on the government as they come to rely more on the services and authorization of the VLW and other government officials. In this respect, the VLW serves to promote and strengthen bureaucratic control by the government over the hinterlands by making them more dependent on it.[1]

There are, of course, other reasons why village level workers have had little success in recent years in inducing villages to undertake cooperative self-help projects. Perhaps the most common cause of failure, after the situation caused by administrative hierarchies, is the presence of factionalism or alliance groups within most villages. Such groups, by their very nature, are not ordinarily disposed to cooperate on a community-wide basis. Hollnsteiner describes this in the Phillipines:

> When. . . an innovator seeks to enlist support which cuts across alliance ties, he is going outside the range of realistic community groupings. . . . The very basis of the alliance system is that there must also exist those in the society who are not allies and thus, do not ordinarily have access to one's wholeharted support. . . . By substituting an impersonal grouping of all barrio residents for the closely-knit, highly personalized alliance grouping, the well-meaning, but naive innovator ignores the existing spirit of community cooperation and deprives it of its spontaneous enthusiasm (Hollnsteiner, 1963, pp. 135-136).

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[1] Taylor, *et al*., give us a good illustration of this sort of thinking in the Indian case:

> . . .we began to discover that a more important issue was whether the faith of villagers in their own competence was increasing and whether their traditional self-reliance was being strengthened. Their repeated, almost universal, answer to our question of why they were for the first time doing this, that, or another thing to meet needs which they had had for generations was: 'Because the government helped us.' Their answer to our question, 'What are you going to do next?', was to name a great variety of improvement projects, practically all of which would require increasing grants of government funds (Taylor, 1966, p. 617).

Village Response to Village Level Workers

In our examination of the interactions between village level workers and the villages in which they work, there are at least two considerations besides the question of self-help which must be taken into account in order to make an overall assessment of VLW's. These include the general area of village response to VLW's, as well as the question of the differential acceptance of the VLW-introduced innovations by various segments of local populations.

General Village Response

It is a frequently cited and apparently well documented observation that semi-traditional village people tend to be quite suspicious of government officials and personnel who enter their villages and attempt to make contact with them. Dube expressed it this way:

> The gulf between the world of the village and of the officials is still so wide that the ideas and programmes of the latter are rarely accepted at their face value. The official gets promises of support publicly, but once he withdraws from the scene the village people dissect and analyze his statements from several angles and try to see all kinds of hidden motives in them (Dube, 1958, p. 120).

An important task of the VLW is to "break down" this suspicion, towards himself at least, and establish a climate of trust between himself, as a government official, and the people of the village. How well has he been able to achieve this goal, and with what segments of the village populations?

As Dube has noted during the early years of India's program, village people did not know whether to regard the VLW as "a minor government functionary" or as "a social worker and leader." In time, however, as the VLW became better known to the people in his area, his "role" became better understood as well. "By their works ye shall know them" -- and so it was with VLW's. Because most VLW's spent a good part of their working time either in their village office or at block headquarters, most became known to the people of their village headquarters as well as to those in the immediately surrounding area as a "minor government functionary." His signature was necessary in order for a person to have access to certain government-rationed commodities such as cement, in order to secure subsidies for the purchase of certain items such as improved plows, or in order to receive free quantities of certain things such as pesticides or rat poison. For those outside his immediate area but within his village circle, he came to be understood chiefly as a minor government functionary who appeared in their village occasionally in order to promote a government scheme of some sort, usually agricultural in nature.

Village Socio-Economic Groups and the VLW

S.C. Dube has justifiably pointed out that in most villages or village areas, there are four types of people with whom the VLW may work: 1) the rural elites; 2) the agriculturalists; 3) the artisan groups and occupational castes; and 4) the low caste, low income groups. Of these four groups, Dube states that the "rural elites," who ordinarily belong to the highest status, income and educational strata of the villages and tend to dominate village and panchayat politics, will often not deal with their local VLW. Instead, they go directly to a higher administrative officer, usually at the block level, if they wish to get something done.

VLW's also tend to have little contact with artisan groups and the like as most of the government's community development schemes are not aimed at such groups. The lower income, lower caste groups, such as sweepers and stone and leather workers have, according to Dube, been the focus of a considerable amount of VLW social welfare work. Other authors, writing more recently, dispute this (Pande, 1967, p. 182) and hold that little has been done to promote the welfare of such groups. This writer's two-year experience of witnessing VLW activities in one north India community development block tends to confirm this last assertion -- he saw very little observable VLW activity among such groups.

This, then, leaves only one group to be considered -- the agriculturalists. As VLW's are ordinarily expected to spend about 75 per cent of their time working in agriculture, it is not surprising that a good part of their time, both inside and outside their offices, is spent in agricultural pursuits. However, to state that the average VLW spends most of his time in this field should not be taken as meaning that he works with all, or even most, of the agriculturalists in his headquarters village or village circle.

Acceptance of Innovations

A considerable body of literature exists attesting to the fact that in India, as well as other countries using extension methods in the introduction of agricultural innovations, those farmers who are the first to accept an innovation are usually found to share such characteristics as: 1) considerably larger land holdings and higher agricultural productivity and income than the norm in their area; 2) higher educational attainments; 3) more urban contacts; 4) more social participation; and 5) more extensive contact with government officials (from the VLW up) than the rest of the people in their village.[1]

These findings are quite in line with Rogers' findings on the nature of change agent contacts with members of their client systems. In a series of four "generalizations," Rogers asserts that:

1. Change agent contact is positively related to higher social status among clients;
2. Change agent contact is positively related to greater social participation among clients;
3. Change agent contact is positively related to higher education and literacy among clients; and
4. Change agent contact is positively related to cosmopolitans among clients (Rogers, 1971, p. 241).

For our purposes, what Rogers is saying with regard to VLW's is that the VLW is most likely to influence those in his area who retain a position close to his in the local socio-economic hierarchy.

Taken in themselves, these findings could prove very damaging to any program of planned change which claims to be developing a large spectrum of the population through such methods. However, there is a corollary to this argument for the use of such change agents. This corollary could be referred to as the "percolation effect." That is, innovations accepted by wealthier, more advanced agriculturalists (commonly referred to in the jargon as "progressive farmers") will filter down to the rest.[1] And there are some research findings which support this position.

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[1] A Partial listing of research articles affirming this includes: (Das Gupta, March 1965, pp. 330-337; Rahudkar, April 1962, pp. 99-103; Bose and Sazena, Sept.-Dec. 1965, pp. 138-151; Chaudari et al., Dec 1967, pp. 468-473; Das Gupta, Jan - March 1963, pp. 27-34; and Loomis and Sen in Zimmerman and Duwors (eds), 1970, chapter 20).

Bose, for example, in a previously cited article dealing with the acceptance of an agricultural innovation in seven villages in West Bengal, notes that within two or three years of its introduction, a few farmers had acquired a knowledge of the innovation. Further:

> When after six or eight years, a large number of farmers have adopted the practice, a situation is reached when only the resisters to innovation are left. At this stage the second point of inflection on the diffusion curve is reached, and the upward slope comes to an end. The remaining part of the curve now has a more gentle slope until the entire village adopts the practice (Bose, 1964, p. 65).

In addition, another writer notes that the rate of diffusion of a new idea or innovation tends to differ between small and large villages, with the smaller villages have more integrated communication systems by which new ideas permeated the village more rapidly and thoroughly (Chaudhari, et al., 1967, pp. 468-473). To what extent does the average small cultivator really benefit from this sort of planned change? That is, how much of what is poured in at the top really percolates down to the fifty to sixty per cent of the people on the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum?

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[1] One classic statement of this theory has been advanced by Charles Erasmus, here paraphrased by Jack Mezirow:

> "Planners should therefore focus on the more actively changing component 'where momentum of change is greatest, and if encouraged it will, I believe, eventually draw in the retarded sectors in a permanent and healthy fashion, with no need for bureaucratic philosophers of self-help'" (Erasmus quoted in Mezirow, 1963, p. 88).

This varies with the nature of the innovation. Large, capital-intensive inputs such as tubewells and tractors, for quite understandable reasons, tend to be taken up by wealthier landowners and go no farther. But, unfortunately, for whatever reasons, the record is not much better for small, non-capital intensive inputs. Thus, the Government of India's Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service came up with this disturbing revelation:

> Thus we see that 66 per cent of large owner-cultivators, 46 per cent of the medium owner-cultivators, 22 per cent of the small owner-cultivators derive benefit from the programme of improved seed supply. The same is found to be true about manures and fertilizers, improved methods of cultivation and pesticides (Pande, 1967, pp. 182-183).

This tends to affirm something that is becoming increasingly clear; that is, the activities of the VLW, while benefiting certain sectors of the village population, ignore the great majority of the people, with the result that a very lopsided form of development is created. In effect, large landholders benefit and middle landholders benefit somewhat, while small landholders, landless laborers, artisans, lower caste workers, and many others receive few, if any, benefits as a result of VLW activities. In fact the small landholders, etc. may actually be experiencing a further deterioration of living conditions because of VLW activities.[1] Perhaps such people have good reason to distrust VLW's, reasons beyond their assumed "backwardness"!

However, in the long run the following is perhaps the most pivotal aspect of any assessment of village level workers as change agents -- the economic effects of their work.

Small Holder Capitalism and the Village Level Worker

We have noted a few of the many and varied criticisms on the role of India's Community Development Program in general and the village level workers in particular. Criticisms of similar programs in Pakistan and the Philippines have been noted as well. There are few, however, who would deny that the rural areas of these countries have witnessed considerable change in the last twenty years, particularly with regard to the commercialization of village agriculture. The relative importance of the VLW in engendering this commercialization is disputed. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the VLW has been a major factor in the penetration of capitalist agriculture into the village, whether as change agent actively encouraging innovations or as government functionary passively responding to local demands for government-regulated inputs. Therefore, first the nature and extent of this penetration prior to the onset of the Green Revolution in 1965-1966 will be examined and then it will be further examined in light of the developments of the Green Revolution.

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[1] Pande further cites evidence to the effect that the living conditions of those who are not members of the "rural elites" have in many cases become worse rather than better since the onset of India's Community Development Program. For example:

> ". . .in one of the enquiries covering twenty blocks it was found that the number of adults applying for employment on hire had gone up from 34 per cent to 41 per cent of the total adult population between 1954-55 and 1959-60. This means that the employment opportunities in rural areas are becoming increasingly limited both on the farms and in the drafts in spite of the community development programme" (Pande, 1967, p. 183)

Smallholder Capitalism Prior to the Green Revolution

In one comparative study of six northern Indian villages in one community development block and six villages in a similar area but not covered by community development block activities, the following statistics were published:

1. One third of the total rice crop of villages in the block area were improved varieties, whereas the amount in the non-block areas was negligible.

2. There was some use of chemical fertilizer in the block area but very little in the non-block area.

3. The average yield of wheat and barley, per hectare, was 935 and 903 kilograms, respectively, in the block area, but only 575 and 790 kilograms, respectively in the non-block area.

4. Consumption levels were somewhat higher in the block villages based on per capita consumption of food-stuffs.

5. The additional productive capacity of the block area as a result of the distribution of improved seed and fertilizer was about six to seven per cent (Pande, 1967, pp. 187-188).

Unfortunately, however, the United Nations study does not provide information on the social distribution of these improvements in production. If this region was like most parts of India and Pakistan and many other developing countries, ten to fifteen per cent of the population owned fifty per cent or more of the cultivable land. Assuming this and given what we know about differential acceptance of innovations, one can rest assured that it was the larger landowners who were chiefly responsible for increases in production and who, therefore, stood to benefit from them.[1]

While there are many important effects and ramifications resulting from the entrance of commercial capitalism to the countryside and the VLW's role in that transformation, the space and scope of this study is limited to noting only a few of the more salient effects. One major effect upon whole villages has been the increased monetization of village life as villages become more interlocked with the external economic system and village cottage industries are displaced by large external commercial interests. Examples of this displacement are manufactured cotton cloth, shoes, sugar, vegetable oils, etc. replacing locally made products.

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[1] K.D. Malaviya, a former central government cabinet minister, writing in 1964, further describes this class in India:

> This top group (8-10 per cent) of landowners constitutes the dominant class in the countryside. . . . These big landowners control the co-operative societies, they dominate the panchayats and local councils, and they obtain the greatest benefits from Community Projects and other such State measures. . . . (Numerous village studies) show irrefutably that the process of the concentration of economic might in the form of land, cattle, implements, capital, etc., at one end of the social ladder, and poverty at the other, is still continuing. Some seven to eight per cent of the rural population own half the land while more than 80 per cent of the rural population have either no land at all or have a plot of less than two acres which means they live in hopeless poverty (Bettelheim, 1968, pp. 231-232).

Evidence from other sources confirms this. Government of India data for 1960-61, for instance, notes that: "(Rural) Households cultivating no land or less than 2.5 acres each constituted 57.59 per cent of the rural households and between them they operated only seven per cent of the total land" (Sharma, 1973, p. 89). In view of the fact that holdings of ten acres or less are not ordinarily subject to "economic rationalization" in terms of such things as mechanization, irrigation and "package programs," this effectively condemns the majority of India's small-holders to a state of semi-subsistence survival.

This, in turn, has ramifications on village social relations. Thus Hollnsteiner notes the increasing tendency in Philippine villages for primary group relationships, such as cooperative house-raising or other cooperative tasks, to be displaced by secondary, contractual relationships based on money (Hollnsteiner, 1963, pp. 141-142). Whether developments of this nature have a positive or negative effect on the quality of village life is perhaps an open question. Among other things, however, it would seem to have the effect of making it more difficult for the poor, who can afford to sell very little of the produce from their small, low-yielding fields in the first place, to procure many of these services now costing money rather than time or kind. It also makes it more difficult for the VLW to generate cooperative endeavors in villages where individual contractual arrangements involving money have become common. This leads to an examination of how the Green Revolution has affected the village situation as described, and the position which the VLW has assumed in this development.

The Green Revolution

What we now refer to as the "Green Revolution" swept the Third World during the second half of the 1960's. It achieved its greatest impact in the three countries dealt with here -- India, Pakistan and the Philippines --and was chiefly centered around the introduction of new high yielding varieties of rice, wheat and, to a lesser extent, maize. As this writer was responsible for the diffusion of these varieties to the VLW's in the block in which he worked in India, he is personally acquainted with at least some aspects of the role which the VLW's in his area played in advancing this program.

How did the Green Revolution alter conditions and what was the role the VLW played in this regard? Harry Cleaver, Jr. has noted the following figures on the extent of application of the high yielding varieties in India, Pakistan and the Philippines in 1969-1970:

	HYV acres	Total acres	HYV as %[a]
Wheat:			
India	15,100,000	41,066,000	36.8
W. Pakistan	7,000,000	15,361,000	45.6
Rice:			
India	10,800,000	93,119,000	11.6
Pakistan	1,890,700	29,640,000	6.4
Philippines	3,345,000	7,842,000	42.7

[a] Here as percentage of the total number of acres given over to either wheat or rice that year in the country listed.

Source: (Cleaver, 1972, p. 78).

Within the space of about four years from the onset of the Green Revolution huge acreages had been given over to the production of high yielding varieties in these three countries, particularly in the HYV wheat in India and Pakistan and HYV rice in the Philippines. Did this have the effect of altering the village conditions we have described, bringing at least relative prosperity within the grasp of a much larger percentage of village people, as the figures listed would seem to indicate? Or did it simply have the effect of accentuating already established trends?

It does, to some extent at least, appear to have had the effect of more firmly tying the middle sized farmer into the national commercial market system, thus extending the benefits of the program to perhaps twenty per cent of the tillers of the soil (who own roughly 85 per cent of all cultivable land in the case of India). This is in accordance with the "building on the best" tradition of most capitalist development, whether agricultural or industrial. It is much easier for farmers who possess some risk capital to consider investing this productively. Also, a farmer with more than, let us say, ten acres is more likely to have irrigation facilities available, together with the various other inputs necessary to successfully apply a package program in high yielding varieties.[1] In addition, India, like most countries, has marked regional disparities in the size of landholdings.

> The average size of holdings was the highest, viz. 12.6 acres in North West India zone. . . . The overall average size of holdings in Central India zone was 12.2 acres but 58 per cent of the holdings covering 18 per cent of the total (cultivated) area were below 10 acres. . . . In West India zone, the overall size was high, namely 12.3 acres, but 61 per cent of the holdings were below 10 acres and occupied 18.6 per cent of the area. . . . In South India zone, as

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[1] "India has only some 20 per cent of her cultivated land under irrigation, and only about half of that has assured water supplies. The adoption has thus been concentrated in the North and Northwestern states like the Punjab where irrigation facilities are concentrated" (Cleaver, 1972, p. 91).

> much as 55 per cent of the holdings covering 12.2 per cent of the area were below 2.5 acres, the overall average size being 4.5 acres. . . . In East India zone, the overall average size was 4.5 acres. . . . The overall average size was 5.3 acres in North India (Uttar Pradesh) but the number of holdings up to 2.5 acres in size formed about 40 per cent of the total number of holdings. . . (Desai, 1969, pp. 271-272).

In effect, regional disparities have replicated local economic disparities as far as the Green Revolution is concerned. Thus it is the least populated, best environmentally disposed areas, such as the North-West zone, which have benefited most from the Green Revolution. Areas such as the north, east and southern regions which have the smallest average acreages and the highest population densities have benefited far less. This is true as well for many parts of central and western India where, in spite of larger average holdings and lower population densities, lack of rainfall or irrigation make the successful adoption of high yielding varieties largely infeasible.

There are numerous other problems which have developed as a result of the Green Revolution -- conflicts between large farmers and tenants as tenants are evicted from the land, the displacing of landless laborers by machinery, forcing both tenants and laborers into urban slums, where they join the ranks of the unemployed, etc.[1]

However, what role has the VLW taken in this acceleration away from semi-feudal modes of production towards large-scale capitalist agriculture? Again, through his association with the "wealthier" farmers in the villages, the VLW has facilitated their advancement at the cost of the subsistence level producer. In this way, he has also helped to demonstrate to the poor farmer, the tenant, and the landless laborer that it is indeed possible to dramatically improve one's living conditions. However, it is not the poor farmers' conditions that are being improved. Charles Bettelheim, writing before the onset of the Green Revolution in India, foresaw much of the rural unrest that has developed since 1967-1968, as well as the role of the VLW and Community Development Program in unconsciously encouraging that unrest:

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[1] For a summary of these effects, see Dutt and Sundharam, "The Green Revolution" in Chen and Uppal, 1972, pp. 20-21.

> There have been other consequences resulting from the C.D. campaign which will affect the future development of rural India. One consequence is that the process of social differentiation has been speeded up. . . .
>
> Another consequence of this sort is that social differences have appeared less natural and more the effect of direct intervention. The feelings of social injustice has therefore grown stronger and resulted in open protests. Thus Community Development can increase social tension and cause violent reactions, which are in direct contradiction with the intentions of its founders.
>
> Most commentators point out that C.D. has developed needs and demands in a large number of villages. This is an important point, for all economic progress necessarily proceeds in this way.
>
> However, as the existing social structure cannot allow most of the needs to be satisfied, opposition may grow stronger and finally result in future social changes. These consequences of C.D. are very important, but not quite what was intended when the experiment began (Bettelheim, 1968, p. 216).

Summary

In this chapter we have examined the village level worker as the creation of a system. We have examined the workings of that system and found that the principle of hierarchical, class-based organization predominates throughout it. It was pointed out, for instance, that while VLW and community development rhetoric may be quite egalitarian in the countries being studied, the actual operationalizing of programs is not only hierarchical in nature, but also has the effect of reinforcing existing hierarchies. This system manifests itself in the internal administering of the programs, in the work and goal orientations of the VLW's in the field, and in relations between VLW's and their client systems. Even "self-help," such as it exists, is permeated with a "top-down" attitude, i.e., "I will do what my superiors direct me to do."

Because of his positioning within the system, the VLW ordinarily caters to the interests of only a proportionally small group of people within a village --in most cases, the more well to do farmers. It was further observed that an argument exists defending this approach in terms of a diffusion of innovations model. In fact, however, this model breaks down upon closer examination because, in situations of resource scarcity (such as is the case in most capitalist-oriented developing countries), large landholders will improve their positions at the cost of smaller farmers, tenants, and agricultural laborers. This was the situation prior to the onset of the Green Revolution, and was only accentuated during it.

CHAPTER VII

CADRES AND VLW'S: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

Basic Comparisons

Hitherto, this writer has attempted to provide two reasonably comprehensive and parallel sketches and interpretations of two quite different types of change agents at work in two different types of developing countries. Where appropriate, some comparisons have already been made. This chapter will attempt to carry this further.

In essence, however, the writer does not claim to be presenting a detailed, systematic comparison of the two approaches. What is presented here is a number of observations loosely centred around the two major themes which this writer feels best exemplify the essential nature of the two change agent approaches. The two themes will be referred to as: 1) the "hierarchical approach" as adopted and applied in India, Pakistan and the Philippines; and 2) the more "egalitarian approach" as adopted and applied in revolutionary China, Vietnam and elsewhere.

Two points need to be clarified:

1. Both approaches dealt with are, in the essentials of their goal orientations and modes of operation, adaptations of two Western change orientations -- one committed to advancing and strengthening capitalism nationally and internationally; the other dedicated to advancing and strengthening Communism in the same respects.

2. In referring to the Chinese cadre approach as being

"egalitarian", it is not inferred that hierarchies per se do not exist in the Chinese context. Clearly, in China, as anywhere else in the world today, organizational hierarchies are necessary to maintain order and continuity in development. What is apparent in the Chinese case, however, (particularly during the Liberation struggle and since the Cultural Revolution) is that hierarchical distinctions have been minimized progressively. Equally important, an egalitarian orientation to development predominates such that people see themselves as living in a society of "semi-equals" aimed at creating a "society of complete equals."

Again, this section will concern itself with a certain number of observations on the comparative aspects of the two change agent approaches dealt with in this study. It should not be inferred that these are the only observations that need be made. If the reader has studied the previous sections carefully, he or she should be able to add other observations as well, either within the framework that is proposed or independent of it.

Introduction

A basic observation founded on the aggregate of the data presented here is that, statements of intent notwithstanding, the overall effect of the village level worker in practice has been in the advancement of rural capitalism, whereas the overall effect of the basic cadre in practice has been in the advancement of rural socialism. For the VLW, the advancement of rural capitalism is set in a framework of class-hierarchical structures and relations and is committed to the retention and advancement of these structures and relations. For the basic cadre, the advancement of rural socialism is set in a framework of egalitarian-oriented structures and relations and is committed to the destruction of the old class-hierarchical framework and its replacement by a new egalitarian-socialist system. It is this writer's contention that, given these two basic frameworks and orientations, a number of corollaries follow -- corollaries which to greater and lesser extents are functionally interrelated.

Improvement and Transformation Orientations

One of the most evident differences between the two approaches is what can be termed the "piecemeal" improvement orientation of the VLW system in contrast to the wholistic transformation orientation of the cadre system. In effect, the VLW is held responsible for the introduction of a certain number of specific innovations aimed at improving a particular aspect of village life, usually the economics of agricultural production. The village cadre, on the other hand, does not assume as his responsibility the extension of particular improvements of a technological nature, although this may, on occasion, be part of his work. Rather, his role is the assumption of internal village leadership as part of a broad effort aimed at transforming the thought, social relations and work relations of the entire village, not merely the "most progressive" sector, as is the case with VLW's.

More important from an overall perspective, however, is the fact that these two change orientations permeate the societies in which they are found. An atmosphere of revolutionary change and transformation fills the Chinese countryside and has, with periodic variations in intensity, since the late 1940's. In other countries, such as India, a very different atmosphere prevails -- an atmosphere ranging from pessimism and fear of what the future may hold, to one of acceptance of piecemeal improvements as a means of personal advancement.

External to Internal Change

The first position, the piecemeal-technological approach, assumes that the first priority in development is the altering of external conditions. Improvement in material conditions is not only what villagers want but also "a sine qua non, a prerequisite, and wellspring for all other possible developmental achievement" (Mezirow, 1963, p. 192). Social development, on the other hand, is considered to be either a natural offshoot of technological development, or a secondary priority to be handled under a separate program.

Frequently, the assumption is made that the technological inputs need not have any major impact on the society's social structure. In general, however, the dynamic of change and development is seen as being external to internal in nature.

In practice, this usually means that developing countries operating in a hierarchical framework emphasize economic planning with so-called "social planning" schemes often being offered as a palliative for those not benefiting in the economic sphere. Planning for cultural change is often given no consideration at all. This ranking of priorities is fairly evident in the order in which the aims of India's Community Development Program are presented in this typical statement of aims:

> To provide for a substantial increase in the country's agricultural production, and for improvements in the system of communications, in rural health and hygiene, and in village education.
>
> To initiate and direct a process of integrated culture change aimed at transforming the social and economic life of the villagers (Dube, 1958, p. 8).

Unfortunately, as should be apparent from the assessment of VLW's and their change agencies, this sort of technological emphasis has not led to anything like balanced growth and development in India or elsewhere, and its human costs are considerable, if not immense.[1]

Internal to External Change

The revolutionary Chinese approach stands in clear contrast to the external to internal change orientation of more hierarchical systems such as those cited. The Chinese approach presumes a dialectical, rather than an evolutionary, structuring of society and calls fcr the raising of consciousness and the transforming of social structures as preliminary to any enduring improvement in the human condition. In other words, this is an internal to external frame of reference. The philosophical basis for this approach has been very succinctly presented by Mao himself:

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[1] Paulo Friere has criticized some of the more outstanding characteristics of this approach:

> ". . .it is the myth of techniques which in turn implies a dehumanization, a kind of messianism of techniques, conferring on technology the role of an infallible saviour. This messianism nearly always ends up by instigating the kind of programs in which humans are diminished in stature. Technical messianism proposes modernization of existing structures in opposition to traditionalism, which seeks to maintain the status quo. . . . Modernization of a purely mechanical, automatic and manipulating type has the center of decision for change not in the area undergoing transformation but outside it. The society in transformation is not the subject of its own transformation. . . . Hence while all development is modernization, not all modernization is development"(Friere, 1973, pp. 129-130).

> The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness with the thing. . . . Does materialist dialiectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the conditions of change and internal causes are the basis of change and that external causes become operative through internal causes (italics mine)(Mao, 1968, pp. 26 and 28).

For the cadre, be he in China, in Vietnam, or wherever, be he from the community in which he works or from outside, his commitment to work from the inside out meant a number of things. It meant that he was called upon to share a common life with the poor peasant, to learn and thoroughly understand the customs of the people with whom he is working, not to distinguish himself in dress, rank or demeanor -- for all intents and purposes to be one of them. Being accepted on a par with his client system was an essential prerequisite to the cadre's introduction of change by means of the Mass Line. All of which demanded an exceptional dedication to the cause on the part of the cadre.

But, some may protest, this sort of internal to external approach sounds much like the community development approach of determining felt needs, then developing cooperative endeavors on the basis of those needs. Why then has the Chinese approach achieved such spectacular successes in China, North and South Vietnam, and elsewhere, while the community development approach has had such spotty or indifferent success in so many of its applications?

Community development rhetoric is basically internal to external, egalitarian, and cooperative (as contrasted to competitive) in focus. It is, however, ordinarily called upon to serve the interests of a system dedicated to the preservation of hierarchical distinctions; a system which in most other ways utilizes an external to internal approach to change. In accordance with the rest of its orientation, it utilizes the community development approach in a piecemeal fashion in response to a particular demand, rather than in a systematic, wholistic fashion such as the Chinese have utilized.

The contradictions here should be obvious. Take, for example, the trained and dedicated community development officer, ordinarily an outsider, better educated and earning more money than local people and usually conscious of his status as a "professional." He will be perceived more as an agent of the hierarchical system that employs him than as a representative of the egalitarian ideas he may espouse.

Content and Process

Mention should be made of a few of the minor, but nonetheless significant, aspects of the two change orientations. In accordance with its external to internal frame of reference, many hierarchical change agencies, including those utilizing VLW's, tend to emphasize the content that particular developments take, rather than the process by which they are accomplished. One example of this in the case of the Pakistan VLW program is:

> After all, they reasoned, annual achievement reports must be filed and reports on what a village needs are much less impressive than statements such as '3,000 people were vaccinated against smallpox, two miles of new road and five new culverts were constructed.' A few conceded that (such achievements) were not often of permanent value . . .(but on the whole) spectacular reports of short-term projects were favored over long-term results (Mezirow, 1963, p. 217).

The Mass Line approach, on the other hand, with its internal to external emphasis, continues to move towards a greater emphasis on process over content. Thus, with regard to the work of village cadres, the Party has generally expressed a greater concern with the manner in which increases of any sort are made rather than the increases themselves (be it in production or in attendance roles for village organizations).

This same principle can be witnessed in such areas as the implementation of the land reform movement prior to and following liberation in 1949. For instance, during 1950-52, the movement met with a lack of popular village support in Kwangtung province due to such factors as strong clan loyalties and divisions within the villages. Instead of forcing the reform for the sake of form, the Party introduced the reforms more gradually in Kwangtung than in the other provinces, making certain that the people's level of consciousness on this issue was raised before attempting to introduce any measures (Vogel, 1969, pp. 27-62).

A similar concern with process over content has been expressed since the Cultural Revolution in such ways as simply rejecting the use of many complicated accounting procedures in industries and communes, on the grounds that they are really not necessary. One of the most popular slogans advancing this effort has been, "Simplify administration and serve the people!"

Goal Determination and the Client System

Another difference between the two orientations at the VLW/ cadre level has to do with the question of who participates in planning and goal determination in the development and administration of the villages. Based on the analysis of 190 case studies involving planned change, Garth Jones has concluded:

> Mutually set goals, (i.e., goals that are determined by both change agency and the client system) usually resulted in successful change, whereas the opposite was the situation where either party dominated the change relationship (Jones 1968, p. 109).

In the case of hierarchical systems, however, it is generally the change agency that dominates this relationship. This is because of the one-way flow of directives and information from agents' administrative superiors to the change agents and finally to the villages themselves. Dube illustrates this in India's program:

> The (VLW) training centres emphasized that methods of work in CDP (Community Development Programme) would not follow traditional bureaucratic lines and that the relationship between VLW's and higher project officials would not be a superior-subordinate relationship. Yet their field experience has showed the VLW's that the administrative set-up of CDP is not radically different from that of other government departments, and that the APO and Dy PEO (Block extension specialists) rather than helping and guiding them were often inspecting their work. Another unrealistic aspect of their training, they think, was that it laid great emphasis on grass roots planning. Time and again in the course of their training they were told that plans will grow up from village people, whereas in reality they had the frustrating experience of finding that plans invariably came from the top and had to be carried down by them to the village people (Dube, 1958, p. 165).

In contrast, the cadre Mass Line approach appears to be a combination of both change agency and client system initiatives in planning and development. A variation of this pattern can be seen in the case of South Vietnam, where the National Liberation Front has used cadre approaches similar to those used by the Communist Chinese during the 1945-1949 Civil War. Frances Fitzgerald cites one village as a typical example in this respect:

> As was the case in Ich Thien village, the first act of the cadres in taking over a village was usually to call a meeting and have the villagers elect one of their number as chairman of the administrative committee. These elections were not free, for the cadres chose the candidates. At the same time, the cadres took care to choose people whom the villagers respected. The cadres continued to control the committee and to initiate policy, but they would gradually train local men to take over the day-to-day work of administration. At first they would train farmers for the simple tasks of gathering villagers for a meeting or handing our propaganda leaflets. After a while they would turn over to them the more complicated tasks of collecting taxes, making speeches, recruiting new partisans, and administering the informal welfare program. As the villagers proved themselves competent to perform these tasks, the cadres retreated further and further into the background (Fitzgerald, 1972, pp. 185-186).

In China during its revolutionary struggle, this process ordinarily took the form of a few poor peasant cadres and activists assuming control of the villages through village committees and peasant associations. Later more villagers emerged to assume a major part of the responsibility for village development and self-government (see, for example, Crook, 1959, Chapter 7). In the case of the Vietnamese villages cited, within a year or two of NFL takeover, they would generally be in a position to begin their own internal reforms. In fact, however, in both China and Vietnam, villages did not pursue such efforts autonomously. While the villages generally determined the actual content of such efforts, it was the cadre, as Party representative, who was responsible for seeing that the form which these developments took was in accordance with Party policy.

In essence, to use Friere's terminology in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the Chinese and Vietnamese villager, by the use of this approach, was able to become, at least in part, the subject of his own development, able to actively take part in the process of his own transformation. The Indian, Pakistani or Philippine villager, on the other hand, is generally made an object of development by hierarchical change agencies that seek to bring development to him without allowing him responsibility for determining the nature of that development. In reality, he is only given the choice of either accepting or rejecting it.

We will now turn to a comparative analysis of the two change agent roles as we have come to understand them.

Change Agents

This section looks at the nature of the two types of change roles studied and will ask what comparative strengths and weaknesses are revealed in each. We will first examine selected aspects of the nature of their roles: as outsider or local, engaged in individualist or collectivist approaches to their client systems, etc. Next we will examine the cadre and VLW as the "man-in-the-middle" between change agency and client system, and the ramifications on the operation of both. Following this is a brief look at the part that dedication and ideological commitment play in each case.

In researching the role of the change agent as a general type, the writer has consulted a number of works professing to offer a general treatment of the subject of change agents and the introduction of innovations. Some of these works have offered a certain number of observations that have general applicability for both cadres and VLW's. Nonetheless, it soon became evident that much of the information offered could apply only to change agents working in a hierarchically structured framework. This perspective is evident in works such as Lippitt, Watson and Wesley's The Dynamics of Planned Change, Roger's Communication of Innovations, and, to a lesser extent, Garth Jones' Planned Organizational Change. Works of this nature usually assume that the change agents will be "professionals" employed by change agencies, that they will be external to their client system, and that they will normally be better educated than those with whom they are working -- all common traits of the hierarchical or "elitist" change agent.

While such works may tell us a good deal about such change agents, they may be of little use to those interested in non-hierarchically structured change. However, as it is the author's intention to utilize relevant data rather than to criticize existing change agent literature, the chief concern here is to extract those parts of this literature which are applicable to both types of change agents.

Internal and External Change Agents

One of the more basic differences between village cadres and village level workers is that, wherever possible, people internal to the client system have been developed as change agents in the Chinese case, whereas village level workers are usually external to the client systems in which they work. In the Chinese case, this is quite in line with the internal to external concept of planned change in that it has been shown to be considerably more difficult for outsiders to bring about social or attitudinal changes in village society than it is for someone who is indigenous to that society. In like manner, it would appear logical for an external to internal change approach to utilize change agents that are external to the client system, although it is more difficult for this writer to establish a necessary connection between the two. Perhaps it lies in the fact that the VLW, in his role as a minor official, is expected to be "objective" in his work relations with his client system and it is assumed that change agents internal to the system cannot remain objective.

This writer, for lack of time, space, and resources, does not wish to enquire into all ramifications inherent in the use of either internal or external change agents in a village client system. At least some of these ramifications have been referred to previously in this thesis, or should be apparent from a study of the cadre and VLW training and work methods outlined in Chapters II and IV. However, a few of the more important aspects of the use of internal and external change agents will be noted here.[1]

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[1] One particularly comprehensive assessment of the VLW as external change agent can be found in (U.N. 1971, pp. 24-25).

The VLW as External Change Agent

The village level worker as external change agent is faced with a number of obstacles in fulfilling his mandate to bring about comprehensive development in "his" villages. Coming from the "outside," he frequently possesses an urban orientation and considers the village(s) a place to work, not a place to live. He does not occupy an internal position in the local power structure, and is an "unknown quantity" to the villagers. Hence he finds it difficult to gain their trust and acceptance in what he seeks to offer them. Because he is from outside, and normally better educated than most villagers, there is likely to be a wide social and cultural gap between himself and most, if not all, of the villagers. All of which makes it more difficult for him to understand and appreciate their circumstances.

Finally, because of bureaucratic demands on him, because of hierarchical distinctions between himself and the villagers, and perhaps because of his own image of himself as a "semi-bureaucrat", his functions in the villages may well be more administrative than innovative. In fact, his role as mini-bureaucrat is more likely to be responded to by a public steeped in the norms of a hierarchical system than is his role as innovator.[1] While the VLW may get some response from adopting this passive role as minor official, he is negating his role as change agent (i.e., one who introduces change) by accepting this other role.

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[1] This was the experience of this writer while living and working in one Indian village, and appears to be the case with most other Indian VLW's as well. Even as a "mini-bureaucrat," however, the VLW finds certain segments of the population approaching him more than others, as was noted previously.

The Cadre as Internal Change Agent

An internal change agent such as the Chinese cadre, finds himself in a position entirely different from that of the VLW. The cadre will generally be able to easily understand the customs, beliefs and orientations of those with whom he has spent most, if not all, of his life. However, his training as a cadre may lead him to reject certain aspects of village life, not as "simple" or "backward" (as do some VLW's) but as "feudal" or "reactionary." Being a local, he will normally be accepted by village people insofar as he does not resort to practices such as "commandism" or other actions which may alienate him from the people. Like the VLW, the new cadre, who is usually fairly young, does not occupy a position of influence in the local power structure. However, if he is able to win and retain the support of his fellow workers by being a helpful friend and energetic workmate, he is more likely to occupy a position in the power structure than is the VLW. Another advantage which the internal cadre seems to have over the VLW lies in the fact that village cadres are usually not so well educated or "worldly-wise" that a social or cultural gap exists between them and the rest of the people in the village. Also, because he is a Party man, not a government man, he does not have to assume a bureaucratic stance, as does the VLW.

On the other hand, because he is so internal a change agent, without professional status or salary, working at the same jobs as other villagers, etc., he frequently finds himself swamped with far more public commitments (meetings, discussion groups, etc.) than he can conveniently handle. These ceaseless demands on their time have apparently led a good number of cadres into becoming discouraged and increasingly apathetic or authoritarian in their work.

Perhaps the essence of the cadre role as an internal change agent is that, unlike the VLW, the cadre is not expected to act as a government official whose job it is to extend changes to the people, to offer new things. Rather, his role is as a leader whose responsibility it is to lead his own people in the process of changing themselves.

One further advantage which the cadre approach seems to have over the VLW approach in this instance is the cadre use of collectivist and group methods in contrast to the primarily individualist approach of the VLW's. It may well be that "internal" social or attitudinal changes can be more easily developed through the use of group and collective methods than can "external" technical improvements. While VLW's have been encouraged to use group methods wherever possible, relatively little has been done by the VLW's in this respect. But, as Taylor, et al. have noted: "The behavior of groups can be more easily manipulated than the behavior of individuals" (Taylor, et al., 1966, p.525). It stands to reason that many changes can be disseminated and accepted more quickly through the use of groups than by working with individuals. An advantage of such methods can be qualitative expansion of one's sense of consciousness and loyalty because of the individual member's commitments to cooperative endeavors. In the case of the NLF in Vietnam:

> For the ordinary people of the village, Front (NLF) control meant a gradual change in the patterns of daily life. Before the focus of life had been the family; now it was the hamlet and the village (Fitzgerald, 1972, p. 184).

The same phenomenon may be said to have occurred in China.

Change Agents as "Men-in-the-Middle"

Both the village level worker and the village cadre find themselves in positions of dual responsibility -- responsible, on the one hand, to the change agencies who have called upon them to assume their roles as change agents, and on the other hand, responsible to the client systems they are supposed to serve. In fact, very few change agents are not subject to this sort of contradiction between "control" and "democracy." The two approaches do, however, have somewhat different ways of dealing with this problem.

In the case of VLW's, the emphasis on "form," bureaucratic control, and top-to-bottom communication has generally caused the VLW to feel more responsible to the change agency than the client system. While it is not so clear cut in the case of Chinese village cadres, there does seem to be some indication that the reverse may be true. Despite their Party training, often they are more committed to their client system than the change agency (the Party). There are a number of good reasons for this: 1) being internal change agents, cadres have been raised with a feeling of loyalty for their village, members of their own clan, etc. -- commitment to the Party cannot always override this; 2) cadres have generally been given a good deal of flexibility (particularly with regard to applying the content of Party programs, if not the form) in exercising their roles as leaders in the belief that conditions vary from area to area and Party policy must not be applied too rigidly at the risk of alienating the peasantry; and 3) it is more difficult to monitor behavior than it is technical improvements.

Dedication and Commitment

> Community development involves human development as well (as technical expertise). When we ask the farmer to use new fertilizers, to attend literacy classes, to elect the leaders of the local council, to participate in the decision-making processes of local government, and to learn to guide and control the development bureaucracy, we are asking for a series of changes in his attitudes toward individuals and toward problems. This involves a revolution not easy to start merely through legislative enactments, appointments of Civil servants, and purchase of office equipment. It has to be led by inspiring individuals who are themselves inspired by the ideals of the movements (Valsan, 1970, p. 384).

An inspired (and inspiring) leadership is generally an ideologically committed leadership. In the twentieth century world of development programs, projects and social movements, this ideological commitment commonly takes the form of a vision of the society to be developed, together with some idea of how this goal may be reached. Together these two might be termed a "myth of development." The validity of any myth is perhaps not so important as the existence of the myth itself, for having created a vision for themselves, men will then set about creating a world to conform with that vision. Where the vision is lacking, however, there is little to inspire the leadership and little to inspire the people as well. "We are moving, but how, where and why?"

The Myth and the VLW

There is a good deal of evidence indicating that village level workers in India and elsewhere presented a picture of motivated rather than inspired leadership during the beginning phases of the community development programs in their countries. The vision of the "world-to-be" was none too clear perhaps, but a few things were clear -- it would be a world of increase, with people having more than they had then -- more to eat, more to wear, more to be happy about, more to consume. And the village level worker, as a servant of the people, would help bring these things to them by working with the farmers and others to bring a better life to all.

Unfortunately, this myth began to falter and break down before very long. As observed previously, the training VLW's received and the conditions they found "in the field" were quite different. The bureaucracy stifled them and limited their effectiveness, while those who most needed their assistance seemed least interested and those who were better placed and better off seemed to be benefiting most from what they had to offer. It is, perhaps, not surprising under these circumstances, that the VLW lost much of his enthusiasm and dedication in a short while. The myth was not confirming itself. Everyone was not getting more of what they wanted or needed and the VLW seemed incapable of helping many of them in that way. Enthusiasm among the people waned as well when the myth began fading, and cooperative endeavors such as village self-help schemes found fewer and fewer people willing to contribute to them. By the 1970's, the bankruptcy of that myth was clearly evident.

The Myth and the Cadre

The Chinese cadre, on the other hand, is subject to quite a different myth. While the vision of the coming world-to-be has purposely only been outlined by the Party leadership and Party theoreticians,[1] the essential features are there for all to see -- a classless, communal society, with no distinctions between peasants and workers, etc. More important than the goal, however, are the clear, unequivocal statements of how this society is to be achieved -- overcoming class contradictions by means of the dialectic, etc.

Another important ingredient in this myth is the idea of the historical role of Communism and its ultimate world-wide victory. Douglas Hyde, himself an active Communist journalist for twenty years before he "saw the light" and became a Catholic, writes perceptively of the force of this idea:

> Marx concluded his Communist Manifesto with the words 'You have a world to win.' Here is a tremendous aim. In material terms, one could hardly aim higher. The belief that the world is there to be won and that Communists can win it is firmly implanted in the mind of every Communist cadre. It is with him all the time. He has a clear goal. He knows what he is working for. And it is something which he believes is capable of realization (Hyde, 1966, p. 31).

Hyde further asserts that the most distinguishing characteristic common to members of the Communist Party everywhere is not, as some would aver, their "ability to hate." Rather it is:

> . . . their idealism, their zeal, dedication, devotion to their cause and willingness to sacrifice. This characterizes

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[1] This, in fact, is true with almost all Communist theoreticians, from Marx to the present day. Painting too specific a picture of the world-to-be could have the effect of severely limiting future options available to the Party.

> the Communists wherever Communism has still to come to power and is obviously true of many in the very different circumstances where it now rules (Hyde, 1966, p. 16).

But, says Hyde, of all these characteristics, perhaps the most important, at least for "getting things done," is a "willingness to sacrifice."

> The Communists' appeal to idealism is direct and audacious. They say that if you make mean little demands upon people, you will get a mean little response which is all you deserve, but, if you make big demands on them, you will get an heroic response. They prove in practice that this is so, over and over again. They work on the assumption that if you call for big sacrifices people will respond to this and, moreover, the relatively smaller sacrifices will come quite naturally (Hyde, 1966, p. 18).[1]

"Success-Failure" and "Trial and Error"

Another important aspect of the two development myths being analyzed has a major impact on either building or destroying the morale and sense of commitment of the village level change agent. This is the perspective that is taken towards the outcome of any particular effort at development. Because of the piecemeal nature of most hierarchically structured change agencies, many development initiatives take the form of "projects" covering a certain time span (usually from a few months to several years) and characterized by a "success-failure" orientation towards the outcome of the project. A project will ordinarily be termed a "success" if it achieves most or all of its objectives, a partial "success" if some of its objectives are achieved, and a "failure" if few or none are achieved. In any case, there is an air of finality about these designations. If a project is labelled a failure, its effect on the morale of those change agents who took part in it can be devastating. It is also common knowledge among those involved in planned change efforts that, once a project is seen by the client system as having failed, it is substantially more difficult to secure their enthusiasm and cooperation in new initiatives.

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[1] Hyde cites one illuminating example of willingness to sacrifice coupled with the "world-to-win" philosophy which has not only served to inspire cadres, but peasants in revolution as well. Hyde quotes one Vietnamese resident in Hong Kong who had fought with the Communists at Dien Bien-Phu. The man describes the briefing they were given before going into battle:

> "You will almost certainly die. Already, even to get within gun range, you have to clamber and slither over men's rotting bodies, the bodies of your own comrades. The probability is that you will die, just as they have done. If you do, you will not just be dying in the fight against French colonialism. You will not just be dying for suffering oppressed humanity all over the world. Your death will help to make the world a better place" (Hyde, 1966, pp. 149-150).

The Communist Chinese approach differs quite considerably from the "success-failure" orientation. On the surface the "mass movement" in China may seem to resemble the "development project" in certain respects. However, Chinese style mass movements, perhaps partially because they generally deal more with "consciousness raising" than with technological innovations, are not so subject to time-tables and evaluation in terms of material achievement. This, coupled with the vision of a continuous movement towards Communism, gives cadre initiatives a more "trial and error" perspective than a "success-failure" perspective. This outlook is exemplified in a statement taken from Mao's "On Practice":

> If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by 'failure is the mother of success' and 'a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit' (Mao, 1968, p. 3).

Because a failure is treated as a lesson for future action, such failures rarely carry the air of finality that a project failure does for hierarchical change agents. Also, insofar as the client system accepts this rationale, they too will not suffer a loss of morale such as to cause them to lose interest in future initiatives. It is, however, very difficult to assess the extent to which this sort of perspective has permeated the masses in China.

Salaries and Morale

While remuneration for services has been shown to be only one factor, and often a minor one, influencing the morale of workers, it is nonetheless a factor which must be taken into consideration.

In the case of Indian VLW's, morale cannot be said to be improved much, if any, by the salaries they receive. They are amongst the lowest paid government servants and average about Rs.100 per month. With reference to VLW's in one C.D. block in Kerala, Valsan notes that all VLW's in the block were high school graduates and were paid salaries comparable to other high school graduates in government service. However, "most of them seemed to be dissatisfied with their work and pay" (Valsan, 1970, p. 93).

A different situation exists in China, where cadres are paid little, if anything, extra for their work as a cadre per se. This, too, appears to have an effect on cadre morale, as well as an influence on possible new recruits. It seems to be a source of some frustration to older cadres that continuing demands are made upon their time, while they receive little financial reward for their efforts. It also encourages a dearth of new high quality cadre recruits, a problem which has plagued the Party for some years.

Thus we see that salaries are to some extent a problem causing some lowering of morale among both village level workers and cadres. It should be noted, however, that this is a problem more easily overcome in an egalitarian-oriented society which deemphasizes monetary incentives than in a hierarchical society which stresses them.

Self-Evaluation Systems

Because "feedback" forms an important part of any carefully constructed approach to planned change, this section will briefly examine the evaluative mechanisms used by both types of change agents and change agencies. In order to effectively evaluate any ongoing planned change program, evaluations should be continuously occurring, not simply within the change agency itself, but among change agents and within client systems. The two approaches we are analyzing, however, have established two quite different sets of evaluative-corrective mechanisms.

VLW Evaluative Mechanisms

One form of evaluation, in the case of those change agencies using village level workers, is through the use of "study teams" composed of experts and authorities, as well as single experts, either from within the country or outside it. These teams are asked to assess and criticize some aspect of the change agency or its programs. This mechanism is quite in line with the general proclivities that most hierarchical systems have for the use of "experts" or "authorities" for other evaluative functions. It also illustrates another important aspect of hierarchical planned change systems. That is, because bottom-to-top communication tends to be poor and frequently limited to numerical listings ("3,000 people were vaccinated, two miles of new road was constructed," etc.), such experts and study teams are often used by higher administrators to "tell us what's happening down there."[1]

India's Community Development Program and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan and the Philippines, have made extensive use of such teams. The fate of the recommendations of such experts is usually fairly predictable: if the expert's recommendations fit with the change agency's previously established priorities and if they do not threaten to drastically alter the change agency or client system status quo and the position of the elites within them, the recommendations may be implemented. If, on the other hand, the expert's recommendations threaten to alter priorities or the positions of members of the ruling classes, such recommendations will hardly ever be implemented, unless outside political pressure (or something akin to it) necessitates it. In addition, some change agencies are willing to allow additions to their ongoing programs, but reject anything resembling structural change within the programs themselves. India's Panchayati Raj initiative, attached to its Community Development Program since 1959, is an example of one such additive.

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[1] One example of this hiatus is illustrated in the conclusion of S.C. Dube's article "Communication, Innovation and Planned Change in India":

> "An effective strategy for reaching the rural masses cannot be developed because so little is known about reference groups, opinion leaders, and decision makers in the village communities. . . . In the absence of this data the policy maker has had to proceed largely on hunch and intuition" (Dube, 1967, p. 167).

Cadre Evaluative Mechanisms

Reports - The Chinese approach, as one would expect, is markedly different, and has at least one advantage over the hierarchical evaluative approach in that those higher up in Party and government appear to be more responsive to "impulses from below." In accordance with Mass Line philosophy, literally thousands of reports and local case studies are produced each month by basic cadres and sent upwards to higher Party and government functionaries. These reports permeate practically all levels of Party and government, with a good number being printed in local or national newspapers as examples of "proper" development or "misdirected" development. The reports are then taken into consideration in the business of Party and government policy formation and can also affect the nature and focus of the various movements that are continually being introduced among the masses.[1]

Representative Institutions - Another interesting contrast in feedback mechanisms is the use of representative institutions as such mechanisms. Hierarchical systems generally tend to place a good bit of emphasis on such representative institutions, be they local or village councils, senates or parliaments, not only as policy making bodies, but also as feedback mechanisms for the general population.

While the Chinese system includes such institutions, the Mass Line philosophy tends to reject a very heavy reliance on them in favour of the development of more "organic" forms of feedback.[2] This, too, is in line with the Chinese emphasis on egalitarianism in its social institutions. Peasants and workers are encouraged to present their problems directly to government and Party higher-ups. Furthermore, administrators and bureaucrats, particularly since the Cultural Revolution, have been encouraged, if not obliged, to spend a certain amount of time each year working in the villages or factories. James Townsend comments on this preference of organic contact over institutional representation:

> It reflects an even stronger theoretical conviction that the mass line and 'socialist democracy' depend on an organic,

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[1] A fairly informative analysis of these movements is given by Frederick T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communication and Development in Communist China" in (Lerner and Schramm, 1967, pp. 195-215).

[2] One academic on tour in China during April of 1974 found, for instance, that some of the Revolutionary Committees elected for the first time in 1968 to manage various industries and communes had not stood again for election since that time (Personal communication with Dr. A.K. Davis, May, 1974).

> intuitive relationship between cadres and masses rather than on institutional and legal controls. Two important aspects of this relationship are an emphasis on direct contacts between cadres and masses, and an insistance on the moral quality of C.C.P. leadership (Townsend, 1967, p. 176).

The extent to which this approach allows for truly popular control or popular influence in decision-making is difficult to assess, at least as difficult as it is in the case of Western-style representative institutions.

Personal evaluations - An additional evaluative mechanism found among cadres is the use of personal and interpersonal evaluation among cadres. As previously noted, one common form which this takes is the use of on-the-spot criticism and self-criticism sessions which are a fairly common occurrence among cadres.

In addition to such group-based forms of evaluation, one type of intra-personal evaluative mechanism has been widely disseminated by the Party, not only among cadres, but also among the masses. Based on the dialectic, and first expressed in Mao's "On Practice," it calls for a continual movement from theory to action, then back to theory, ad infinitum, and finds its Western equivalent in Paulo Friere's concept of "Praxis" (i.e., action followed by reflection, then action again).[1]

In practice, the basis for theory, reflection, or consciousness is often taken from among many of Chairman Mao's general statements.

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[1] "Often correct knowledge can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice" (Mao, quoted in Serving the People with Dialectics, 1972, p. 24).

This process can, and apparently has, been applied to everything from cadre village work to the building of dams. Magazines such as China Reconstructs and Peking Review frequently have articles illustrating this process in action.

Summary

In this chapter we have made a series of comparisons between village level workers and village cadres. The two have been compared in terms of their contrasting orientations towards change and development (piecemeal improvements contrasted to revolutionary transformation, as well as external to internal and internal to external approaches). They have also been contrasted with respect to emphasis on form or content, goal determination by change agencies and client systems.

With respect to the change agents themselves, contrasts were made between the use of people internal and external to the client systems, change agents as "men in the middle," the problem of dedication and commitment and the importance of a strong "myth of development" to sustain that sense of commitment. The author has also looked at other aspects of the two approaches, such as the "success-failure" and "trial and error" methods of assessing change, the question of salaries and morale, and a comparison of the self-evaluative systems of the two approaches.

It is now time to make concluding judgments on the two approaches and what each has to recommend as a method of change and development.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Two Modernizing Systems Face to Face

Two different types of change agents, for the most part in two different countries (India and China) have been compared in this thesis. However, the implications of these comparisons are of a considerably broader scope than a simple comparison of two types of change agents. In effect, at least in some measure, we have brought two modernizing systems together and asked: What does each system say about itself and the other?

In one respect, the two systems (and the change agents that represent them) exemplify two quite different forms of material development. While it would be difficult to state that either China or India has demonstrated significantly higher production increases in a long-term perspective,[1] it is quite apparent that the sources of such increases, as well as their distribution, differ markedly in the two cases. In India, the largest proportion of the country's wealth is produced by and for perhaps twenty per cent of the people, whereas in China this figure is close to one hundred per cent.

If, however, one assesses the two systems from a Marxist perspective, or if one accepts Paulo Freire's perspective in this case, it would be necessary to assert that the most fundamental difference between the two lies not only in the realm of material development, but perhaps most importantly, in the creation of two different modes of consciousness. In Marxist terms, these two modes of consciousness are "class consciousness" and "socialist consciousness." In Freire's terms, these two modes are called "oppressor-oppressed" consciousness and "critical" or "liberated" consciousness.

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[1] See, for example, Pranab Bardhan, "Recent Developments in Chinese and Indian Agriculture" (Chen and Uppal, 1971, pp. 44-58).

While the two sets of terms, Marxist and Freireian, cannot be said to be precisely equivalent, they are similar enough for us to be able to say that both sets describe essentially the same frames of mind. Freire goes to considerable length to prove to us that class-based societies do in fact foster oppressor-oppressed relations and states of mind among their various members.[1] Such relations and states of mind predominate in all class-based societies, developed or underdeveloped. However, the delineation of such relationships may be difficult in more developed areas where, to quote Denis Goulet in his introduction to Freire's Education for Critical Consciousness, "the psychic boundaries between oppressors and oppressed. . .are so fuzzy" (Freire, 1973, p. x).

On the other hand, can a "socialist consciousness" or a "liberated, critical consciousness" be said to exist in a country such as China? Mao Tse-tung would be the last person to affirm that a deep socialist consciousness exists today throughout China. If it did, then there would have been no reason for him to purposely initiate the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for instance, nor to state that it may be necessary for China to experience continuing cultural revolutions "every fifteen to twenty years." Most China scholars agree, however, that there is at least a veneer of "socialist consciousness" present in the Chinese masses today.

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[1] If the reader wishes to enquire further into the nature of oppressor and oppressed levels of consciousness, it is suggested that he/she read Chapter 1 of Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

Does one find a "critical" or "liberated" consciousness manifesting itself as well? To this Freire would probably reply that it is to the extent that a genuine dialogue exists between the people and their leadership and among the people themselves, enabling them to operate as subjects creating and participating in their own development.[1] And our evidence would indicate that China is closer to achieving this ideal than perhaps any other country in the world today.

A Sense of Direction

India, like many other countries with hierarchical, piecemeal modernization systems, has been afflicted with a hazy, uncoordinated sense of direction in its overall development program:

> . . .the country is still searching for an identity and has not yet been able to evolve a consensus on what it ultimately wants to be. There is a mounting desire for attaining increasingly higher standards of life, but the ultimate social and cultural goals still remain somewhat hazy (Dube, 1967, p. 166).

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[1] As we have seen in the Chinese case, the creation of this dialogue has probably been the basic cadre's most important contribution to the Revolution.

The Marxist interpretation for the cause of this lack of direction is that such modernizing systems "lack theory."[1] It is apparent, on the other hand, that countries such as China have no problem with lack of theory or vision, hence their sense of direction is quite clear as well. What does tend to cause disharmony or uncertainty of direction, however, are the occasional major policy shifts calling upon the populace to foreswear one political line for allegiance to another.[2]

The Achievement of Objectives

Has either system achieved the objectives it has set out for its change agents and itself? As has been amply illustrated, both village level workers and cadres have had major impacts upon the course of rural development in all the countries examined. In the case of village level workers, however, we have observed that the major effects of their work have not conformed to the objective of improving living conditions of all the people. Rather, they have resulted in improving the lot of the wealthiest ten to twenty per cent of the village populations. In part because it has failed to achieve its original objectives, support and enthusiasm for VLW-type community development programs is waning in countries like India at the present time. One of the major reasons for this failure lies in the hierarchical structure of both the change agency and the client system, a structure which protects and supports the wealthy and powerful of the country.

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[1] ". . .vulgar, 'practical men' respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long range perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley (Mao, 1968, p. 13).

[2] The "Hundred Flowers" movement followed by the Anti-Rightist movement during 1956-57, and the Cultural Revolution led by, among others, Lin Piao, followed by the current anti- Confucious, anti-Lin Piao movement in 1974.

The use of cadres as change agents appears to have achieved its objectives to a considerable extent despite numerous problems and limitations. While village cadres experience "man-in-the-middle" problems as do VLW's, they are not so subject to hierarchical problems and this in itself enables them to be more effective in their work with the people. In addition, the periodic use of mass movements in China has the effect of advancing the consciousness and enthusiasm of both the cadres and the masses.[1]

The Applicability of Cadre Methods for VLW's

Our examination of cadres and VLW's has revealed that, weighed in the balance, the cadre approach in general may be said to recommend itself more than the VLW approach. Given this conclusion, the evolutionary-oriented change agent theorist may quite legitimately ask whether certain aspects of the cadre approach can find application in a non-Communist context, or whether it is possible to develop something like a synthesis of the two approaches. Let us take these two inquiries one at a time.

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[1] A personal communication with Dr. Paul Lin, China scholar with considerable experience travelling and working in China, affirms that, in his view, the people have not lost a great deal of interest in the mass movements because each new movement tends to touch on a different aspect of the life and thought of the people (Paul Lin, personal communication, March, 1974).

First, can certain aspects of the cadre approach be applied by a hierarchically-oriented change agency in order to achieve its own ends? One case of this having been attempted was in the "pacification" or counter-insurgency programs in both Vietnam and Algeria. One writer, sympathetic to the American cause in Vietnam, has written the following description of the counter-insurgency teams in South Vietnam:

> As originally devised by a small group of Americans, these armed teams were formed of volunteers from local militia units, given a few weeks training and then assigned in platoons to villages with several functions ranging from civic action to ferreting out Viet Cong underground organs and marking their members for what has been reported as 'political assassination' in some cases. Their training has emphasized the 'Four Essential Points' ('respect the people, help the people, protect the people, and follow orders') and the 'Eight Rules' governing relations with the people inspired by Mao Tse-tung's 'Eight Points of Attention' though not identified as such ('speak politely, pay the correct price for anything you buy, return anything you damage, don't bully the people, don't damage the crops, don't violate the women, and treat captives decently'). These units even use the Viet Cong system of criticism and self-criticism of themselves in daily meetings . . . (Donnell, 1968, p. 374).

This sort of American-inspired initiative was doomed to failure. Perhaps the chief reason for this is explained by Eqbal Ahmad, who himself witnessed similar counter-insurgency measures in Algeria during the 1950's:

> It has been widely noted by observers that despite its rhetoric of winning the hearts and minds of the people through progress and participation, counterinsurgency often culminates in massive crimes against the population. One of the reasons for it is that counterinsurgents' myths are totally contrived and, lacking a basis in popular perceptions, fail to elicit a favorable response. The unresponsive masses then become objects of systematic reprisals (Ahmad, 1971, pp. 191-192).

Hypothetically, it may be possible to isolate or extract certain cadre strategies or tactics and use them in a different context. But programs utilizing significant portions of the cadre approach will probably be doomed to failure, or will reap results in no way similar to the Chinese case unless they are seriously committed to an ideology which is similar to the movement which originated the strategy. Does this mean that only Communist countries can apply the Chinese cadre approach? Not necessarily. One non-Communist country which would appear to be creating conditions whereby it might successfully apply the cadre approach is Tanzania.

Tanzania and the Cadre Approach

Tanzania is an African nation which has rejected Marxist theory as a basis for development but has firmly dedicated itself to a socialist-collectivist pattern of development and a parliamentary form of government. Tanzania's ruling political party TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) is quite militant and very well organized, with party branches working actively throughout the country.[1]

Tanzania, like most former colonial territories, inherited a legacy of hierarchically structured government agencies, together with an incipient capitalist system of production. In spite of this, its efforts since independence in 1961 have been towards limiting administrative hierarchies and suppressing capitalist structures while replacing them with socialist structures. At least some government and party consideration has already been given to the possibility of developing Chinese-style cadres in Tanzania. The former Deputy Secretary-General of the TANU Youth League, for example, has given the following assessment of their possible effectiveness in a Tanzanian context:

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[1] "It can be argued. . .that TANU is the most effective political party in all of independent Africa" (Saul, 1973, p. 304).

> . . .the success or failure of the socialist cadres at the grassroots level will largely depend on our ability to provide their counterparts at various levels above. This is for the obvious reason that however good, hard-working and dedicated the lower cadres may be, they will inevitably be frustrated (by) the crushing weight and immobility of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie above. In general terms, it might be said that cadres require a right organizational framework within which to operate effectively (and that) such a framework does not exist at the moment. Without it cadres will simply be absorbed into the established system, and sandwiched in various layers of bureaucratic hierarchy they will be neutralized and rendered harmless. It would follow, therefore, that the whole proposal presupposes also the necessity of party reorganization to provide such a framework, The overhauling of the party machinery and radical changes in methods of work could provide a basis for creating a vanguard within a mass party (Kisenge quoted in Saul, 1973, p. 306).

What of other developing countries? Is it not possible for them to consider the use of the cadre approach? A further examination of the Tanzanian situation may answer these questions. The village cadre, as we have come to understand him, is clearly a socialist phenomenon. Tanzania today is the most militantly socialist state in Africa, and one of the most seriously socialist, non-Communist states of all developing states. John Saul outlines a few of Tanzania's more important achievements in this regard:

> . . .in terms of obtaining national control over surpluses and cutting the links of dependency, in terms of stemming

> the crystallization of reactionary privilege and power and providing the conscious and effective base for a further articulation of progressive political policies, in terms of generating the cultural and ideological weapons necessary for resisting imperialist hegemony and underpinning such policies, significant breakthroughs have been made (Saul, 1973, p. 239).

All of this has, in large measure, proved possible because Tanzania's colonial legacy was such a "weak" one in comparison with most other African countries. Tanganyika, prior to independence, was one of Africa's poorest countries, "least transformed by international capitalism" and possessing a very small, weak, and unentrenched administrative and business elite. Hence, Tanzania has not experienced the difficulties in shifting from hierarchical to egalitarian structures which most other developing countries would experience, if they tried. And it appears unlikely that the ruling government and business elites in most developing countries are presently willing to allow any form of egalitarian structure strong enough to threaten their hegemony.[1]

It would, for instance, prove exceedingly difficult to create the preconditions for the use of a cadre-type approach in India, given the resistance of its present heavily entrenched landholding and bureaucratic elites and their ability to resist and undermine almost any reform intended to benefit the poor majority of the rural population. Sharma, for example, in his carefully documented study on the economic origins of the Green Revolution, points out how India's landholding elites not only successfully resisted the various land reform and land ceiling legislation passed by the government during the 1950's, but in many cases actually benefited from it.[1]

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[1] . . .as Andre Gunder Frank and others have argued, the further these processes (started by the colonial legacy) have gone, the more difficult it can be to get back to a starting point where the most rational exploitation of the countries potentialities remains a live option" (Saul, 1973, p. 256).

There are few, if any, cases on record in which a well-entrenched ruling elite willingly allowed itself to be deprived of much of its power and influence without a fight. The history of Chile since 1970 is a vivid example of just this. Under these conditions, only an intense and well directed popular reform movement, or a violent revolution, seem adequate for providing the preconditions necessary for the emergence of a cadre-type approach in hierarchically structured developing societies.

A Synthesis?

What of the possibility of synthesizing the VLW and cadre approaches, creating a new sort of VLW that could effectively serve the interests of both the wealthier and poorer classes? It is necessary to recognize that there are, in fact, certain other types of change agents, operating in hierarhcically structured countries, which seem to occupy a middle ground between the orientation and approach of the cadre and the VLW. One example of this type of change agent is the social animateur, the change agent of animation sociale, which has been used in both former French West Africa and Canada's Province of Quebec.

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[1] ". . .rural India has undergone major structural and institutional changes over the past two decades. These changes have brought to the surface a stratum of Indian agriculturalists who are much more secure in terms of legal rights in their vast landholdings, much more articulated - economically and politically - vis a vis the wider society, and much less committed to village-based norms of reciprocity and interdependence than were their predecessors of twenty years ago."

And with regard to "the weaker sections of the Indian peasantry":

> ". . .their conditions were bad enough twenty years ago; over time they have become worse, both absolutely and relatively. In 1960-61, 38.03% of all rural households. . . lived below the extreme poverty line based upon a very conservative estimate of a minimum of Rs.15 per capita per month in consumption expenditure (1960-61 prices). The percentage rose to 44.57 in 1964-65 and to 53.02 in 1967-68" (Sharma, 1973, pp.93-94).

Animation sociale, like the Chinese cadre approach, places a strong emphasis upon the use of internally recruited paraprofessionals who work with local groups in an effort to generate popular participation in local development. Unlike cadres, however, social animateurs do not operate as part of a political party and are not ordinarily expected to become work leaders and "standard bearers" within their client system. Animation sociale change agencies may or may not be strongly hierarchically structured (the West African animation sociale structures are considerably more hierarchically-based than is Quebec's Conseil des Oeuvres de Montreal, for example). Moreover, animation sociale is dependent upon government, if not for actual funding, then for permission to operate.

> This desire (of animation sociale projects) for self-determination through the introduction of a rational approach to action requires a willingness on the part of the government to plan, that is, to exercise control and introduce rationality into the socio-economic changes that are taking place, plus the desire to involve as many people as possible in the planning (Blondin, 1970, p. 402).

Because of this dependence on a hierarchically structured government, animation sociale projects will ordinarily be encouraged insofar as they serve the interests of the ruling elites, tolerated insofar as they do not openly oppose these elites, and suppressed or co-opted insofar as they threaten to displace the positions of privilege and power which these elites have managed to garner for themselves. It seems that it is very difficult for the poor to improve their own lot without offending the rich.

Is it possible, then, to create a synthesis between the VLW and cadre approaches as we have come to understand them? It is possible, perhaps, in a strictly material sense. However, the question we must ask ourselves is: whose interests will this change agent actually serve? As we have amply documented, the village level worker chiefly serves the interests of the wealthier ten to twenty per cent of the rural population. In other words, they serve the interests of the elites. The cadre, on the other hand, has chiefly served the interests of the poor majority. The evolutionary theorist may well ask: "Is it not possible to serve the interests of both groups?" Our analysis from two countries, China and India, would indicate that, among developing countries today, it is not possible. Repeatedly, the wealthier classes (and countries) have improved their positions only at the expense of the poorer majorities. We are witnessing the progression, not of an *evolutionary* reality, but of a *dialectical* one. As Paulo Freire has observed:

> The more human world to which they (the oppressed) justly aspire, however, is the antithesis of the 'human world' of

> the oppressors - a world which is the exclusive possession of the oppressors, who preach an impossible harmony between themselves (who dehumanize) and the oppressed (who are dehumanized). Since oppressors and the oppressed are antithetical, what serves the interest of one group, disserves the interests of the others (Freire, 1972, p. 142).

Consequently, in the end no man can serve two masters. If a change agent in a hierarchical system, be he VLW, cadre, or something in between, wishes to serve the people, he must be prepared to do battle with the ruling class. And if he chooses to serve the ruling class, he must be prepared to do battle with the people.

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